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ABSTRACT 
This thesis demonstrates how Augustine’s concepts of good and evil opened up certain 
conceptual possibilities that Descartes, Kant and Schelling later developed through 
their own metaphysical systems: more precisely, its contention is that Descartes, Kant 
and Schelling adhere, directly or indirectly, to Augustine’s model for ontology by 
rendering being absolutely Good, so as to repress evil as a mere privation, fault, or 
absence. After the introduction, the first chapter examines how Augustine’s rationalist 
demonstration for the benevolent God’s existence as being’s highest totalization 
permits him to develop a theodicy according to which evil is the epiphenomenal 
privation of the Good rooted in the misuse of our free will. At the same time, we shall 
see that Augustine’s late doctrine of predestination inadvertently threatens his 
ontologization of the Good, insofar as it re-envisions God as bringing evil into being 
as a co-eternal principle alongside the Good by gratuitously condemning some to 
eternal damnation. The second chapter corrects the typical portrayal of Descartes as 
having broken with medieval, Christian philosophy by showing how Descartes only 
really breaks with scholastic Thomism so as to return to Augustine’s even more ancient 
rationalism. Descartes thus translates Augustine’s ontological argument against the 
sceptics into his innate ideas of the cogito and the perfect God, as well as Augustine’s 
theodicy into his epistemological account of error’s privation of what truly is. 
Ultimately, we shall see that Descartes is even, as it were, “too Augustinian for his own 
good” when he reconstructs the problematic predestinarian doctrine through his late 
occasionalism. In the third chapter, I show that, while Kant’s first Kritik is deeply 
sceptical about ontological arguments, his second Kritik recapitulates Augustine’s 
 
 
ontologization of the Good by demonstrating through other, critical means that our 
moral behaviour operates in such a way as if we have a free and immortal soul created 
by a benevolent Creator. As per Augustine, Kant thus holds that evil can only result 
from our freedom to deviate from the law of the highest, divine Good, even as he also 
recognizes an even more radical evil as the will’s anterior condition. The final chapter 
shows how the young Schelling attempts to resolve Augustinian theodicy’s 
shortcomings by ontologizing being as always already free, and hence evil. In the final 
analysis, however, even Schelling eventually reaffirms an absolute spirit of pure 
Positivity beyond evil’s negative dialectic to account for the inverse problem of how 
the Good can emerge out of the dark ground of being.  
By tracing how three canonical philosophers extrapolate Augustine’s chief thought-
structure, which conflates being with the Good to the detriment of evil as privation, this 
thesis hopes to show that Augustine’s legacy on the history of Western metaphysics 
has perhaps been insufficiently registered in much scholarship. This is a hypothesis that 
could be tested further by putting Augustine in dialogue with other thinkers, although 
this task is evidently beyond this thesis’ scope.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis demonstrates how Augustine’s concepts of good and evil opened up certain 
conceptual possibilities that Descartes, Kant and Schelling later developed through 
their own metaphysical systems. More precisely, my contention is that Descartes, Kant 
and Schelling adhere, directly or indirectly, to Augustine’s model of ontology by 
rendering being absolutely Good, so as to repress evil as a mere privation, fault, or 
absence. By tracing how three canonical philosophers extrapolate Augustine’s chief 
thought-structure which conflates being with the Good to the detriment of evil as 
privation, I will show that Augustine’s immense legacy on the history of Western 
metaphysics has perhaps been insufficiently registered in much scholarship. This is a 
hypothesis that could be tested by putting Augustine in dialogue with other thinkers, 
although this task is evidently beyond this thesis’ scope.  
1.1. THE ONTOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF AUGUSTINE’S CONCEPTS OF 
GOOD AND EVIL  
I follow Aristotle in defining metaphysics, what is later known as first philosophy or 
ontology, as the study of being qua being.1 Metaphysics’ unique task is to uncover the 
concept that is capable of accounting for everything that is by way of a single, general 
structure, entity, force, principle, cause, or being, which is mutually shared by the 
multiplicity of individuated things. Using Descartes, Kant and Schelling as examples, 
this thesis will argue that a large strand of the history of Western metaphysics is 
                                                     
1 See, for instance, Aristotle, “Book Zeta,” in Metaphysics, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin, 1998), 
201. 
 
 
2 
indebted to Augustine in the precise sense that it conceives of being as wholly Good, 
and hence of evil as a privation without any ontological status of its own, apart from 
the Good which it corrupts.  
Certainly, there are Platonic precedents upon which Augustine draws to demonstrate 
that being is absolutely Good.2 But, although Plato and Plotinus develop an Idea of the 
Good, they give much less regard to extrapolating the inverse notion of evil except as 
a secondary implication of their notion of the Good.3 So, while Augustine is indebted 
to the Platonists’ concept of the Good, he goes into greater detail about the 
consequences for evil as a privation. More precisely, Augustine invented the concept 
of the will (voluntas) as the source of evil’s privation of the Good when we freely 
choose to negate it. In The Theory of Will in Classic Antiquity, Albrecht Dihle argues 
that ancient philosophy, from Plato to the Stoics, only saw humans as needing to 
rationally understand the universe’s harmonious order to act in accord with the Good 
without any intervention from what Augustine would call the “will”: “free will does 
not exist in its own right as it does according to St. Augustine’s anthropology. It 
depends on man’s alleged potential ability to reach an adequate understanding of reality 
by his own intellectual effort.”4 On Dihle’s account, the concept of the will only arises 
                                                     
2 See, for instance, Plato, “Book 7,” in The Republic, in Complete Works, eds. John M. Cooper and D.S.  Hutchinson, 
trans. G. M. A. Grube and C. D. C. Reeve (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), particularly 1128-
1134. 
3 There are certainly scattered references in Plato and lengthy discussions in Plotinus of evil as both a punishment, 
a failure to participate in the Good, and even a moral choice. See C.M. Chilcott, “The Platonic Theory of Evil,” The 
Classical Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1923), 27-31; and Denis O’Brien, “Plotinus on Matter and Evil,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Plotinus, ed. Llyod P. Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 171-195. Ultimately, 
Platonism’s approaches to evil are incidental to this thesis except insofar as they influenced Augustine’s rigorous 
account of evil, at which point it will be addressed in Chapter 2, § 2.2. and § 2.3. 
4 Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity (London: University of California Press, 1982), 45-6. 
For other accounts of Augustine as the inventor of the will against the Greeks’ reduction of willing to knowing, see 
James Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 2; and Simon 
Harrison, Augustine’s Way into the Will: The Theological and Philosophical Significance of De Libero Arbitrio 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), vi. 
 
 
3 
at the advent of Christian philosophy to respond to the problem of how we are to 
account for evil in a world created by a benevolent creator: “how is one to reconcile 
the belief in the goodness of the Creator who governs everything according to his 
omniscience and omnipotence […] with the existence of both moral and physical 
evil?”5 To address this problem of evil, Dihle contends that Augustine invented the 
idea of our freedom to negate the Good of being. Here, Dihle recapitulates a common 
reading of Augustine as introducing the concept of voluntas: “it is generally accepted 
in the study of the history of philosophy that the notion of the history of will […] was 
invented by St. Augustine.”6 According to this widespread consensus, it is Augustine 
who first develops a theodicy by drawing upon the notion of free will to account for 
evil in a world created by a benevolent God.  
If I therefore seek to characterize Descartes, Kant and Schelling as inheriting an 
Augustinian conceptual paradigm rather than as footnotes to Plato, it is because they 
recapitulate both Augustine’s Platonic concept of the Good and his innovative theodicy 
of privative evil.7 So, this thesis’ original contribution will be to show how Augustine’s 
understanding of the Good as supreme existence, and hence evil as a pure negativity, 
are appropriated—be it explicitly, implicitly, unconsciously, or through mediators—
by modern philosophers as distinct as Descartes, Kant and Schelling, and in a way 
                                                     
5 Dihle, Will, 99. For another account of how Augustine introduces the notion of will as an explanatory cause for 
evil, see Charles H. Kahn, “Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine,” in The Question of “Eclecticism”: 
Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, eds. J.M. Dillon and A.A. Long (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). 
6 Dihle, Will, 123.  
7 This is not to say that there is nothing in ancient philosophy that anticipates the notion of voluntas. Brad Inwood 
has argued that Seneca’s notion of prohairesis anticipates Augustine’s notion of will. See “The Will in Seneca,” in 
Reading Seneca: Stoic Philosophy at Rome (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). A similar anticipation of 
voluntas in Aristotle can be found in Anthony Kenny, Aristotle’s Theory of the Will (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1979). Nevertheless, both Kenny and Inwood note that these anticipations are not identical to Augustine’s 
later conception of will. 
 
 
4 
which indicates Augustine’s enduring impact from his own time to the post-Kantian 
period. 
1.2. GENERAL LITERATURE REVIEW APROPOS THE HISTORY OF 
CONCEPTS OF GOOD AND EVIL 
Although this thesis looks at Augustine’s ontological concepts of good and evil, the 
major studies of the moral notions of good and evil in the history of philosophy should 
still be surveyed. In this respect, the works of Susan Neiman, Richard Bernstein and 
Hans Blumenberg (who also addresses evil in an ontological register) stand out in post-
war scholarly literature.8 
In Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy, Neiman’s survey of 
philosophers like Kant and Schelling justifiably leads her to conclude that evil is the 
key concept in the history of modern philosophy: “as an organizing principle for 
understanding the history of philosophy, the problem of evil is better than 
alternatives.”9 Thereafter, however, her work diverges from this thesis as she proceeds 
to speak of the moral sense of evil as it is exemplified by historical events, such as the 
1755 Lisbon earthquake, the Holocaust, September 11, and the bombing of Hiroshima; 
as, for instance, in her claim that “September 11 was indeed a historical turning point 
that would change our discussion of evil.”10 It is therefore unsurprising that Neiman’s 
concentration on the multiplicity of particular instances of evil leads her to conclude 
                                                     
8 There are no works specifically examining the widespread legacy of Augustine’s concepts of good and evil over 
the history of modern and post-Kantian philosophy. Works looking at Descartes’ relation to Augustine, and 
Augustine, Descartes, Kant and Schelling’s concepts of good and evil in isolation will be treated in their respective 
chapters.  
9 Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2015), 7.  
10 Neiman, Evil, x. 
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that evil is always a relative, particular evil without any overarching, ontological 
essence: “attempts to capture the forms of evil within a single form risk becoming one-
sided or trivial.”11 Here as before, this thesis differs from Neiman insofar as it holds 
that it is the same concept of the evil of privation rooted in our free will that can be 
found in philosophers as diverse as Augustine, Descartes, Kant and Schelling. 
More precisely, Neiman argues that modern philosophy’s concept of evil underwent a 
transition from Leibniz’s account of the physical world as the source of evil to 
Rousseau’s account of our free will as making us responsible for evil: “Rousseau began 
to demarcate a sphere of natural accident that is neutral; disaster has no moral worth 
whatsoever and need have no negative effects. The latter were the result solely of 
human failure.”12 Neiman also observes a second transition away from attempts to 
make evil intelligible by furnishing a theodicy, due to Nietzsche, Freud, Arendt and 
other Jewish philosophers’ realization that we can never satisfyingly account for moral 
evil.13  
My thesis differs from both transitions that Neiman identifies. It rejects Neiman’s 
transition from denying natural evil towards addressing only moral evil. The moderns 
did not introduce the latter idea, since Augustine already held that natural and moral 
evil are two subcategories of the general concept of evil as privation.14 It is no wonder 
that the debates surrounding the 1755 Lisbon earthquake were set against the backdrop 
of debates between Jesuits and Calvinist Jansenists, both of whom were deeply trained 
                                                     
11 Neiman, Evil, xiii, 10. 
12 Neiman, Evil, 39. 
13 Neiman, Evil, 203-4, 257. 
14 See Chapter 2, § 2.3 of this thesis for a detailed discussion of moral and natural evil in Augustine’s thought. 
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in the Augustinian tradition.15 As for the second transition Neiman identifies, I also 
argue through the example of Schelling that post-Kantian philosophy (partially) 
abandons theodicy’s project of defending the benevolent God. However, whereas for 
Neiman this begins with Kant, for me it begins with Schelling. As we shall see in the 
fourth chapter, as modern as he might seem, Kant is still committed to the thought-
structure that Augustine inaugurated. Moreover, the way I conceive of Schelling’s 
break from the philosophical traditions is different to how Neiman envisions it. While 
for Neiman Schelling is part of the post-Kantian trend of abandoning the question of 
theodicy altogether as hopeless, for me he is rather the first to ontologize privative evil 
to account for the Augustinian theodicy’s shortcomings. Far from seeing evil as 
inscrutable, Schelling identifies it with the dark ground of being itself.   
Similarly, in Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation, Bernstein correctly argues 
that the concept of evil constitutes the kernel of much of Western philosophy. Here as 
with Neiman, however, Bernstein focuses on Arendt and other political theorists’ moral 
notions of evil (meaning “genocide, massacre, torture, terrorist attacks,” etc.).16 
Consequently, Bernstein focuses on particular instances of moral evil in a way which 
arguably sidelines the fact that many of the philosophers he discusses are primarily 
talking about evil in terms of an abstract, ontological concept: “I have always believed 
that the deepest philosophic perplexities have their roots in our everyday experiences, 
and ought to help illuminate these experiences. Looking back over the horrendous 
                                                     
15 To give just one example, Lima’s archbishop Antonio de Barroeta already explained the earthquake in terms of 
divine punishment for humanity’s moral sins: “the true subterranean fire […] is the lasciviousness burning in men’s 
hearts; the true volcano is concupiscence”. See Jonathan Israel, “Nature and Providence: Earthquakes and the 
Human Condition,” in Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights 1750-1790 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 42. 
16 Richard J. Bernstein, Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation (Oxford: Polity Press, 2002), ix. 
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twentieth century, few of us would hesitate to speak of evil.”17 Bernstein’s focus on 
moral issues is ultimately the consequence of his selection of mostly post-Kantian 
political thinkers as the object of his study. This means that he seldom considers the 
pre-Kantian metaphysicians like Augustine, who best articulate the ontological 
signification of their concepts of good and evil. Like Neiman, then, Bernstein 
repudiates the idea that there is any overarching concept of evil throughout 
philosophy’s history: “throughout I have indicated my skepticism about the very idea 
of a theory of evil, if this is understood as a complete account of what evil is.”18 What 
both Bernstein and Neiman have in common is a tendency to treat good and evil as 
solely moral concepts. This is because they overlook the influence of Augustine’s 
ontological concepts of good and evil upon the modern period they study. So, although 
my thesis is close to theirs in arguing that good and evil mark a major thread of 
philosophy’s fundamental, conceptual opposition, my starting point with Augustine 
will lead to a rather different conclusion. This is that good and evil are primarily 
ontological concepts of being and non-being. This is not so much a critique of 
Bernstein and Neiman’s works, but rather a differentiation of their ethical focus from 
my metaphysical concerns, even though the terms and philosophers treated partially 
overlap.  
In The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, Blumenberg comes closest to my own thesis 
when he argues that modern philosophy marks a second attempt to answer medieval 
philosophy’s problem of evil, even if he diverges from me in arguing that this second 
                                                     
17 Bernstein, Evil, ix. 
18 Bernstein, Evil, 225.   
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attempt develops into an absolute break upon which modernity grounds its 
legitimacy.19 In the first part of his monumental text, Blumenberg criticizes Karl 
Löwith for arguing that modern, secular philosophy remains Christian by translating 
the messianic ideal of redemption as the Enlightenment idea of humanity’s historical 
progress.20 While Blumenberg proffers several objections to Löwith’s secularization 
thesis, the key reason is that secularization cannot be the defining feature of modernity 
since Christianity already secularized itself. When it became clear to the early Church 
that the final judgment was not imminent, Christianity had to survive by making itself 
beneficial to humanity in the here and now: “to demonstrate its usefulness to the 
surrounding world […] the ancient Church ‘secularizes’ itself into a stabilizing 
factor.”21 
In the second part of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, Blumenberg further defends 
modernity’s legitimacy by critiquing another thesis that modernity marked a regression 
to Gnosticism’s idea of splitting reality into two, co-eternal principles of good and evil. 
On the contrary, for Blumenberg, modern philosophy was rather a second attempt to 
“ward off” the Gnostic view that the physical world was created by a distinct demiurge 
from God.22 The first attempt was the Augustinian theodicy according to which evil is 
the result of the misuse of our will, which burdens human sin with the cosmic 
responsibility of introducing evil into the world. At the same time, the late Augustine 
suggested that God predestines some to sin with the result that his own attempt to ward 
                                                     
19 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1985), 125-6. 
20 See Karl Löwith, Meaning in History (London: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 19. 
21 Blumenberg, Legitimacy, 45. 
22 Blumenberg, Legitimacy, 125-6. 
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off Gnosticism inadvertently made God responsible for evil. By the time of late 
medieval nominalism, God is deemed so powerful that he can punish anyone without 
any humanly comprehensible justification for doing so. Consequently, the modern age 
emerges by honing in on the concept of “self-assertion” in an effort to reinstate a 
comprehensible order to the world. As Blumenberg concludes, “the Middle Ages came 
to an end when their spiritual system’s notion of ‘providence’ ceased to be credible to 
man and the burden of self-assertion was therefore laid upon him.”23 For Blumenberg, 
modernity’s legitimacy rests on humanity’s self-assertion from which God’s 
explanatory power recedes. 
My thesis agrees with Blumenberg that, while Augustine always intends to conceive 
of God as absolutely good, he contradicts himself when he unwittingly makes God evil 
by admitting that he preordains sinners to commit their sins.24 It also agrees that much 
of modern Western philosophy marks so many attempts to answer the same problem 
of evil through various means. In my reading, however, the modern philosophers I treat 
never completely break from this same project of ontologizing the Good, as they do for 
Blumenberg when they develop a distinct interest in obtaining objective knowledge of 
the temporal world on the basis of a self-assertion against later medieval nominalism.  
1.3. METHODOLOGY OF TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
This thesis will occasionally go beyond the letter of the texts in the sense that Descartes, 
Kant and Schelling do not always explicitly trace the thought-structures they develop 
                                                     
23 Blumenberg, Legitimacy, 138.  
24 For a detailed discussion of Augustine’s predestinarian turn, see Chapter 2, § 2.5. 
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back to Augustine. Yet, this will not result in a hermeneutic “free for all.” Rather, I am 
simply arguing that Augustine inaugurates the concept of being as absolutely Good and 
evil as the will’s privation, which Descartes, Kant and Schelling also articulate, 
whether they trace it directly back to Augustine or not. Such a reading has several well-
established methodological precedents, such as psychoanalysis and particularly 
deconstruction. According to Derrida’s deconstructive method, the thinker’s intention 
must be taken into account without being the exclusive arbiter of their writings’ 
meaning, insofar as their own philosophy can also escape what they intended it to be. 
More precisely, Derrida argues that philosophical texts are grounded on oppositions 
between two terms, of which one is denigrated in favor of the other. Deconstruction 
thus involves identifying this opposition and demonstrating how the privileged term 
actually presupposes the denigrated term. As Jonathan Culler explains this 
deconstructive approach: “to deconstruct a discourse is to show how it undermines the 
philosophy it asserts, or the hierarchical oppositions on which it relies, by identifying 
in the text the rhetorical operations that produced the supposed ground of argument.”25  
While my approach is not strictly deconstructionist, there is some methodological 
overlap, in that I make a close reading of the source texts of Augustine, Descartes, Kant 
and Schelling to show how they are grounded on a certain ontologization of the Good 
to the detriment of evil as non-being. At the same time, since I am treating these four 
philosophers’ concepts of good and evil in their ontological sense, I have to take a 
global approach to their works and analyze their larger metaphysical systems rather 
                                                     
25 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structuralism (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1982), 87. 
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than any one of their works in isolation from the whole. Therefore, it has not been a 
matter of analyzing one particular text, but of synthesizing much of their corpuses to 
discern their general, underlying structure, albeit without losing the sense of a rigorous 
exegesis. Moreover, each chapter will also conclude by moving from an exegetical 
exposition to a critical reflection, which shows how each philosopher’s conflation of 
being with the Good is ultimately undermined by an inadvertent re-ontologization of 
evil. This last aspect of my readings is perhaps what is closest to Derrida’s comparable 
claims that philosophical systems “deconstruct themselves” at certain points, despite 
their authors’ intentions. 
To be clear, I am not saying that these philosophers are uninterested in anything other 
than ontologizing the Good. Clearly, Descartes also wishes to legitimate and undertake 
his physics, and Kant aims at establishing transcendental idealism as a new basis for 
metaphysics. What I am saying is that their works also contain an essentially 
Augustinian opposition between good and evil that has often been overlooked. As I 
proceed, then, I will also consider the key secondary literature around both 
philosophers’ metaphysics in general and their concepts of good and evil. In short, my 
methodology consists of a careful textual analysis of Augustine, Descartes, Kant and 
Schelling’s key metaphysical works for their ideas of good and evil, as well as a critical 
analysis of whether they achieve what they set out to do. At different points along the 
way, I also discuss the relevant secondary literature to draw upon similar arguments in 
support of my thesis, or dispute common misconceptions apropos the part of each 
system as I address it. 
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1.4. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER OUTLINE 
In Chapter 2, I proffer a close textual analysis of Augustine’s corpus as in effect 
“excommunicating” evil from the Church of being, so as to render the latter absolutely 
perfect. As we shall see, this incites him to marry the Christian doctrine of God’s 
absolute benevolence with the Neo-Platonists’ proofs for the Idea of the Good. This 
then permits him to develop a theodicy to further acquit the benevolent God from all 
responsibility for evil by indicting our own freedom to renounce him. By systematizing 
Augustine’s thought around the problem of evil, I will condense and convey the essence 
of his philosophy as the rendering of being as absolutely Good, so as to repress evil as 
its secondary, epiphenomenal effect.  
Despite all his rational argumentation for being’s absolute goodness, however, we will 
see that Augustine’s late doctrine of predestination ultimately argues that God 
condemns some to an eternal realm of pure privation alongside that of the Good. The 
chapter will thus conclude by arguing that Augustine’s predestinarian doctrine 
reintroduces a second, Manichean principle of evil into being. In the final analysis, 
Augustine’s endeavor to ontologize the Good is undermined by its failure to 
incorporate evil into a truly comprehensive theory of everything.  
If Augustine cannot ultimately, as it were, seal up the gates of hell that menace being’s 
perfection, the fulfilment of his promise is left to those who inherit his conceptual 
legacy. The rest of this thesis thus considers whether Descartes, Kant and Schelling 
fare any better at realizing Augustine’s same ends to suppress evil. Although the choice 
of these three philosophers is somewhat arbitrary given that I am using them to test the 
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hypothesis that Augustine’s influence is widespread over much of modern and post-
Kantian Western metaphysics, there are two reasons why I begin with them. Firstly, I 
have chosen Descartes and Kant because they are two figures who are said to have 
marked a decisive break from the traditions before them. Consequently, I cannot be 
charged with having focused on peripheral or clearly Augustinian thinkers, who are not 
really representative of modern Western philosophy. Moreover, I chose Schelling 
because I hold that he does inaugurate a certain break that philosophers like Hegel and 
Nietzsche shall further develop, even if he is still haunted by the specter of Augustine 
insofar as this break precisely involves submitting the Church father to a negative 
reassessment. 
In the third chapter, I will demonstrate that Descartes, the supposed pioneer of the 
modern break from the medieval, Christian tradition, is still deeply indebted to 
Augustine. Descartes thus adopts Augustine’s own cogito and ontological arguments 
to ward off the thought of the evil demon by re-elevating God to being’s highest 
perfection. This then permits Descartes to develop an epistemic theodicy that translates 
Augustine’s concept of evil as the error of misrecognizing a fragment of reality for its 
totality, when we freely choose to think beyond the limits of our finite understanding. 
Seen in this light, Descartes does not so much break from medieval Christian 
philosophy altogether as he does from Aquinas’ specific empirico-scholastic method, 
by way of a return to Augustine’s rationalist approach. 
In the fourth chapter, I turn to Kant. It is true that Kant shows how the ideas that 
Augustine and Descartes use to verify God’s existence are actually those of the mind’s 
superimposition over reality such that we can coherently experience and think it. 
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Nonetheless, I will argue that Kant adopts a practico-transcendental approach in an 
effort to show that the condition for the possibility of our moral practice’s legitimacy 
is the actual existence of the benevolent God. Kant thus proceeds to argue that our 
moral practice functions in such a way that evil can only be the privation of the 
benevolent being by way of our freedom to renounce it. From Descartes to Kant, the 
same ambition to strip evil of any ontological stature persists as philosophy’s “Platonic 
Form,” even if they deploy two different methods to lay the same demon to rest.   
If so many methodological innovations are needed to defend Augustine’s theodicy in 
the first place, however, it is because it continuously comes up short against the brute 
reality of evil. As we shall see, Descartes’ late occasionalist doctrine recapitulates 
Augustine’s own predestinarian doctrine in a way that makes God responsible for all 
our sins. Similarly, Kant affirms the ontological existence of a radical evil when he 
acknowledges it as the condition for the possibility of our freedom to choose the Good 
in the first place. If my line of questioning proves justified by a close exegesis, much 
of modern Western philosophy can be characterized as a modern Augustinianism in its 
many inadequate attempts to secure the being of the Good against the brute fact of evil.  
In the final chapter, we shall see that it is because of these modern philosophers’ 
struggle to account for evil that Schelling turned Augustine on his head by ontologizing 
evil. Schelling thus elucidates the conditions for the possibility of human beings’ 
freedom to renounce the ground from whence we emerge by re-envisioning the God 
who created us as always already free, and hence evil. While Schelling certainly has 
for his stated aim the positivization of evil, we shall nonetheless see that his desire for 
a system capable of explaining everything through a single structure eventually leads 
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him to reaffirm an absolute spirit of pure Positivity beyond evil’s negative dialectic. 
Ultimately, then, even an avowed anti-Augustinian like Schelling buckles under the 
weight of the tradition before him, until he winds up repenting.  
From one end to the other, our central question, our “demon” as it were, returns to 
haunt us: on the one hand, is there enough evidence to develop the hypothesis that 
Augustine furnishes the “divine Idea” in which Descartes, Kant and Schelling 
participate? On the other hand, to what extent do these philosophers thereby falter in 
their thinking of being qua being by falling silent when confronted with the brute reality 
of evil?  
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CHAPTER 2. FACING AUGUSTINE’S DEMONS 
This chapter examines how Augustine’s demonstration of the benevolent God’s 
existence as being’s highest totalization permits him to develop a theodicy according 
to which evil is the epiphenomenal privation of the Good rooted in the misuse of our 
free will. I therefore agree with Étienne Gilson’s ground-breaking argument that, 
although each of Augustine’s works marks a particular intervention in a specific 
historical debate, we can discern throughout them “one long” rational proof for God’s 
existence.26 I will slightly modify Gilson’s argument by specifying that Augustine’s 
writings do not simply comprise one rational demonstration of God’s existence, but 
more precisely a rational demonstration of God or being as absolutely good, so as to 
strip evil of any independent reality. By identifying this chief underlying motive of 
Augustine’s writings, I avoid Gilson’s characterization of Augustine’s theodicy as a 
somewhat extraneous project to his proof of God’s existence. Instead, the theodicy 
becomes an essential step in the same deduction to demonstrate the benevolent God’s 
existence. Similarly, I can reconceive Augustine’s ethics of how fallen creatures return 
to the Good as another necessary stage in the derivation of God’s absolute benevolence 
through his opening of a path to redemption. Simply put, my wager (which, as we shall 
see, echoes those of Blumenberg and Albert Camus among others) is that, by bringing 
the problem of evil to the fore as the catalyst for Augustine’s philosophical pursuits, I 
can formalize much of his enormous intellectual edifice.27 
                                                     
26 Étienne Gilson, Introduction à l’étude de saint Augustin (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1949), 24. All 
translations from French texts throughout the thesis are my own. 
27 Besides Gilson, the most perspicuous general introduction to Augustine is Eugene Teselle, Augustine the 
Theologian (London: Burns and Oates, 1970). The only writings of Augustine that I will seldom cite are his sermons, 
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One relatively rare study of the metaphysical stakes of Augustine’s thought is James 
Anderson’s St. Augustine and Being. I agree with Anderson’s observation that “the 
properly metaphysical dimensions of Augustine’s thought have received little attention 
among scholars.”28 Although Anderson spends considerable space showing that 
Augustine envisions God and being as one and the same, he shows minimal regard for 
exploring the ontological implications that this has for the idea of the Good, since the 
Good is co-identical with God. Moreover, Anderson spends even less time addressing 
the ontological consequences for evil as a privation rooted in the will. Nor does he 
detail the biographical backdrop that incited Augustine’s metaphysics, or the ethics that 
he subsequently derives from it, as this chapter will do.  
What most clearly distinguishes Anderson’s essay from this thesis is that he rejects the 
idea that Augustine influenced Descartes on the grounds that the latter was more 
interested in seeking truth than God: “Augustine’s if I err, I am is not, like Descartes’ 
cogito, the starting-point of a system of pure reason but of a supernatural Wisdom 
uniting him […] to the living God.”29 Here, Anderson underestimates the Augustinian 
dimensions in Descartes, let alone Kant, Schelling and others. Instead, Anderson’s goal 
is to polemicize against the scholastics’ reservations about reading Augustine as a 
metaphysician. So, although my goal is comparable to that of Anderson on paper (to 
demonstrate the ontological stakes of Augustine’s understanding of God), it differs in 
terms of its philosophical rather than theological emphasis, its comparative approach 
                                                     
homilies and psalms. This is because they are his least philosophical works inasmuch as their intended audience 
were Hippo’s lay people, whom F. Van der Meer describes as “very simple people, for Augustine explains 
everything to them in the most elementary manner.” Augustine the Bishop: The Life and Work of a Father of the 
Church, trans. B. Battershaw and G.R. Lamb (London: Sheed and Ward, 1983), 132. 
28 James F. Anderson, St. Augustine and Being: A Metaphysical Essay (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), v. 
29 Anderson, Augustine, 52. 
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to Augustine with other philosophers, and even its account of Augustine’s metaphysics 
as not simply centred on being, but more specifically on the being of the Good, so as 
to wipe evil from the face of that which is.  
In Le Dilemme de l’être et du néant chez saint Augustin, Émilie Zum Brunn goes one 
step further than Anderson to show how there is a dialectic of being and non-being at 
work in at least the early Augustine. Focusing on Augustine’s Latin semantics, Brunn 
argues that Augustine explicitly describes God as being (magis esse, summum esse, 
ipsum esse, uere esse, etc.), and all things as minus esse or “existents” by way of their 
finite participation in the divine being: “Augustine retrospectively translates his 
experience of the rapport of man to God in the ontological language of magis esse and 
minus esse.”30  
Now, if God is being, the Fall from his grace can only be a descent into non-being or 
non-esse: “it is about showing the ontological diminishment, the ‘nihilation’ to which 
the man who chooses terrestrial values condemns himself.”31 While Brunn’s work 
parallels my own thesis, she never discusses God’s attribute as the Good. 
Consequently, she misses what I consider to be Augustine’s key gesture: the conflation 
of being and the Good to the detriment of evil as non-being. Nor does Brunn put 
Augustine in dialogue with other philosophers as I will in the subsequent chapters on 
Descartes, Kant and Schelling. Like Anderson, Brunn can be seen as anticipating my 
own metaphysical reading of Augustine, even if she does not systematize both 
                                                     
30 Émilie Zum Brunn, Le Dilemme de l’être et du néant chez saint Augustin: des premiers dialogues aux 
“Confessions” (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1969), 15. 
31 Brunn, Dilemme, 59. 
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Augustine’s philosophy, theodicy and ethics around the problematic of conferring 
being not just to God, but to the benevolent God, and hence non-being to evil. 
Finally, Robert Cooper’s short article called “Saint Augustine’s Doctrine of Evil” 
marks the only attempt to cohere Augustine’s thought around his concept of evil: “the 
attempt to systematize Augustine’s thought is perhaps a presumptuous, and surely a 
difficult undertaking. […] It is my belief that it is to be found in the problem of evil.”32 
The trouble is that Cooper concludes that Augustine adequately resolves the problem 
of evil by tracing it back to the misuse of voluntas: “Augustine sought the clue to the 
solution of the problem in the human will”; and: “we have, then, on the basis of that 
inquiry, sought to find a resolution to the problem, on what we believe to be 
Augustinian principles.”33 In this chapter’s final section, we shall see that Cooper 
overlooks how Augustine’s solution fails to achieve what it sets out to do: unify all of 
being around the sovereign Good.  
Before we reach this critical analysis, this chapter’s first two sections show how 
Augustine develops a rationalist demonstration for the benevolent God’s existence as 
being’s highest totalization. The third section traces how Augustine develops a 
theodicy according to which evil is but the privation of the Good as a consequence of 
the misuse of our libero arbitrio. The fourth section then demonstrates how Augustine 
develops an ethics of how the exercise of various virtues permits us to return to our 
true echelon of perfection in the hierarchy of being. If the narrative does not end there 
as it does for Augustine himself, it is because the final section ultimately changes tack 
                                                     
32 Robert M. Cooper, “Saint Augustine’s Doctrine of Evil,” Scottish Journal of Theology 16, no. 3 (1963), 256-7. 
33 Cooper, “Augustine’s Doctrine,” 262, 276. 
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from an exegesis to a critical analysis of Augustine’s late doctrine of predestination as 
inadvertently threatening his ontologization of the Good, insofar as it re-envisions God 
as bringing evil into being—as an eternal, ontological principle alongside the Good—
by gratuitously condemning some to eternal damnation. 
2.1. AUGUSTINE’S PROBLEM OF EVIL  
2.1.1. The biographical backdrop of Augustine’s problematic  
Reflecting upon his teenage years in the Confessiones, Augustine explains how the 
problem of life’s privations was presented to him with the passing of his closest 
friend.34 It was the haunting presence of his friend’s absence combined with the fear of 
his own inexorable death which enflamed what would become Augustine’s lifelong 
obsession with overcoming the evils of material finitude and loss by chasing the ideal 
of an immutable eudemonia: “mine eyes sought him everywhere, but he was not 
granted them; and I hated all places because he was not in them.”35 Even in his 
adolescent thought, we can already see the germ of Augustine’s mature concept of evil 
as the absence of existence itself. By contrast, we can see that Augustine is conflating 
the Good with esse insofar as its antithesis of evil marks the loss of life and being. As 
Augustine later formulates it, “the chief good is that which is properly described as 
having supreme and original existence. For that exists in the highest of the world which 
continues always the same, which is throughout like itself, which cannot in any part be 
                                                     
34 The two most extensive biographies of Augustine are Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (London: 
Faber and Faber, 2000); and Gerald Bonner, St Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies (London: SCM Press, 
1963). 
35 Saint Augustine, Confessions, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 1-01, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. J.G. Cunningham 
(New York: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2009), 132. Hereafter NPNF. 
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corrupted or changed.”36 By early adulthood, Augustine already set in stone his life’s 
goal of determining whether there is an eternal Good totalizing all existence, so as to 
stave off the painful flux of the finite.  
2.1.2. Augustine’s first Manichean solution 
To this end, Augustine dedicated the next decade to studying the pagan philosophies 
and eclectic theologies on offer throughout the Roman Empire in the fourth century 
CE. In 371 CE, aged seventeen, Augustine’s initial attempt to explain the privation of 
his youthful friendship made recourse to Manichaeism, because of its central tenet that 
evil is an equally omnipotent and co-eternal ontological force as the Good. After all, if 
we experience just as much privation of our happiness as we do happiness itself, the 
Good cannot alone exhaust being. It is necessary to admit a certain beingness to evil, 
too. Nonetheless, for Augustine, the problem remained that, while the Manicheans 
repudiated the body at a moral level as the source of evil and suffering in favour of the 
spiritual as the ground of the Good, they never repudiated the body at the ontological 
level inasmuch as they maintained that evil had an ontological independence from the 
Good. Augustine encapsulates the Manicheans’ dualist ontology as follows: “they say 
that there are two kinds of souls, the one good, which is in such a way from God; […] 
the other evil, which they believe and strive to get others to believe pertains to God in 
no way whatever.”37 If Augustine would eventually abandon Manichaeism, it is 
                                                     
36 Saint Augustine, “On the Morals of the Catholic Church,” in NPNF1-04, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Richard Stothert 
(New York: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1984), 76.  
37 Saint Augustine, “On Two Souls, Against the Manicheans,” in NPNF01-04, 180. For a book length study of 
Augustine’s critique of the Manicheans, see N. Joseph Torchia, Creation Ex Nihilo and the Theology of St. 
Augustine: The Anti-Manichean Polemic and Beyond (New York: Peter Lang, 1999). 
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because he found its bestowal of half of being to the shadows as unsatisfactory to meet 
his demands for a sovereign Good which reigns supreme over all of being. 
2.1.3. Augustine’s “road to Damascus” 
At age thirty, Augustine’s despair at the temporal world’s sufferings led him to 
Christianity. In particular, Augustine became enamoured with its central belief that 
there is but one absolutely benevolent God, who is utterly incapable of committing evil 
deeds. In 386 CE, aged thirty-one, Augustine officially converted to the religion which 
preached God’s all-embracing perfection. The consolations of Christianity soon 
became clear when his mother Monica died. Instead of despairing at his mother’s loss 
as he had when his friend had died, Augustine now contented himself with the belief 
that what he loved about her particular being would continue to live on forever through 
the Supreme Being as the all-encompassing “Good of all”: “as soon as she breathed her 
last, […] my own childish feeling, which was, through the youthful voice of my heart, 
finding escape in tears, was restrained and silenced. For […] she neither died unhappy, 
nor did she altogether die.”38 With Christianity, Augustine finally found the one belief 
system that immunized him from life’s evils through the ideal of another life in union 
with the one, true being of the Good. 
2.1.4. Augustine’s rational approach to the problem of evil 
Being a young, curious intellectual, however, Augustine continued even after his 
baptism to be haunted by the logical problem of how evil can exist in a world created 
by the Christian God. After all, such a God is neither capable of creating evil because 
                                                     
38 Augustine, Confessions, 311. 
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of his absolute benevolence, nor limited in his power by another ontological entity of 
Evil, as the Manicheans claimed. Consequently, Augustine devoted the rest of his life 
to developing a rational demonstration of the Christian God’s perfection in an effort to 
exorcise evil from being’s paradisiacal garden. Augustine himself explains how the 
being of the Good in which he already believed could not be rationally proven until he 
had furnished a theodicy accounting for the brute fact of evil: “I believed Thee both to 
exist, and Thy substance to be unchangeable, and that Thou hadst a care of and 
wouldest judge men. […] These things being safe and immovably settled in my mind, 
I eagerly inquired, ‘Whence is evil?’”39 We can see Augustine’s bourgeoning 
philosophical interests in the Confessiones’ very structure: whereas purely religious 
books of his time would have concluded with book ten and Augustine’s successful 
conversion, Augustine adds three more philosophical books addressing metaphysical 
gaps in Genesis.40 
Certainly, Augustine extracted his two central tenets of the being of the Good and the 
evil of privation from the scriptures, and particularly Paul’s epistles. At the same time, 
Paul and even Christ himself emphasize the ethico-practical issue of how to return to 
the Good from evil, rather than their ontological status. Even when Paul is pressed for 
proof that he speaks the Word of God, he advocates a more mystical than rational 
approach of following our soul’s will, such as it is directed towards the highest Good: 
“since you desire proof that Christ is speaking in me, […] examine ourselves, to see 
                                                     
39 Augustine, Confessions, 227. In Book Seven, Augustine repeatedly poses this question: “whence is evil?” (220, 
222).  
40 Augustine himself makes a distinction between the first ten books about “myself,” and the last three about the 
“sacred scriptures” (Confessions, 60). 
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whether you are holding to your faith.”41 If it is our soul’s élan vital that drives us to 
affirm God, Paul dismisses the philosophical bickering amongst early Christian 
intellectuals as a distraction from the righteous path in each of our souls: “avoid such 
godless chatter.”42  
So, while Augustine certainly learnt the Christian doctrines from earlier Christian 
apologetics, and particularly Saint Paul’s epistles and Saint Ambrose’s sermons, none 
of them were as interested in philosophically fortifying the faith as he.43 I therefore 
agree with Gilson’s intellectualist tradition of reading Augustine as a rationalist, even 
if both Gilson and I qualify that Augustine occasionally acknowledges that mysticism, 
fideism and even sense perception can be secondary, albeit inferior modes of 
apprehending God.44 
2.2. AUGUSTINE’S RATIONALIST ONTOLOGIZATION OF THE GOOD 
2.2.1. The sceptical context and Platonic inspiration for Augustine’s proto-
ontological argument 
To rationally prove the benevolent God’s existence, Augustine made particular 
recourse to Neo-Platonism.45 Certainly, some Platonists’ belief that we could attain 
                                                     
41 1 Cor. 12:3, 5, in The Holy Bible: Revised Standard Edition, trans. Revised Standard Version Bible Committee 
(London: The Bible Societies, 1952). 
42 1 Tim. 2:16. 
43 Augustine, Confessions, 188-9. 
44 For a brief discussion of Augustine’s relation to mysticism and empiricism, see Chapter 3, § 3.1. 
45 Augustine, Confessions, 251; and “Letter VI,” in NPNF1-01, 525. All letters cited are from NPNF1-01. The most 
important studies of Platonism’s influence on Augustine’s thought are Phillip Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the 
Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and John M. Rist, 
Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). One might object that 
Augustine’s doctrines sound rather stoic. They would not be alone in this line of reasoning: Marcia L. Colish’s 
history of stoicism argues that Augustine is influenced by the Stoics’ own conception of Nature as the summum 
bonum. However, Colish mitigates this claim by acknowledging that Augustine was even more influenced by the 
Neo-Platonists: “he qualifies stoic theodicy so extensively under the influence of Neo-Platonism or Christianity as 
to compromise many of its basic ingredients.” The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages 2: 
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knowledge of the Good through our own reason alone, without the grace of God, drew 
Augustine’s ire.46 Nonetheless, Augustine held the Platonists’ rational argumentation 
in such high regard that he even defended them as closer to Christianity than the pagan 
religions: “were it not more accordant with every virtuous sentiment to read Plato’s 
writings in a ‘Temple of Plato,’ than to be present in the temples of devils to witness 
the priest of Cybele mutilating themselves?”47 
Now, if the question of what is true, and hence truly good was of crucial importance 
for Augustine as it had been for Plato, it is because he was writing against the academic 
sceptics about whom he had read in Cicero’s writings. The academic sceptics had first 
emerged at the beginning of the third century by challenging the different bases of our 
knowledge. Augustine is particularly interested in the way that the academic sceptics 
revived Plato’s argument that, since all knowledge emanates from our sense perception 
of particular, passing sensations about which we are often deceived, we cannot know 
anything for certain. For if we cannot even know whether something is truly cold or 
hot in itself or only for me, we certainly cannot hope to obtain the knowledge of far 
more complex and fundamental truths, such as the nature of good and evil. 
Augustine can barely conceal his disdain when he comes to summarize the heretical 
academic scepticism: “the city of God thoroughly detests such doubt as madness 
regarding matters which it apprehends by the mind and reason with most absolute 
                                                     
Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought Through the Sixth Century (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), 154. While Augustine 
himself frequently acknowledges Platonism’s influence on his thought, he is only ever critical of the Stoics for being 
materialists, and hence conflating spiritual being with what he calls physical evil (see, for instance, “Letter CXXI,” 
974). 
46 Augustine, Confessions, 253-4. 
47 Saint Augustine, The City of God, in NPNF1-02, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Marcus Dods (Grand Rapids: Christian 
Classics Ethereal Library, 1984), 55. 
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certainty.”48 For Augustine, however, it is not enough to dogmatically disavow the 
sceptics’ reasoning through the recourse to fideism. On the contrary, they must be 
immanently critiqued on their own philosophical turf.  
In De libero arbitrio, Augustine constructs an objection that Descartes would famously 
resuscitate.49 Augustine’s critique is immanent in the sense that it uses the sceptic’s 
own logic to show that we can know certain truths.50 He thus begins by conceding to 
the sceptics that our sense perception does not proffer certain exterior knowledge. Yet, 
whereas the sceptics are content to rest their case at our incapacity to hold anything as 
certain, Augustine argues that there is another, interior faculty of knowing, which is 
immune from the dissimulation of exterior sensations. According to Augustine, the 
sceptics’ very doubt of our own existence permits him to argue that even they admit 
that we know the truth of our own existence through the very act of our doubting it, 
since when we doubt we at least affirm ourselves as existing as a substance capable of 
doubt: “I ask first whether you yourself exist. Are you perhaps afraid that you might 
be deceived in this line of questioning? Surely if you did not exist, you could not be 
deceived at all.”51 In other words, Augustine accepts the sceptics’ claim that we must 
doubt all knowledge emanating from our sense perception, only to show that the 
sceptics’ very doubt grants us the knowledge of our rational soul’s existence as a 
                                                     
48 Augustine, City, 662. 
49 For a comprehensive comparison with Descartes’ method, see Chapter 3. 
50 The key studies of Augustine’s epistemology are Ronald H. Nash, The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine’s Theory 
of Knowledge (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1969); and Lydia Schumacher, Divine Illumination: 
The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). 
51 Saint Augustine, On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings, trans. Peter 
King (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 35.  
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doubting thing. As Augustine succinctly puts it in De civitate Dei contra paganos, “if 
I err, I am” (si enim fallor, sum).52 
2.2.2. The proto-ontological argument itself 
However, Augustine’s ambition is not to prove that we can know this or that particular 
truth, but to show that the divine being is absolutely good. To this end, Augustine draws 
on Plato’s Phaedo to argue that, although our judgments of particular things as, say, 
more or less good, true and beautiful, change as the qualities of those things also come 
and go, they nonetheless suppose an ideal standard of the Good, the True and the 
Beautiful, which eternally and universally persists as the criteria to which our 
judgments and the qualities of things refer.53 Augustine further observes that these 
Ideas of the Good, the True and the Beautiful cannot emanate from the sensible things 
themselves, because we judge those things according to the extent to which they 
partially embody the Ideas, which must therefore have more reality as the most generic 
totalization of all particular, finite qualities: 
Inquiring whence it was that I admired the beauty of bodies whether celestial or 
terrestrial, and what supported me in judging correctly on things mutable, and 
pronouncing, “this should be thus, this not”—inquiring, then, whence I so judged, 
seeing I did so judge, I had found the unchangeable and true eternity of Truth.54 
As we shall see in the next chapter, to conclude the proof here by moving directly from 
the judgment of sensible things to the existence of a superior Good resembles Aquinas’ 
                                                     
52 Augustine, City, 561. 
53 See Plato, Phaedo, in The Last Days of Socrates, ed. and trans. Christopher Rowe (London: Penguin, 2010), 
especially 170, 176, 185. Augustine himself attributes this argument to “the Platonists” in Confessions, 251. 
54 Augustine, Confessions, 244. 
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more empirically inclined cosmological proofs.55 For Augustine, however, this only 
permits us to turn inward to the Idea of the Good in our minds. Without proving that 
the Idea of the Good emanates from a being superior to the mind, we risk repeating the 
heresy of certain mystical Platonists who imagined that our own mind was in fact one 
and the same with the divine Good.  
To avoid this, Augustine argues that we cannot be the authors of the Ideas because we 
even judge ourselves according to the extent to which we embody these Ideas, after 
which our judgments strive:  
We make judgements about physical objects in this fashion when we say that 
something is less bright than it ought to be, or less square, and so on, and about the 
mind when we say that one is less well-disposed than it ought to be. […] We make 
these judgements in accordance with the inner rules of truth that we discern in 
common.56 
If these Ideas stand as our superiors, Augustine proceeds to argue, they cannot emanate 
from ourselves, let alone the external world. Rather, they can only come from that 
which contains as much perfection and truth as the Ideas themselves. The only thing 
that could have as much perfection as the Ideas, however, are precisely those Ideas. 
Given, Augustine concludes, that nothing could have created these Ideas except 
themselves, they must have an independent, ontological existence: “when the mind 
perceives itself to be mutable, and apprehends that wisdom is unchangeable, it must at 
the same time apprehend that wisdom is superior to its own nature, and that it finds 
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more abundant and abiding joy in the communications and light of wisdom than in 
itself.”57 All Augustine needs to add to “Christianize” this essentially Platonic concept 
of being is to identify what is an impersonal Idea of the Good for Plato with the divine 
Idea in the mind of the Christian God: “suppose we were able to find something that 
you had no doubt not only exists but also is more excellent than our reason. Would you 
hesitate to say that this, whatever it is, is God?”58 Such is the rational, Neo-Platonic 
and (as we shall see) proto-Cartesian way by which Augustine establishes the 
benevolent God’s existence from the interior certainty of our soul’s existence.  
2.2.3. From God’s existence to his benevolence 
Augustine’s proof is not only intended to rationally verify God’s existence, but above 
all his benevolence. After having demonstrated God’s existence, Augustine thus argues 
that, since God is the standard of our judgments of the qualities of all things in the 
double sense of the word “quality” as signifying both what is and what is good, the 
divine being must be one and the same with the highest Good, which totalizes all 
particular goods. That is to say, since the proof works by recognizing God as the 
standard for all our judgments of things as more or less good, it not only verifies his 
existence. It also proves that he exists as the highest Good itself. So, Augustine’s proof 
is not only designed to prove God’s existence, but also verify him as the summum 
bonum incarnate. Augustine concludes by rejoicing thus: “there is something more 
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exalted than our mind and reason. Here you have it: […] ‘take delight in the Lord and 
He will give you your heart’s longings.’”59  
2.3. AUGUSTINE’S THEODICY 
2.3.1. Augustine’s privation theory of evil 
Even after demonstrating the Christian God’s existence, Augustine still needs to 
rationally account for the brute fact of evil that we indubitably encounter if he is not to 
simply deny it by appeal to Church dogma. Augustine thus turns to developing his 
theodicy of the privatio boni by arguing with Plotinus that, if being is the absolute 
Good beyond which there is nothing as he has already demonstrated, evil cannot be 
anything ontologically positive in itself.60 Rather, evil can only be the secondary 
privation of the being of the Good. As Augustine encapsulates, “what is that which we 
call evil but the absence of good?”61 While Augustine’s privation theory of evil is 
certainly influenced by Plotinus’ idea of evil as non-being, there is a crucial difference. 
At times, Plotinus still arguably remains a dualist in that he tends to reify non-being as 
a realm distinct from being. In Plotinus’ own words, “evil cannot have place among 
Beings or in the Beyond-Being; these are good. There remains, only, if Evil exists at 
all, that it be situated in the realm of Non-Being.”62 Conversely, Augustine 
unambiguously characterizes this non-being as nothing but the negation of the 
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sovereign being of the Good, which cannot exist independently of the Good that it 
negates. For Augustine, evil has no reality at all apart from the being of the Good, of 
which it is the “less good.” It is merely a turning away or fall from the Good 
(perversitas, aversus, defectio, lapsus, deformitas, deviare, infirmare, etc.).  
2.3.2. Natural evil 
More precisely, Augustine divides the general evil of privation into two subcategories 
of natural and moral evil. Natural evil denotes the emergence of the material world of 
particular, sensible things ensnared in the temporal flux of becoming as the privation 
of the purely intelligible, and hence universal and immutable divine Ideas in the 
godhead: “the wound or disease is not a substance, but a defect in the fleshly substance, 
that is, privations of the good which we call health.”63 This for Augustine is what the 
Nazarene was referring to in the “Sermon on the Mount,” when he implores us to reject 
pursuing earthly goods that are liable to rot in favour of the highest Good, which 
remains eternally the same: “do not lay up for yourselves treasures on earth, […] but 
lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust consumes.”64 
At the same time, famously, Augustine qualifies that natural evil is not really an evil 
created by God; on the contrary, it is even a good insofar as it is the just punishment 
that God confers on us for committing moral evil. Even though we feel sickness, hunger 
and death as painful, it remains good to the extent that it is humanity’s just 
comeuppance after Adam’s original sin of renouncing, and hence depriving himself of 
a higher Good in favour of more immediate, yet inferior corporeal pleasures. Augustine 
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continues: “the punishment of evildoers which is from God, is, therefore, an evil for 
evildoers, but it is among the good works of God, since it is just to punish evildoers 
and, certainly, everything that is just is good.”65 Further, natural evil is also good in the 
sense that it incites us to escape from our sickly privation, thereby opening our minds 
to the melody of the heavens as the path to redemption. In Augustine’s own terms, “in 
the universe, even that which is called evil […] only enhances our admiration of the 
good; for we enjoy and value the good more when we compare it with evil.”66 
2.3.3. Moral evil 
Even if natural evil were not a just punishment, it is not so much generated by God as 
it is by the agents of the second category of moral evil. According to Augustine, moral 
evil marks our free choice to renounce the divine being in favour of more immediate 
but inferior and passing pleasures, thereby depriving us of the totality of being’s 
perfection: “the will is turned to its private good, […] to something lower when it takes 
delight in bodily pleasures, and thus someone who is made proud or curious or 
lascivious is captured by another life that, in comparison to the higher life, is death.”67 
As we have already seen Blumenberg argue in the introduction apropos Augustine’s 
solution to the problem of Gnosticism, the crux of Augustine’s account of moral evil 
is that God has no “damned spots” on his hands even though he created human beings 
like ourselves with the freedom to renounce him, because God’s conferral of freedom 
to us is a good in itself inasmuch as it is made in the image of his own free will. 
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Therefore, while God wills that we have free will as a good in itself, he does not will 
for us to use it in such a way as to negate him in favour of a lowlier good. Indeed, God 
even partially rigs the game in his favour by bestowing upon us the grace of reason, the 
articles of faith, the prophets, Jesus Christ and the Church to direct us towards the 
choice of God over sin. If we still decide to renounce him, then, the blame is only to be 
laid at our door. This is what transpired when the archangel Lucifer contested God’s 
superiority, only to be banished to an eternal privation in hell. As Augustine explains 
with reference to Ecclesiastes: “‘pride is the commencement of all sin,’ because it was 
this which overthrew the devil, from whom arose the origin of sin.”68 Similarly, Adam 
morally sinned when he appraised his own choice to eat from the tree of knowledge 
above and beyond God’s prohibition.69 So, the crux of Augustine’s theodicy is that 
both moral and natural evil are not really evil, but the secondary effects of an anterior 
ontological good. Seen in this way, evil is either a just punishment for sin, or the misuse 
of the will made in God’s image.  
2.4. AUGUSTINE’S ETHICS 
2.4.1. The three eras of human history 
According to Augustine’s reading of the Old Testament, the immediate descendants of 
Adam were exiled from God’s kingdom and condemned to walk the earth full of Job’s 
ignorance as to why there is suffering. Augustine periodizes this as the first of three 
eras of human history after the Fall and before his final judgment, each of which marks 
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increasingly clearer revelations of God. In the second era of history, God wiped the 
slate clean by the flood, which eliminated the most ignorant of human generations. 
After Noah, God began to send other intermediaries between the finite and the infinite 
to spread his Word, such as Abraham’s founding of the Jewish religious community, 
and Moses’ institutionalization of the Ten Commandments. In the third and final stage 
hitherto came the Incarnation. Just as Adam’s original sin condemned all of humanity, 
so did the Nazarene redeem us of original sin through his death and our baptism, as 
well as conferring on us the gift of the holy spirit and our reason which gravitates 
around the divine Ideas. In Augustine’s own words, “the miracles performed by our 
Lord Jesus Christ are indeed divine works, and incite the human mind to rise to the 
apprehension of God from the things that are seen.”70 What Augustine thinks that these 
concrete, historical vessels of the divinity all teach us is that we must spurn the “earthly 
Gomorrah” and its “love of self, even to the contempt of God” in favour of the 
“heavenly” city and its “love of God, even to the contempt of self.”71 It is this third 
epoch of history, armed as we now are with the divine Ideas, in which Augustine sees 
himself as intervening. 
2.4.2.  The theoretical and practical virtues 
Augustine’s ethics involves exercising the virtues of “faith,” “hope,” “wisdom” or 
“prudence,” “temperance,” “love” or “charity,” “courage” and “justice.” Here, it is 
necessary to see how Augustine is not only referring to faith in the sense of belief; faith 
also means the doctrines contained in the articles of faith, which Augustine has 
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theologically vindicated. As Nash points out, “Augustine uses the word ‘faith’ in a 
number of different senses.”72 After rationally extrapolating God’s existence and 
theodicy, and turning to an account of charity or love, Augustine thus describes all this 
as his “confession of faith.”73 By faith, then, Augustine is referring to the knowledge 
of our history from whence we have come both in being created by God, and then 
having fallen through sin: “the teaching of faith [is] about past and future things.”74 
This is why Augustine elsewhere refers to faith as the wisdom or prudence that teaches 
us precisely about the obedience to God that is good for us, as well as the rebellion 
against him which marks our misery: “consider whether prudence seems to you to be 
knowledge of things to be pursued and avoided.”75 Augustine similarly describes hope 
as the same rational knowledge orientated around the future confidence that we can 
reascend to our proper level of perfection through a life of fidelity to God.  
Love or charity then refers to the desire for God after establishing his existence by faith 
and wisdom. For Augustine, this love must assume an objective expression through the 
love of our neighbours. Augustine consistently insists that the true believer does not 
only subjectively believe, but also practically believes by committing good deeds to 
others, enacting the Church’s commandments, and performing the missionary work of 
the conversion of others: 
As for love, which the apostle declares to be greater than the other two graces, that is, 
than faith and hope, the greater the means are in which it dwells in a man, the better is 
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the man in whom it dwells. For when there is question as to whether a man is good, 
one does not ask what he believes or what he hopes, but what he practices.76 
Finally, Augustine encapsulates all of these virtues through the overarching virtue of 
justice. Simply put, justice designates the synthetic constellation of all the other virtues 
around the rational and practical affirmation of God as the Good incarnate. As 
Augustine recapitulates, “justice is but the virtue by which each receives his due.”77  
2.4.3. The Pelagians and the Donatists’ temptations 
Augustine also negatively formulates his ethics in terms of what we ought not to do 
when he argues that these virtues permit us to avoid the three temptations of “the lust 
of the flesh,” “the lust of the eyes,” and “the pride of life.” The voluptuous temptation 
of the flesh transpires when we are content to overlook the greater Good by satisfying 
our particular, temporal wants in the here and now. In this way, the voluptuous 
temptation lures us in until we have abandoned pursuing the only really immutable 
beatitude in the next life, which we can only attain precisely by sacrificing such 
temporal pleasures. Similarly, the temptation of the eyes resembles the fixation on 
particular, ephemeral pleasures, colours and odours among the spontaneous flow of 
bodies in becoming. Spontaneously drawn to wherever our eyes lead us, we forget all 
about rationally organizing the multiplicity of sensible things around the Church 
hierarchy, such as it is the terrestrial incarnation of the loftier, Supreme Being: “the 
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eyes delight in fair and varied forms, and bright and pleasing colours. Suffer not these 
to take possession of my soul; let God rather possess it.”78  
Finally, the temptation of pride involves putting our own individual interest at present 
before the general Good of all in the next life to come: “no one therefore has a single, 
i.e. pure heart, except the man who rises above the praises of men; and when he lives 
well, looks at Him only, and strives to please Him.”79 The paradox is that it is precisely 
this temptation to affirm oneself out of a vain concern for the judgment of others that 
deprives us of our true self in the angelic rank of perfection, a rank to which we can 
only ascend by passing the final judgment. If these temptations are to be avoided even 
though they bring us a temporal, immediate joy, it is because our eternal beatitude 
without the evil of privation can only be found in the plenitude of God’s being after a 
life of fidelity and charitable action.  
Augustine also critiqued the temptations of the Donatists and the Pelagians in the 
polemics he wrote as the bishop of Hippo, a small African port town, where he was 
tasked with uniting the Christian community amid fights, riots and strikes agitated by 
these factions-turned-heretics. As Brown explains in his biography of Augustine, after 
he became a priest in 391 CE and then bishop in 396, “this same man now took the first 
step on that long road that led from introspection and the neo-Platonic doctrine of 
contemplation to those tangible realities.”80  
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On the one hand, Augustine chastises the Donatists for their fanatical enforcement of 
the letter of Church doxa, to the point where they actually end up condemning the 
faithful.81 The Donatists first emerged in 311 CE in reaction to those Christians who 
had collaborated during the persecution of Diocletian in 303-305, even if they took 
their name and philosophy from Donatus and Saint Cyprian’s writings during the 
Dicean persecution in 250. Augustine would face off with them in 396 CE, and again 
as they experienced a resurgence after the sack of Rome in 410, during which times 
many Christians renounced their faith to avoid persecution. According to Cyprian, to 
be a good Christian means codifying the Scriptures’ teachings into a series of iron-clad 
tenets which we have only to follow.82 The problem is that Cyprian identifies these 
tenets with specific dogma, such as “we must not swear,” and we must preserve 
“virginity and continence.”83 In this way, Cyprian and the Donatists who followed him 
focused upon objective discipline and obedience to a set of specific practices without 
regard for the subjective intent behind those who enact them. Consequently, even 
Christians who truly believe, but are never baptized or are forced to transgress the 
tenets without consent, are condemned as having lapsed.  
According to Augustine, the Donatists emphasize objective practice so much so that 
they forget that we must always have subjective fidelity to God. Seen in this way, 
Christians who renounced their faith from fear of persecution while remaining 
subjectively loyal to it are still good Christians. For example, in defence of the Christian 
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virgins who were raped during the fall of Rome, Augustine argues that they remained 
subjectively faithful to the Christian virtue of temperance from such earthly acts: 
“while the will remains firm and unshaken, nothing that another person does with the 
body, or upon the body, is any fault of the person who suffers it.”84 This is what Paul 
was getting at when he rebuked Peter for claiming that the Gentiles must follow Jewish 
customs like circumcision.85 For Paul as for Augustine, being a Christian is not only 
about outward obedience to traditional customs, but more importantly about the 
subjective intention behind such deeds: “he is a Jew who is one inwardly, and real 
circumcision is a matter of the heart, spiritual and not literal.”86 To cast out those who 
are faithful in their inner intention would only amount to weakening the unity of the 
Church. 
Whereas the Donatists follow the letter of the law so much so that they condemn even 
good Christians, the Pelagians make the inverse error of affirming that we can attain 
the Good from our own will without God’s grace. In Pelagius’ own words, “God 
wished to bestow on the rational creature the gift of doing good of his own free will, 
[…] so that with his capacity for good and evil he could do either.”87 For Augustine, 
the Pelagians fall into sin by imagining that they can merit beatitude without divine 
assistance and its representatives of the Church: “there are some persons who presume 
so much upon the free determination of the human will, as to suppose that it need not 
sin and that we require no divine assistance […] An inevitable consequence of this is, 
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that we ought not to pray ‘not to enter into temptation.’”88 Contrary to both Pelagian 
and Donatist temptations, we have seen that Augustine’s own ethics is neither a pure 
voluntarism nor a blind obedience to dogma, but rather an alchemy of subjective 
fidelity and practical action in the hope of our redemption through the love of God. 
2.4.4. The role of the Church and the State 
Augustine does not advocate performing such virtues in isolation from the community 
of believers. Along with our inner reason, he also prescribes that we obey the directives 
of the Church that also embodies God’s Word.89 Augustine even goes so far as to argue 
in doublespeak style that the Church paradoxically loves sinners punishing them if only 
so as to draw them closer to his grace: “nor are we thus precluded from inflicting such 
punishment as avails for correction, and as compassion itself dictates. […] Sin can be 
punished in love rather than be left unpunished.”90 Always a man of his word, 
Augustine supported the emperor’s decrees of 399, 407, 408 and 415 CE, which purged 
the Donatists. Clearly, Augustine’s idea that the Church must reorganize the temporal 
law around the eternal Law as best as it can, certainly had the potential, and indeed did 
fuel the ideological flames of the medieval Catholic Church’s directive that the 
oppressed look towards the future, messianic life of beatitude, rather than their misery’s 
immediate amelioration. 
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2.4.5. The fourth stage of history 
Augustine’s ethics ultimately comes down to envisioning our temporal lives as a 
concatenation of divinely ordained trials and tribulations, whereby we must avoid the 
temptation to choose the immediate, particular pleasures in favour of subjectively and 
objectively following the Church’s commandments as the divine’s earthly embryo. It 
is only in this way that we will be resurrected to our true level of perfection at the 
moment of the last judgment. It is this that Augustine anticipates as the fourth and final 
stage of human history: “how great shall be that felicity which shall be tainted with no 
evil, which shall lack no good!”91 Having finally laid his demons to rest, Augustine 
thinks that he can now rest another kind of rest, that of the eternal Sabbath, without 
labour or lack to corrupt its ontological completeness. 
2.5. AUGUSTINE’S DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION 
2.5.1. Whereof Augustine cannot speak 
In the beginning, Augustine developed a rationalist demonstration of the benevolent 
God’s existence. This permitted him to furnish a theodicy according to which evil is 
the privation of being as a result of our free will to affirm particular, passing pleasures 
over and above God’s perfection. Finally, Augustine’s ethics traced how we can 
redeem ourselves from the misuse of our will by living a life of contemplation and love 
of the divine Ideas incarnated by the Church. In the following chapters, we shall see 
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that Augustine’s absolutization of the Good is crucial insofar as it constitutes the model 
followed by philosophers as diverse as Descartes, Kant and Schelling. 
There, we shall also see that philosophy’s problem is that it not only inherits 
Augustine’s solutions, but also his problems. I will therefore conclude this chapter by 
problematizing Augustine’s philosophy for failing to truly explain both the Good and 
evil through a singular concept of being. Although by doing so I shall have to explain 
the last of Augustine’s central doctrines, I am nonetheless moving from a strict exegesis 
to a critical analysis. At the same time, this critical analysis lays the groundwork for an 
exegesis of Schelling’s own critique of the Augustinian tradition in the fifth chapter.  
2.5.2. Augustine’s late predestinarian turn 
My contention is that Augustine corners himself into admitting a certain beingness to 
evil in a way which threatens his initial ontologization of the Good. It is well-known 
that, in his 396 letter to Simplician, Augustine inaugurated a turn in his thinking by 
developing his doctrine of predestination, which would become ever more pronounced 
in his final years.92 Whereas Augustine initially argued that our free choice to perform 
good actions can lead to our redemption, he later argues that God predestines who shall 
go to heaven and hell, regardless of our good deeds: “it is therefore settled that God’s 
grace is not given according to the deserts of the recipients, but according to the good 
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pleasure of His will. […] He has certainly willed that His grace should be gratuitous.”93 
Augustine does not go so far as some later Protestant and occasionalist thinkers, who 
radicalised his predestinarian doctrine by arguing that God even predestines our 
particular choices.94 Conversely, for Augustine, the misuse of our will can lead us if 
elected to heaven to reverse God’s predestination such that we are sent to hell: “do we 
then by grace make void free will? God forbid! […] Free will is not made void through 
grace, but is established, since grace cures the will whereby righteousness is freely 
loved.”95 At the same time, those who are elected to hell cannot be saved no matter 
what good use they make of their will. Since we do not know whether we are elected 
to heaven or to evil, however, we cannot simply give in to vice, since this would ruin 
our chances of entering heaven if we are among the chosen elect. Furthermore, freedom 
is also maintained as the explanation for the origin of evil insofar as Adam was indeed 
free. It was only after Adam freely sinned that we were condemned to the temporal 
world where we can only be redeemed by God’s election. Augustine thus distinguishes 
between free will as the source of evil and redemption through predestination: “it is 
one thing to inquire into the source of evil and another to inquire how one can return 
to his original good.”96 In this way, Augustine maintains that he can still explain evil 
as Adam’s will to privation while stripping his descendants of their freedom. 
As we have already seen Blumenberg argue in the introduction, the objection can 
nonetheless be raised as to whether Augustine’s predestinarian doctrine puts in doubt 
his notion of being as absolutely good. Does predestination not mean that God is unjust, 
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insofar as he saves only some while condemning others to eternal damnation? To this 
kind of objection, Augustine responds that God cannot be charged with this injustice 
because any condemnation is still the just punishment for original sin. Instead, we 
should be happy that God is merciful enough to save anyone at all: “let us not then be 
ungrateful, that according to the good pleasure of His will, a merciful God delivers so 
many to the praise of the glory of His grace from such deserved perdition.”97 As Leszek 
Kolakowski succinctly puts it, even a gratuitous God is just, because “God owes us 
nothing.”98  
One can nonetheless legitimately argue that the sins of Adam are vastly 
disproportionate to the punishment of the eternal damnation of his progeny, who never 
even had the freedom to avoid their forbearer’s original sin. What Augustine thus 
misses is that the predestination of some to heaven is also the simultaneous 
predestination of others to a realm of eternal death. In this way, predestination 
effectively amounts to God’s bringing into being an eternal realm of pure non-being or 
privation alongside that of the Good. Consequently, God cannot be seen as wholly 
good, but rather as split by a second will-to-privation. The problem is that a God who 
wills the privation of his creations would be virtually indistinguishable from the devil 
who tempts us away from the Good. So, Augustine’s very attempt to affirm the 
benevolent God’s absolute omnipotence over all things through his predestinarian 
doctrine inadvertently threatens to introduce a principle of evil into the divine being 
itself. As Gillian Evans also suggests, “Augustine had really been moving back towards 
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a position on a certain issue close to that which he had occupied as a Manichee.”99 
Despite his attempt to prove being’s absolute goodness, Augustine’s late predestinarian 
turn threatens to topple his whole ontology. 
It is no wonder that it is precisely in Augustine’s defence of predestination that his 
original rational commitments are cast aside as he proceeds to assert by sheer faith 
alone that God’s reason for condemning some are mysterious, and yet just: “is there 
injustice with God? Of course not!”; and: “if it is disturbing, O man, who are you to 
talk back to God?”100 This elucidates why, in Christian Metaphysics and Neo-
Platonism, Albert Camus argues that Augustine’s pessimistic view of human depravity 
marked the decisive turn from Greek and Hellenic optimism in human reason’s ability 
to attain the Good towards a faith in divine redemption: “by understanding Saint 
Augustine, we can understand the entire course of Christianity’s evolution: to soften 
progressively Greek reason and to incorporate it into its own edifice, but in a sphere in 
which it is inoffensive. Beyond this sphere, it is obliged to yield its authority.”101 Here, 
Camus tends to overlook Augustine’s earlier affirmation of freedom and human reason 
as this chapter has traced. Nonetheless, Camus is right that Augustine’s later 
predestinarian doctrine makes a recourse to dogmatic faith to ensure that God remains 
just despite the withdrawal of his mercy from the damned. 
                                                     
99 Evans, Augustine on Evil, 147. In this thesis’ introduction, we already saw that Blumenberg also viewed 
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Augustine’s late predestinarian doctrine does not refute my thesis that, from his 
Christian conversion onwards, he always held that being was absolutely Good. Instead, 
it raises the question as to whether Augustine can rationally ontologize the Good 
without ultimately resorting to faith as a final court of appeal. By Augustine’s own 
rational standards, the recourse to faith in God’s enigmatic justice is the very 
inadequate response that his philosophy set out to resolve in the first place. The final 
step in Augustine’s solution to the problem thus comes full circle back to the problem 
of the solution.  
2.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Figure 1 below visualizes the problem of evil that Augustine cannot ultimately resolve. 
The largest circle at the centre represents Augustine’s concept of being as the absolute 
Good totalizing the qualities of all particular things. The four smaller circles that 
partially overlap with and partially fall outside the circle of the Good formalize God’s 
creation of a multiplicity of things by virtue of their participation to varying degrees in 
the godhead’s divine Ideas. Moving clockwise from the twelve o’clock position, we 
can see that most of the first circle falls within the being of the Good. It therefore 
symbolizes humanity’s true entelechy in the hierarchy of being. The second circle that 
still lies for the most part within the circle of being symbolizes the human being insofar 
as it is fallen from its proper, angelic rank of perfection, while retaining a significant 
access to the divine Ideas organizing its reason. The third circle symbolizes the animal, 
the plant and all other living organisms, who are caught halfway between the evil of 
privation and the being of the Good. The fourth and final circle represents inanimate 
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matter, which falls entirely outside of the circle of the Good. It is but one and the same 
with natural evil. 
That which lies within the large circle is what Augustine can explain: the being of the 
Good and the multiplicity of individuated creatures to the extent that they strive after 
that Good. Although Augustine dogmatically disavows that anything outside the circle 
has being, we can see that, apart from our reason, our entire lives transpire outside 
“being.” If metaphysics is about accounting for everything, including the brute fact of 
our own privative existence in the material world, the circle must be expanded to 
incorporate evil into the realm of being.  
Figure 1. Augustine’s hierarchy of being 
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In the fifth chapter we will see Schelling’s attempt, albeit ultimately unsuccessful, to 
reconcile the Good and evil by way of a single ontological force, entity, or principle. 
We must first step back from the world’s edge to see how philosophers in Augustine’s 
wake sought to defend his absolutization of the Good in ways that he could not.  
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CHAPTER 3. AFTER AQUINAS, DESCARTES’ EPISTEMIC 
AUGUSTINIANISM  
The rest of this thesis puts Descartes, Kant and Schelling in dialogue with Augustine 
to develop the hypothesis that one dominant thread of the Western philosophical 
tradition comprises a concatenation of methodological fortifications of Augustine’s 
metaphysics of the summum bonum and the privatio boni. This chapter focuses on 
correcting the textbook histories of philosophy’s typical portrayal of Descartes as 
having broken with medieval, Christian philosophy. In his influential biography of 
Descartes, Stephen Gaukroger best articulates the view that Descartes’ chief works lie 
in the fields of mathematics and natural philosophy rather than metaphysics and 
theology.102 By contrast, there is another view most recently championed by Stephen 
Menn in Descartes and Augustine, which emphasizes Augustine’s enduring influence 
or at least formal affinity with Descartes.103 What ultimately emerges from the 
immense literature on Descartes is two seemingly contradictory readings of Descartes 
as either breaking with or adhering to Augustinianism.  
This chapter does not so much set out to favour one view over the other, but shows 
how these two views are actually compatible. That is to say, it is possible to reconcile 
how Descartes can justly claim to revolt against late medieval Thomism, all the while 
remaining faithful to Christian philosophy’s earlier Augustinian tradition. To do this, 
it is necessary to trace how Aquinas broke with the apophatic theology in Augustine’s 
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wake by appropriating Aristotle’s more “quasi-empirical” or worldly method of 
inferring God’s existence from his footprints in the world. Having clarified how 
Augustine differs from Aquinas in terms of their methods of affirming the same 
Christian God’s absolute benevolence, I will then demonstrate that Descartes does 
break with the Thomist scholastics’ Aristotelian “empiricism”—albeit only by 
returning to Augustine’s even more ancient rationalism. Descartes thus translates 
Augustine’s ontological argument against the sceptics into his innate ideas of the cogito 
and the perfect God. He then translates Augustine’s theodicy into his epistemological 
account of error qua the privation of what truly is. Finally, he even reconstructs 
Augustine’s problematic predestinarian doctrine through his late “occasionalist turn.” 
3.1. AQUINAS’ WORDLY REFORTIFICATION OF AUGUSTINIANISM  
3.1.1. Aquinas against the mystics  
By the thirteenth century, the Augustinian tradition’s rational arguments were 
challenged and modified by theologians like Pseudo-Dionysius and Johannes Eckhart’s 
more mystically and apophatically inclined defences of God’s benevolence. According 
to these negative theologians and mystics, God’s goodness totally withdraws from this 
life. Consequently, we can only know him negatively, through a leap of faith, or by 
ineffable mystical experiences. Although he only emerged towards the end of Aquinas’ 
life, Eckhart best exemplifies this mystical Augustinianism. Eckhart grew up in a 
religious climate where many men had died during the Crusades and increasingly more 
women had assumed religious functions, in particular the female mystics known as the 
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“beguines.”104 With constant reference to Augustine, Eckhart argues that, since God’s 
goodness totally transcends the present, finite life, we cannot comprehend him through 
logical reasoning or empirical inferences. Instead, we can only grasp him by following 
our soul’s inner feeling or “will” for the Good:  
The soul has by nature two capacities. The one is intelligence. […] The second capacity 
is Will. That is a nobler one, and its essential characteristic is to […] lay hold of God 
in a mysterious manner, and the Unknown God imparts His impression to the Will. 
[…] Therefore St. Augustine saith that the soul is greater by its love-giving power than 
by its life-giving power.105  
                                                     
104 For Eckhart’s historical context and particularly the influence of the beguines, see Elizabeth Alvida Petroff, Body 
and Soul: Essays on Medieval Women and Mysticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 7. For accounts of 
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105 Johannes Eckhart, “The Self-Communication of God,” in Meister Eckhart’s Sermons, ed. and trans. Claud Field 
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“Augustine,” in Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys (Cambridge: Oxford University 
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in favor of following our innate yearning or “love” for a Good beyond which any temporal goods can gratify. To 
make this case, they all focus on the Confessiones’ early chapters, and particularly the “vision of Ostia.” They 
therefore downplay the fact that Augustine’s initial yearning is only a preliminary step in a longer rational deduction 
of the benevolent God. So, while it is possible to develop a mystical Augustinianism by focusing on this part in 
isolation from the whole, it does not really capture Augustine’s own proof. It is therefore as textually inaccurate as 
would be the argument that Augustine is a sceptic because of his stage of hyperbolic doubt before arriving at the 
certainty of his own and God’s existence. As Bernard McGinn explains, although “Eckhart was familiar with a wide 
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Eckhart: The Man from Whom God is Nothing (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 2001), 175. The best 
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“thinker’s mysticism” in the sense that he affirms that we can cognize God through our desire for an immutable 
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l’augustinisme (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2002), 70. 
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Eckhart’s statement here is typical of how Christian mystics reconfigured Augustine’s 
prescription to find God within ourselves into a focus on our sentiment, feeling or will 
instead of our rational thought.  
While the mystics’ method was different, they wielded it to the same end of seeking 
the divine being of the Good. Eckhart persists: “our salvation depends upon knowing 
and recognizing the Chief Good which is God Himself.”106 If Aquinas was also obliged 
to develop another method in the age of the Christian mystics, it was because the 
apophatic approach left the mystics open to the charge that their ethereal penchant for 
otherworldly transcendence could say nothing of the sensible, privative world in which 
we presently reside. Worse still, insofar as the mystics insisted that God completely 
transcends this life, they even inadvertently committed the heresy of granting the 
temporal order its own independent ontological existence. 
3.1.2. Aquinas’ Aristotelian revival 
At the same time that the beguines were becoming prominent, Latin translations of 
Aristotle were being so widely distributed in French, German, and English universities 
that the Church forbade certain Aristotelian doctrines in 1277 for posing the threat of 
a complete system, which was independent of Christian doctrine. Given, however, that 
Islamic philosophers were appropriating Aristotle’s philosophy with great success to 
fortify their own faith, certain Dominican philosophers like Aquinas sought to 
recuperate Aristotle for the Christian cause. On Aquinas’ reading, Aristotle had 
responded to Plato’s difficulty in accounting for the brute fact of sensible particulars 
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through his theory of transcendent Ideas by turning from metaphysics to physics and 
granting a certain beingness to the sensible world.107  
Putting two and two together, when confronted with the sensible remnant of the 
problem of evil for the mystics on the one hand, and the rediscovery of Aristotle’s 
corpus on the other, what Aquinas essentially did was to appropriate Aristotle’s 
worldlier or “quasi-empirical” method to show how even the sensible world finds its 
being in that of the benevolent God. As Chesterton explains, Aquinas’ “empirical turn” 
to Aristotle was motivated by the need to correct the Augustinian mystics’ 
otherworldliness that took little notice of the temporal world: 
There was in a sense a more subtle danger in Augustine the Platonist than even in 
Augustine the Manichaean. […] It thought of God too exclusively as a Spirit who 
purifies or a Saviour who redeems; and too little as a Creator who creates. That is why 
men like Aquinas thought it right to correct Plato by an appeal to Aristotle.108 
As Paul VI positions Aquinas contra mystics and naturalists alike by showing how 
Aristotelian worldliness still leads to Augustinianism: 
Thomas thus overcame the kind of exaggerated supernaturalism that flourished in the 
medieval schools and at the same time stood firm against the secularism that was being 
broadcast in the European universities through a naturalistic interpretation of Aristotle. 
He showed clearly in his teaching and in the example of his scientific approach to 
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reality, how a full and unconditional fidelity to the word of God was to be united in 
teaching and in life to a mind unreservedly open to the world.109 
Whereas the mystics argued that the Good completely transcends the present world 
except through the will’s ineffable communion, Aquinas sought to explain how the 
Good still organizes the sensible realm without being reducible to it, by appropriating 
Aristotle’s more worldly approach. 
For Aquinas, the origin of our knowledge lies in sense perception.110 Although we 
cannot grasp the purely intelligible idea of God, we can discern his effects in the 
sensible world: “the intellect depends on the sense for the origin of knowledge”; and: 
“because we are not able to see His essence, we arrive at the knowledge of His being, 
not through God Himself, but through His effects.”111 Aquinas even rejects the 
ontological argument that we can prove God’s existence by thinking the idea of God 
even if we have yet to encounter any of his sensible effects: “it does not follow 
immediately that, as soon as we know the meaning of the name God, the existence of 
God is known.”112 Certainly, Aquinas holds that the intellect is distinct from the body 
insofar as it survives the body’s death. Yet, our minds are hylomorphically bound to 
the corporeal in our present, fallen state. So, the search for redemption through the 
knowledge of God must begin with the sensible tools with which we are equipped.  
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The best example of Aquinas’ worldly approach is his five proofs for God’s existence, 
which infer from effects back to their divine Cause.113 Here, we can clearly discern 
Aristotle’s influence inasmuch as all five demonstrations are grounded upon the 
principles of the impossibility of real contradiction and infinite regress, which we never 
really observe in nature. As McInerny notes, “we can imagine the excitement with 
which Thomas poured over those passages in Aristotle where the pagan philosopher 
argues that the world of change and motion requires in order to be at all […] a first 
mover.”114 Aquinas’ “proof by movement” argues that we perceive things as constantly 
changing or moving from potentiality to actuality. Now, something cannot move from 
potentiality to actuality except if it is moved by another thing already in actuality. 
However, since an infinite regress of finite things moving other finite things from 
potentiality to act is also impossible, there must be a first Unmoved Mover, which 
moves all things without being moved itself, as the pure act without further potentiality, 
which Aquinas calls God. “The proof by efficient causality” states that nothing in the 
world of becoming can have its existence contained in its essence, since it would have 
to paradoxically exist before itself. But since an infinite series of efficient causes is also 
impossible, there must be a first Cause without cause, which we may call God. “The 
proof by contingency” explains that all things emerge, become and perish, and can 
therefore be and not be. If all things are thus contingent, and yet an infinite regress of 
contingent things as the cause of other contingent things is impossible, there must be a 
necessary Being or God, whose essence contains his existence. It is by means of this 
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necessary divine Being, rather than an infinite regress of contingent causes, that all 
other contingent things gain their temporary existence by participating in its Essence. 
The “proof by final causality” states that we regularly observe inanimate things 
gravitating around a certain goal or purpose too often to be mere chance. However, 
inorganic objects cannot have the knowledge of their own goal. It thus follows that 
another thing or a God must confer their goal on them. 
Most importantly for our purposes, the “proof by the degrees of being” marks a quasi-
empirical twist on Augustine’s own ontological argument by arguing that we make 
judgments about things as more or less good than others. While our judgments of things 
tend to change in accordance with the becoming of those things, they nonetheless imply 
a certain standard of Perfection or a God, who exists eternally and universally as the 
means by which all things participate to varying degrees to gain the qualities which we 
are judging: 
Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble, and the like […] 
as they resemble in their different ways something […] which is truest, something best, 
something noblest, and, consequently, something which is uttermost being. […] 
Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, 
goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.115 
Therein lies the empirical caveat to what is essentially Augustine’s own ontological 
argument: whereas Augustine argues that we judge ourselves in accordance with these 
ideas, which must therefore be more perfect than our minds, Aquinas argues that we 
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judge external things according to these ideas, which must be superior to the world. Be 
it by Augustine’s rationalism or Aquinas’ more worldly approach, the result is the 
same: the Idea of the Good must emanate from an even more perfect being than either 
ourselves or the world.  
Having inferred God’s existence, Aquinas proffers his “analogy of proportionality” to 
render him omnibenevolent. According to Aquinas’ analogical method, given that the 
five proofs demonstrated that God is the all-encompassing pure act towards which all 
sensible and contingent things gravitate as the centre of their true perfection, we can 
infer God’s properties by attributing to him the infinitely perfect qualities of our finite 
qualities: “it must be said that to see the essence of God there is required some 
similitude in the visual faculty, namely, the light of glory enlightening the intellect to 
see God, which is spoken of in the Psalm In Thy light we shall see light.”116 Putting the 
analogy of proportionality into action, Aquinas infers that, since God is the pure act 
after which all things strive, he is the absolute Perfection or Good of all, without any 
lack or deficiency: “all related perfections are in God. Hence He is universally 
perfect.”117 By observing that all things desire God’s pure act as the highest Good, 
insofar as it totalizes being’s full potentiality without privation, Aquinas is able to 
conflate being with God’s benevolence: “good and being are really the same”; and: 
“every being, as being, is good.”118 Such is how Aquinas refortifies Augustine’s 
ontologization of the Good by virtue of our experience in the ephemeral world of the 
fallen. 
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It only remains for Aquinas to infer that evil is merely a privation of God’s 
benevolence: “as Augustine says: since God is the highest good, He would not allow 
any evil to exist in his works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to 
bring good even out of evil.”119 Despite the semi-empirical facelift, Aquinas establishes 
the same thing as Augustine: being’s absolute goodness that reduces evil to the realm 
of non-being. 
3.2. DESCARTES’ MODERN BREAK AS A RETURN TO AUGUSTINE 
3.2.1. The sceptical backdrop to Descartes’ critique of Aquinas 
If I digressed to discuss Aquinas’ defence of Augustinian theodicy, it is because it 
created the conditions for Descartes’ modern break from Thomist scholasticism, if only 
by a return to Augustine’s rationalism. By the late sixteenth century in which Descartes 
was born, the Thomist scholastics’ inductions of God’s benevolence had been thrown 
into doubt by Montaigne and other modern sceptics. In “Apologie de Raymond 
Sabond,” Montaigne argues that our senses can give each of us different and even 
contradictory knowledge: “as for the error and uncertainty of the operation of sense, 
each can furnish as many examples as one pleases along with falsehoods and 
deceptions.”120 For instance, a phenomenon that is hot or good for one person can 
appear cold or bad for another. For Montaigne, then, the only sure road to God is 
through a leap of faith: “it is faith alone that certainly and wholeheartedly embraces the 
highest mysteries of our religion.”121 By now, this situation facing Descartes in the 
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early seventeenth century should sound familiar: much as Augustine appropriated the 
Neo-Platonists’ rationalism contra the academic sceptics, so does Descartes 
appropriate Augustine’s rationalism to combat the modern sceptics. 
3.2.2. Was Descartes really a Christian? 
It is true that Descartes often translates Augustine’s rationalism in terms of the 
Euclidean method of instilling us with the absolute certainty that our knowledge is 
valid, insofar as it is derived from axiomatic principles.122 It can thus seem as if 
Descartes is only using Augustine’s method to pursue a very different, and decidedly 
modern, end of determining the true for truth’s sake. According to Gaukroger, for 
instance, it is only after Galileo’s condemnation in 1633 that Descartes tries to reconcile 
his physics with theology by developing the ontological argument in the Méditations: 
What he was subsequently concerned to do was to legitimate his physical theory. […] 
The only way to do this effectively, Descartes came to believe, was in terms of a 
vocabulary and a mode of presentation derived from scholastic natural philosophy and 
metaphysics, despite the fact that these were completely antithetical to his own 
naturalist philosophy.123 
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Having published the Méditations in 1640, Descartes thus returns to systematizing his 
thoughts in the Principes de la philosophie and developing his physics in Passions de 
l’âme before his death at the decade’s end.  
On the contrary, my contention is that Descartes sought to prove being’s absolute 
goodness when confronted with the brute fact of physical evil. As Descartes makes it 
even more clear in his correspondence with Princess Elisabeth during the last decade 
of his life, philosophy’s ultimate goal must be to affirm the highest Good: “the 
sovereign good is without doubt the thing which we ought to put forward to ourselves 
as the goal of all our actions, and the contentment of mind that comes from it is also 
rightly called our end.”124 While Gaukroger is right that Descartes concentrated on 
mathematics and physics in the 1610s, Descartes already had a deeply religious 
education in the Jesuit collège system throughout the 1600s.125 On 10 November 1619, 
Descartes also had his three famous dreams where he was lost and confounded in the 
woods with phantoms surrounding him and lightning striking everywhere, before 
opening a book which told him to reflect inward on his own mind, and thereby become 
calmer through the certain conviction of his own existence. Upon waking, Descartes 
even attributed the dream to the grace of God. Baillet transcribes Descartes’ dream, 
recorded in his lost Olympia, in the first biography of Descartes: “continuing to 
interpret his dream in waking, Descartes supposed that the way out of incertitude [… 
was] the good council of a wise person, or even Moral Theology.”126 Gaukroger 
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himself describes Descartes’ night of dreams as a tarrying with the problem of evil in 
the guise of sensible deceptions: “feeling that while he had not erred in the eyes of men, 
he may have erred in the eyes of God, he reflected on good and evil.”127 On 
Gaukroger’s own account, Descartes’ dreams expressed a tension between his religious 
convictions and his physical experimentations: “guilt played a crucial role in the 
‘Christianization’ of pupils. […] It would have been nothing short of remarkable if 
Descartes […] had not felt the rigours of the Christianizing process.”128 Given that 
Descartes’ 1619 dream already contained the schematic germ of the Méditations’ 
musings on scepticism, the evil demon, the cogito and the ontological argument, 
Gaukroger undermines his own thesis that Descartes only became concerned with the 
problem of evil after 1633. This alone elucidates why, precisely after his dreams, 
Descartes spent the next year working on his first account of the rationalist method in 
Règles pour la direction de l’esprit. Later on, Descartes himself identifies 1619 as the 
year that he abandoned the study of books to join the army so as to start from scratch 
in his experience of the world without learned prejudices: “this is why […] I entirely 
left behind the study of letters, […] resolving to no longer search for any other science 
than that which I could find within myself.”129  
It is true that, after 1620, Descartes returned to working on his physics and mathematics 
after struggling to furnish the desired method. His continued religious motives are 
clear, however, insofar as he recommenced writing Les Règles in 1626-7. Descartes 
describes the difficulty of reconciling his natural philosophy with the Christian faith in 
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a letter to Mersenne: “as for what you asked me, how Christian virtues agree with the 
natural, I do not know what to say”; and: “I fear that you would judge that my 
philosophy is too emancipated from theology.”130 In light of these facts, Descartes’ 
hesitation to publish the exposition of his physics in Le Monde before the Méditations 
did not simply stem from a fear of persecution; it was also because of his own desire to 
reconcile his natural philosophy with his Christian faith. As Descartes himself tells us 
in a letter to Mersenne: “I only wanted to entirely suppress the Treaty that I had made, 
and lose almost all my work of four years, so as to render an entirely obedient life to 
the Church.”131 Gaukroger himself wonders why Descartes did not publish Le Monde, 
given that he would not have actually faced persecution in the Netherlands or France, 
where a similar physics was already widely accepted.132 Seen in this light, to imagine 
that Descartes only really cared about his physics and mathematical inquiries simply 
because they form his earliest writings (which is not even true, given his even earlier 
religious school years) would be like imagining that Augustine must have always been 
anti-Christian because he was first a Manichean.  
If there is any controversy at all as to whether Descartes’ theology specifically harks 
back to Augustine, it is because, although we know that Descartes regularly discussed 
Augustine with Mersenne from 1637 onwards, the extant correspondence commences 
almost a decade after Descartes began to compose an early version of the 
Méditations.133 It is also true that Descartes initially responds to Mersenne’s 
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observation of the similarities between Descartes and Augustine that the latter “does 
not seem to make the use of it [the cogito] that I do.”134 Three years later, however, 
Descartes endorses Augustine’s cogito argument to certify our own existence at 
Mersenne’s repeated behests: “I truly find that it serves to prove the certitude of our 
being.”135 Descartes’ final viewpoint on Augustine is that he is happy to trace his own 
philosophy back to Augustine, since he is no longer interested in originality: “I have 
great satisfaction that my thought agrees with those of a so wise and excellent person. 
Because I am hardly of the mindset of those who desire that their opinions appear 
new.”136 Whether Augustine directly influenced Descartes is an irresolvable question 
that is ultimately incidental to this thesis.137 What is important for my present purposes 
is whether Descartes shared a thought structure that can be seen as originating with 
Augustine; and from Descartes’ own account, it can. 
Certainly, Descartes argues at times that he wants to determine whether we can really 
possess absolutely indubitable knowledge. On second impressions, however, 
Descartes’ motives for certain knowledge turn out to be one and the same with 
Augustine’s theological objectives, insofar as he can only anchor our knowledge upon 
secure foundations by demonstrating the benevolent God’s existence. Descartes’ 
metaphysics and physics cannot therefore be completely separated, since he needs the 
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mathematical approach to prove God, and needs God’s benevolence to guarantee his 
physics. As Michael Latzer argues, “the distinction breaks down in other ways, too, 
when we recognize that divine grace is just as surely needed for cognitive clarity and 
the attainment of truth as it is for moral integrity and salvation.”138 Consequently, 
Descartes’ fixation upon finding a sure footing against deceptive sense perception—
what he also tellingly calls the “evil demon”—reflects Augustine’s own obsession with 
the problem of evil. Descartes himself identifies the desire to repress evil or error as 
the driving motive of his rationalist renovation of the Christian faith: “I must examine 
if there is a God, and […] if he can deceive: because without the knowledge of these 
two truths, I do not see how I can ever be certain of anything.”139 Little wonder that 
Descartes himself even concedes to Arnauld’s claim that “the basis for Descartes’ 
entire philosophy [is] exactly the same principle as that laid down by St. Augustine”: 
“it would be a kind of impiety to apprehend that discovered truths in philosophy were 
contrary to those of faith.”140   
If Descartes was nonetheless held to be heretical by many of his contemporaries, it is 
because his “new” method of fortifying the Christian faith is at least formally opposed 
to the Thomist tradition’s inductive arguments, if not to its end result of demonstrating 
the divine existence. We now know better, however, that Descartes’ rationalist method 
should not be seen as sacrilegious, since it only opposes Aquinas so as to return to the 
earlier Church father Augustine’s own rationalist method when confronted with the 
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Thomists’ inadequacies to indubitably prove the articles of faith. As Gilson explains, 
“the [Augustinian] tradition by which he founded himself was universally respected in 
the Church, and it is for this that Descartes could not have lacked being sensitive to it. 
[…] In Saint Thomas’ place, he substituted Saint Augustine.”141 The remainder of this 
chapter will thus trace how Descartes follows Augustine even more so than Aquinas: 
from his initial scepticism and the epiphany of his own existence, to the purely 
intelligible proof of the benevolent God’s existence, to the theodicy of error as the 
privation of reality emanating from our free will, and even to his own theodicy’s 
undoing through his late occasionalism, according to which God predestines sinners to 
their sins.  
3.3. DESCARTES’ MÉDITATIONS MÉTAPHYSIQUES 
3.3.1. The first three meditations’ recapitulation of Augustine’s ontological 
argument 
In the preface to the Méditations, Descartes puts his Augustinian cards on the table by 
arguing that he aims to use his new rational method to rectify on surer grounds the two 
classical Augustinian doctrines of our soul’s free, immortal existence, and of the 
benevolent God’s capacity to consequently reward or punish us, depending upon how 
we utilize our freedom. By appropriating their own philosophical approach, Descartes 
believes that he will be able to convert even the modern sceptics back to the Church’s 
ranks: 
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I have always held that these two questions, about God and the soul, were the principle 
one which ought to be demonstrated by the reasoning of philosophy rather than by 
theology. […] It does not seem possible to ever be able to persuade infidels to any 
religion, nor even to any moral virtue, if one does not firstly prove to them these two 
things by natural reason.142  
In the first meditation, Descartes adheres to Augustine’s own initial method of radical 
scepticism by observing that our sense perception sometimes deceives us, such that we 
ought to doubt all our empirical knowledge, including even the scholastics’ inductive 
proofs for God’s existence.143 John Carriero highlights throughout his reading of the 
Méditations its anti-Thomist bent in terms of its rationalist method, if not its ultimate 
aim of verifying the benevolent God’s existence: “the fundamental issue separating 
Descartes and Aquinas concerning our knowledge of God is their different conceptions 
of how we cognize God. […] Descartes holds that our cognition of God is not 
constructed from sensory materials: we cognize God immediately.”144 The problem 
with Carriero, however, is that he can only see Descartes as a modern break, since he 
overlooks that Descartes not only critiques medieval philosophy qua Thomism, but 
appropriates it qua Augustinianism.  
In any case, Descartes adds, we must not simply doubt knowledge emanating from our 
exterior sense; we must even doubt our purely conceptual, interior knowledge, as if an 
evil demon were deceiving us into mistaking non-being for being: 
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I will therefore suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, 
but a certain evil demon, no less cunning and deceitful as he is powerful, has employed 
all his industry to deceive me. […] This is why I will carefully take guard to not believe 
any falsity.145  
In the second meditation, Descartes’ hyperbolic doubt paradoxically permits him the 
same insight that permitted Augustine to counter the ancient academic sceptics: he 
cannot doubt his own existence without affirming his existence, at least as a doubting, 
and hence thinking, thing: “there is thus no doubt that I am, if he deceives me; and that 
he deceives me all that he will want, he will never be able to make me think that I am 
nothing, so long as I would think to be something.”146 By securing this one truth of his 
own existence as a thinking substance, a truth which is absolutely certain even when 
he doubts it, Descartes recapitulates Augustine’s own immanent critique of the 
sceptics. 
Like Augustine, however, Descartes wants to know more truths about reality outside 
the self-certifying existence of the res cogitans. In the third meditation, Descartes thus 
essentially recapitulates Augustine’s ontological argument.147 He does this by 
surmising first that all our ideas must have causes, and secondly that these causes must 
have as much reality as their ideal effects if they are to produce them.148 For instance, 
the ideas of particular, physical objects could have been created by us as a thinking 
substance insofar as we can think of such objects’ purely intelligible and mathematico-
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geometric forms, which possess more reality than their particular, physical 
instantiations. However, the idea of an absolutely benevolent and all-powerful God 
cannot emanate from our own finite beings, since it contains more reality than 
ourselves. We have no experience of anything infinite, yet we have an idea of infinity; 
so this idea cannot have come from our experience. In fact, the only thing from whence 
such an idea of a being without limit could emanate is from such a perfect being itself. 
Descartes affirms: “God exists, because […] I will not have the idea of an infinite 
substance, I who am a finite being, if it has not been put in me by some substance which 
was truly infinite.”149 Here, Descartes may seem Thomist since his proof is based on 
explaining finite effects by way of an infinite cause. For Descartes, however, the 
thought of the finite and the infinite transpire wholly within the mind, rather than 
through judgments about the external world. As Secada puts it, whereas Aquinas is 
“existentialist” in that he holds that we know a thing’s existence before its essence, 
Descartes is “essentialist” in holding that we know a thing’s nature before its 
existence.150 All epistemic cosmetics aside, the third meditation is a close 
recapitulation of Augustine’s ontological argument of examining our own ideas to 
prove God’s existence. 
For this linkage of Descartes’ ontological argument to that of Augustine to work, it is 
important to briefly address the role of Saint Anselm. Many commentators argue that 
Descartes’ ontological argument originated with Anselm’s argument in the eleventh 
century that, since we can conceive of something of which nothing is greater, it must 
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exist in reality, since to exist is greater than to not exist.151 In Anselm’s reply to 
Guanilon’s “lost island” objection, he expresses his ontological argument in terms even 
more closely aligned to that of Descartes. Namely, he specifies that he is not saying 
that everything that can be thought, such as Guanilon’s imaginary island, necessarily 
exists in reality. He is merely saying that what can be thought that could not have been 
generated from thought, such as the idea of a being more perfect than thought, must 
necessarily exist.152 Here, I do not deny that Anselm’s ontological argument anticipates 
that of Descartes. I merely want to point out that, as Anselm himself acknowledges, he 
is merely recapitulating Augustine’s original ontological argument:  
I have not been able to find that I have made in it any statement which is inconsistent 
with the writings of the Catholic Fathers, or especially with those of St. Augustine. 
Wherefore […] let me first read diligently Augustine’s books on the Trinity, and then 
judge my treatise in the light of those.153  
While we cannot be certain that Descartes directly drew upon Augustine, he himself 
acknowledges the influence of Anselm, who was indeed influenced by Augustine. 
3.3.2. The fifth meditation’s proof of God’s perfection 
In the fifth meditation, Descartes proffers an even more strictly Augustinian proof for 
God’s existence in a way which also more explicitly confers him the attribute of 
perfection.154 If we were able to create the idea of God, Descartes argues, we would 
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totalize all of reality, since the Idea of God denotes the absolute perfection of all reality 
itself without lack or remainder. However, we judge ourselves to be finite and deficient 
with reference to the idea of God’s infinite perfection (enssumme perfectum). It is thus 
impossible that we or anything else could have produced the idea of an infinitely good 
being of which we are deprived. It therefore follows that such an idea can only emanate 
from that infallible being itself: “it is necessary that I attribute to Him all sorts of 
perfections. […] And this necessity is sufficient for me to make myself conclude that 
this first and sovereign being truly exists.”155 Here as elsewhere, Descartes closely 
follows Augustine’s proof for God’s existence from the fact of our inferior self-
evaluation when juxtaposed with his absolute perfection. 
3.3.3.  The fourth meditation’s epistemic translation of Augustine’s theodicy 
After having anchored being’s perfection upon surer, Augustinian soil than Thomist 
scholasticism, in the fourth meditation, Descartes addresses Augustine’s subsequent 
problem of how evil can exist in a world created by the benevolent God. Here, 
Descartes seeks to pass off Augustine’s theodicy as a kind of epistemological account 
of error qua reality’s privation. It is clear that Descartes is referring to the same 
signified as Augustine, in the latter’s idea of “evil,” by the epistemic term of “error,” 
when Descartes negatively defines this error as nothing “real and positive” in the 
twofold sense of the latter adjective as neither good, nor ontologically existent. On the 
contrary, error is the mere “privation” of the truth of what really is.156 As Descartes 
recapitulates the Augustinian theodicy in epistemic terms: “as for privation, which only 
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consists of the formal reason of error and sin, it has no need of any relation to God 
since it is not a thing or a being.”157 It follows from this that God cannot deceive us by 
depriving us of the real, since he is one and the same with reality’s perfection: “it is 
impossible that He ever deceive myself, since in all fraud and deception we encounter 
some sort of imperfection.”158 Descartes’ (and Augustine’s) second proof has already 
shown that God bestows us the capacity to judge things as true or false, insofar as our 
reason orbits around the Ideas in his mind qua reality’s totalization. In a letter to 
Mersenne, Descartes cites Augustine as an authority on this very critical point: “to 
those who say that God continually deceives, […] they contradict the fundamentals of 
the Faith, which is that God cannot deceive, and which is repeated in many places in 
S. Augustine.”159 By redefining evil as the error of privation of what reality is actually 
like, Descartes is able to acquit God of all charges inasmuch as he is being’s totality. 
Through his notion of “noetic sin,” Peter Harrison has also argued that the early modern 
epistemic pre-occupation with error was influenced by the theological idea that the Fall 
cognitively impaired our faculties, an idea which had been revived through the 
Protestant Reformation’s appropriation of the Augustinian corpus.160 While Harrison 
shows how this led natural philosophers to develop microscopes, telescopes and other 
empirical aids to supplement our fallen senses, others like Descartes focused on pure 
reason as our sole faculty that rests intact after the Fall.161 At the same time, Harrison 
tends to trace Descartes’ rationalism back to Aquinas’ optimism that we can think the 
                                                     
157 Descartes, Méditations, 465-6.  
158 Descartes, Méditations, 456.  
159 Descartes, “À Mersenne 21 avril 1641,” Correspondance III, 359-60. My translation. 
160 Peter Harrison, The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
3. 
161 Harrison, Fall, 6. 
 
 
72 
glory of God, contra Augustine’s (late) pessimistic view of human depravity: 
“Descartes held fast to a relatively optimistic Thomist account of human nature and 
aspired to attain, in his own words, a ‘perfect knowledge of all things.’”162 This is 
because Harrison largely downplays Augustine’s own rationalism by accepting the 
Calvinist focus on his late predestinarian doctrine, in isolation from his larger 
framework as the exhaustive account of Augustine. Elsewhere, Harrison does 
acknowledge Augustine’s confidence in reason’s capacity to access the divine 
mysteries against the Protestant account: “the retention of these ‘gifts’ provided 
Augustine with the confidence to refute skepticism.”163 Here, Harrison admits that the 
Protestant reading of Augustine’s predestinarian doctrine takes on a life of its own 
beyond its original source: “they surpassed Augustine in their stress on the depravity 
of human nature.”164 Hence, while Harrison is right that early modern philosophy 
translates sin as error, at times he overlooks how this is philosophically rooted in 
Descartes’ return to Augustine rather than to Aquinas.  
Thus far, Descartes has only demonstrated that evil does not emanate from God’s will. 
He still has to address from whence it does arise. To this end, Descartes qualifies that, 
since we are not ourselves God, our knowledge by virtue of our reason’s participation 
in the divine Ideas is inferior and finite. But, although our knowledge is limited, our 
will surpasses those limits in its curiosity to think the entirety of being in all its 
perfection. Putting the two and two of our infinite will and finite knowledge together, 
we have the freedom to at least attempt to understand all of reality because of our will, 
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even if we will not ultimately be able to because of our finite understanding. Descartes’ 
initial method of hyperbolic doubt already presupposed that we have the free will to 
turn against our prejudices to believe in the existence of God, the world, and even 
ourselves before we have actually proven them: “we have a free will that makes it such 
that we can abstain from believing doubtful things, and thus prevent ourselves from 
being deceived.”165 It is only a simple, next step for Descartes to deduce that error 
transpires as the consequence of our free choice to try to (mis)recognize a part of reality 
for the whole, which is ultimately beyond the boundaries of what we can know: 
The will being a lot ampler and more extended than the understanding, […] I also 
extend it to things I do not understand; to which […] it easily distances itself, and 
chooses good for bad, or the false for the true. This is what makes it such that I deceive 
myself and sin.166 
Descartes thus concludes his epistemic translation of Augustine’s theodicy with the 
ethical caveat that we ought to refrain from making such judgments beyond the scope 
of our finite knowledge if we are to avoid erroneously depriving God of his full and 
glorious being: “if I abstain from giving my judgement on a thing, when I do not really 
conceive it with clarity and distinction, it is evident that I make good use of it, and that 
I am not deceived.”167 Here as elsewhere, Descartes’ account of our free will as the 
source of error recalls Augustine’s concept of moral evil rooted in voluntas.  
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3.4. DESCARTES’ LATE OCCASIONALISM 
3.4.1. The fifth and sixth meditations’ mind-body dualism 
The trouble with Descartes is that he is so faithful to Augustine that he ultimately 
recapitulates the latter’s own predestinarian doctrine in an occasionalist guise to the 
extent that both can be seen as undermining the initial ontologization of the Good. 
Descartes’ troubles arise when his very recapitulation of God’s absolute perfection 
compared to lowly, extended things corners him into inadvertently ontologizing 
extended substance as a separate being.168 More precisely, Descartes qualifies that we 
have a clear and distinct idea of the cogito and God as spiritual substances, without 
reference to any other substance beyond them. Since we need nothing outside of 
spiritual substance in order to explain it, we thus have an ontologically distinct being. 
What Descartes soon realizes, however, is that it equally follows from this that we can 
clearly and distinctly conceive of extended substance without the idea of any spiritual 
substance: “the soul is a substance entirely distinct from the body; because, examining 
that which we are, […] we have no need of extension, of figure, of being in any place, 
nor of any other such thing that we can attribute to the body.”169 Descartes is thus 
obliged to confer extension its own ontological substantiality. It is Descartes’ mind-
body dualism that led to Leibniz’s critique of his physics for conceding to the atheist 
idea that extended substance has its own kingdom of being distinct from that of heaven. 
In Leibniz’s own words: 
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As to the philosophy of Descartes, […] I do not hesitate to say absolutely that it leads 
to atheism. […] I believe that the laws of mechanics which serve as a basis for the 
whole system depends on final causes; that is to say, on the will of God determined to 
make what is most perfect, and that matter does not take all possible forms but only 
the most perfect; otherwise it would be necessary to say that there will be a time when 
all will be evil.170 
Following Leibniz, the Church even put Descartes on the index of heretical writers 
because his mind-body dualism seemed to contradict the idea that the Eucharist coheres 
the body around the mind.171  
3.4.2. Descartes’ late occasionalist turn 
In his 1640s correspondence with Princess Elisabeth before his death in 1650, 
Descartes attempted to resolve the mind-body dualism by way of an anticipation of 
occasionalism.172 According to this occasionalist doctrine, God would not be the 
supremely perfect being if events transpired that did not emanate from him. Given that 
he is indeed such a being as Descartes has already shown, God must occasion all events, 
including all of the effects that seemingly stem from our will: 
We cannot demonstrate He exists except by considering Him as a supremely perfect 
being. He would not be supremely perfect if something could happen in the world that 
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did not come entirely from Him. […] God is such a universal cause of everything that 
He is in the same way the total cause, and thus nothing can happen without His will.173 
As Gaukroger explains Descartes’ later occasionalist bent (albeit against his own thesis 
separating Cartesian physics from metaphysics), “at no stage did Descartes believe that 
human perceptual cognition, still less human behaviour, could be explained without 
reference to an immaterial intelligence.”174 It is no wonder that, in the wake of 
Descartes’ death, other Cartesians like Nicolas Malebranche recapitulated Descartes’ 
rationalist method, cogito and ontological arguments, and physics; albeit, with the 
added supplement of a greater occasionalist emphasis in part to alleviate Leibniz’s 
concern that physical evil is a distinct, ontological realm from that of divine spirit.175  
The problem is that this occasionalist solution to the Cartesian mind-body problem 
simply reproduces the same problem found in Augustine’s predestinarian doctrine. As 
we saw in the second chapter, if God predestines or occasions everything including 
even our particular choices, he is in some sense willing immoral acts into being. As 
Latzer, too, suggests: “is my putative freedom to avoid error and to choose the good 
and the true a genuinely unconstrained power, given that, in the very strident language 
of Descartes’ letter to the princess, the slightest thought could not enter into a person’s 
mind without God’s willing?”176 In Descartes’ own words: 
When we think of the infinite power of God, we cannot but believe that all things 
depend on Him and, by consequence, that our free will is not exempt from this. For it 
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implies a contradiction to say that God created men of such a nature that the actions of 
their will do not depend on His. For this is the same as saying that his power is […] 
finite since there is something that does not depend on it at all.177 
Like the late Augustine’s appeal to faith in God’s mysteries, all that Descartes’ 
Cartesian followers like Malebranche could say in the face of this objection is that we 
cannot say anything about God’s ultimately enigmatic machinations: “do not ask why 
God wants to unite spirits to bodies. It is a constant fact, but whose principles has 
hitherto been unknown to philosophy.”178 Ultimately, Descartes’ late occasionalist turn 
fairs no better than Augustine’s predestinarian doctrine at rationally defending being’s 
absolute goodness when confronted with the brute fact of evil.  
3.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Descartes’ initial goal was to rationally demonstrate Augustine’s ontologization of the 
Good contra the sceptics and scholastics alike. The starting point of hyperbolic doubt, 
the cogito argument, the ontological argument, and the epistemic theodicy: all these 
ideas are already present in Augustine. The problem with Descartes is that he was so 
faithful to Augustine even to the point of his own undoing, namely when he makes God 
responsible for our sins through his late occasionalist doctrine. Since Descartes and his 
Cartesian disciples proved inadequate at defending the Augustinian theodicy by 
depriving evil of any ontological reality, we shall see in the next chapter why Kant 
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sought to ontologize the Good by other means than rationalism (not to mention 
empiricism and mysticism).  
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CHAPTER 4. THE AUGUSTINIAN “ANTINOMY” OF 
KANT’S CRITICAL TURN 
“How fortunate we are that neither moral nor physical evil can shake our faith in one God 
who governs the world in accordance with moral laws!”—Kant, Lectures on Philosophical 
Theology 
 
Having situated Descartes’ modern break in the Augustinian lineage, in this chapter we 
shall see how even Kant’s critical turn adheres to the central tenets of the Church 
father’s metaphysics of the Good. After Cartesian rationalism and Thomist 
scholasticism, Augustine’s influence is so widespread under other names that it can no 
longer be a matter of historically tracing philosophers’ direct references to him, or 
through intermediary figures, who were in turn influenced by him. As Elmar J. Kremer 
and Michael J. Latzer note, “if it is possible to speak of a ‘consensus’ or ‘mainstream’ 
approach to theodicy in the Christian West, such would be the theodicy of Saint 
Augustine.”179 Instead, I will make a comparative study of the formal resemblances 
between Augustine and Kant.180 
                                                     
179 Elmar J. Kremer and Michael J. Latzer, “Introduction,” in The Problem of Evil in Early Modern Philosophy, eds. 
Elmar J. Kremer and Michael J. Latzer (London: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 4. 
180 To my knowledge, there are only two articles that put Kant and Augustine in dialogue: Edgar Valdez, “Kant, 
Augustine and Room for Faith,” in Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 18, no. 1, 2013, 
19-35; and John E. Hare, “Augustine, Kant and the Moral Gap,” in The Augustinian Tradition, ed. Gareth B. 
Matthews (London: University of California Press, 1999). Valdez links Augustine’s idea that we cannot find the 
divine Good in the sensible world, but only through faith in a supersensible beyond, to Kant’s idea that we cannot 
find the highest moral law in phenomena but only in the noumenon by taking it as the object of rational faith. Hare 
links Augustine’s proto-Calvinist idea that we cannot attain salvation in this life to Kant’s idea of the highest Good 
as a regulative, unattainable ideal. While both essays make important steps of putting Augustine and Kant in 
dialogue, this chapter focuses on the broader similarities between their projects as both attempting to ontologize the 
Good, albeit by different means (primarily rationalist for Augustine and practico-transcendental for Kant).  
 
 
80 
Now, it is true that Kant’s first Kritik is deeply sceptical about Descartes and 
Augustine’s ontological arguments for being’s perfection. Nevertheless, we shall see 
how, in his second Kritik, Kant recapitulates Augustine’s ontologization of the Good, 
not by mobilizing rationalism as Descartes and Augustine do, but through a practico-
transcendental method. This new method enables Kant to argue that our moral 
behaviour operates in such a way as if we have a free and immortal soul with duties 
towards a benevolent Creator. Once more, evil can only result from our freedom to 
deviate from the law of the highest, divine Good. By inferring that the same, old 
benevolent God is the necessary condition for the possibility of our moral practice’s 
validity, Kant redeems the Redeemer once more in a recapitulation of Augustinian 
theodicy by other, critical means.  
In the final analysis, however, I will argue that Kant’s practical ontologization of 
human freedom inadvertently ontologizes our moral evil to negate the benevolent being 
from whence we emanate as much as it ontologizes our good will. Having elucidated 
Kant’s aborted effort to rescue what he still can of the Augustinian doctrine by 
transcendental means, we shall then be in a good position to see how Schelling’s 
philosophy submits the Augustinian legacy, with Kant included, to a negative 
reassessment.  
4.1. KRITIK DER REINEN VERNUNFT 
4.1.1. The question of metaphysics 
Certainly, Kant opens the first Kritik by lamenting the fact that, whereas the sciences 
are constantly making progress in their knowledge of the world, metaphysics is mired 
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in a “battlefield” of contradictory ideas and systems.181 Given that metaphysics has 
already abdicated its throne as queen of the sciences by Kant’s day, it would be 
surprising if Kant were to dedicate his gargantuan book to further beating an already 
dead dog. On the contrary, Kant’s goal is to restore metaphysics upon a new, legitimate 
ground by calling into question the validity of its older, dogmatic form.182 
Kant begins his inquiry into the possibility of true metaphysical knowledge by 
observing that all knowledge is comprised of two kinds of judgments, linking 
predicates to subjects. On the one hand, a priori, analytic judgments have their 
predicates contained in the concept of the subject. For instance, the statement “all 
bodies are extended” is an analytic judgment, because bodies imply extension. On the 
other hand, synthetic, a priori judgments have to infer the predicate because it is not 
contained in the concept of the subject. For example, the proposition “all bodies are 
heavy” is a synthetic, a priori judgment because heaviness is not implied by the 
essential definition of bodies. Since such synthetic a priori judgments make universal 
claims, they cannot be derived with certainty from the particular objects of experience. 
That is to say, if all our knowledge purely conforms to particular objects of experience, 
we cannot validly generalize any objective, universal propositions. For objective, 
universal knowledge to be possible, objects must instead conform to our a priori 
cognition. Kant explains his “Copernican turn” of re-envisioning objects as conditioned 
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by cognition, rather than our cognition as derived from objects: “if intuition has to 
conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything 
of them a priori; but if the object conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, 
then I can very well represent this possibility.”183 Only if Kant can show that our 
metaphysical knowledge derives from an a priori, “pure” or “transcendental” ground 
through which all objects are given can he restore metaphysics’ validity.  
4.1.2.  The transcendental aesthetic 
In the “Transcendental Aesthetic,” Kant turns to considering the transcendental 
conditions for synthetic, a priori judgments or metaphysical knowledge by examining 
how the mind is first affected by objects through what he calls “sensibility.” Sensibility 
denotes the pure forms of intuition before any concrete sensations since they are that 
through which all sensations appear. According to Kant, all objects of outer and inner 
sense are given in terms of two forms of space and time respectively. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that space and time are not empirical objects drawn from 
experience, but rather the ground that all sensations presuppose to appear at all. While 
we can therefore think of all objects in space and time as not existing, we cannot think 
of space and time as not existing. In Kant’s terms, although space and time are 
“empirically real,” they are also “transcendentally ideal” as the conditions for all 
objects of experience, which nonetheless arise from the mind rather than being things-
in-themselves.184  
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4.1.3.  The transcendental logic 
In the “Transcendental Logic,” Kant argues that, while intuition gives objects to us, we 
can only think them through “concepts of the understanding.” Just as there are no 
concepts without intuition to think, so is there no thought of intuition without concepts: 
“thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”185 The 
necessary, a priori rules of the understanding are formalized by logic in terms of our 
faculty of judgment, which attributes predicates to subjects. Kant identifies four 
general, underived types of judgments which each have three moments: quantity that 
judges in terms of universal, particular and singular moments; quality that judgments 
affirmatively, negatively or infinitely; relation that judges categorically, hypothetically 
or disjunctively; and modality that judges problematically, assertorically or 
apodictically. These judgments permit us to synthesize a sensible manifold of intuition 
under one cognition or concept through three steps: intuition gives a sensible manifold; 
the imagination synthesizes this manifold under a concept of the understanding; and 
the concept gives the manifold a unity. This threefold synthesis generates as many 
categories of the understanding as there are judgments by which we can think a sensible 
manifold of intuition: the categories of quantity that are divided into unity, plurality 
and totality; quality that are divided into reality, negation and limitation; relation 
divided into substance and accidents, cause and effect, and reciprocity or community 
between agent and patient; and modality divided into possibility and impossibility, 
existence and non-existence, and necessity and contingency. 
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Kant also provides a “transcendental deduction” of this threefold synthesis to guarantee 
the concepts’ objective validity by showing that they arise a priori before all particular 
objects of experience. To this end, Kant identifies the three faculties of the mind as 
sense, imagination and apperception. Sense creates the “synopsis” of the a priori 
manifold by distinguishing it in time and space; imagination the “synthesis” of the 
manifold by reproducing it under an a priori rule; and “apperception” the 
transcendental unity of the manifold as reproduced by imagination.186 Kant pays 
particular attention to the last moment according to which we can only see the manifold 
as a unity by distinguishing it from other past impressions, which requires a 
consciousness, or “transcendental unity of apperception,” that represents the manifold 
reproduced by imagination in terms of our past impressions: “it is this apperception 
that must be added to the pure imagination in order to make its function intellectual for 
in itself the synthesis of the imagination, although exercised a priori, is nevertheless 
always sensible, for it combines the manifold only as it appears in intuition.”187 
Through the transcendental deduction’s threefold synthesis, we arrive at the objective 
validity of the categories of the understanding, since they are not empirically inferred 
from contingent objects of experience (which would require us to merely assume their 
universality), but are rather the conditions for all possible experience as such.  
4.1.4. The analytic of principles 
In the “Analytic of Principles,” Kant details the faculty of judgment’s way of 
subsuming things under given rules in terms of “transcendental schema,” which apply 
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pure concepts of the understanding to sensible intuition. Put otherwise, the schema is 
that part of the imagination which turns a sensible image into a cognition by relating it 
to the rule of the concept. The schema thus mediates between the purely sensible image 
and the a priori concept. The table of judgments generates four possible schemata for 
synthesizing a sensible manifold under the unity of a concept. The “axioms of intuition” 
synthesize all appearances in terms of extensive magnitudes. The “anticipations of 
perception” give each object an intensive magnitude or specific degrees of reality 
through the affirmation of certain qualities and the negation of others. The “analogies 
of experience” synthesize all appearances in terms of the a priori rules that determine 
their relation to each other in time. More precisely, the analogies of experience stipulate 
that all appearances involve substances that persist to be able to have temporal relations 
between distinct substances; they presuppose a causal relation by which we see some 
appearances as succeeding others in time; and the various manifolds of representation 
appear under certain principles of simultaneity, such as the law of contradiction 
according to which opposites cannot appear at the same time and place, but only after 
each other. Finally, the “three postulates of empirical thinking” in general synthesize 
appearances in terms of what is actually experienced, what can possibly be 
experienced, and what is necessarily experienced as the general condition of 
experience.  
4.1.5. The transcendental dialectic 
A crucial consequence of the fact that metaphysical knowledge is derived from a priori 
concepts of the understanding is that we cannot think objects as things-in-themselves 
or “noumena” beyond the “phenomena” of possible experience: “with this faculty we 
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can never get beyond the boundaries of possible experience.”188 Although we can 
conceive of things-in-themselves as those things which must affect us for the categories 
of sensibility to then give them as objects in space and time, we cannot know what they 
are like outside of their appearance for us through pure intuition. The noumenon is thus 
not a positive cognition, but rather an abstraction from all forms of sensible intuition: 
“from this arises the concept of a noumenon, which, however, is not at all positive and 
does not signify determinate cognition of any sort of thing, but rather only the thinking 
of something in general, in which I abstract from all form of sensible intuition.”189 
Nonetheless, the noumenon does serve the positive function of acting as a limit concept 
beyond which the objective validity of our sensible cognition cannot stretch: “the 
concept of a noumenon is therefore merely a boundary concept, in order to limit the 
pretention of sensibility.”190 
In the “Transcendental Dialectic,” Kant shows how we can avoid falling into the 
“transcendental illusion” of thinking beyond the bounds of possible experience, an 
illusion which is nonetheless inevitable. Although it has no objective validity, the 
illusion serves a function of making reason consistent by extrapolating the syntheses 
of conditions to an absolute unconditioned endpoint. Kant identifies three types of 
illusions beyond the bounds of experience: psychology’s thinking of all experience in 
terms of a subject; cosmology’s thinking of all objects of appearance in terms of a 
world; and theology’s thinking of the ultimate condition of all things in terms of a 
Supreme Being.  
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In psychology, there are four “paralogisms” that all mistake the conditions of 
experience for things-in-themselves. In short, the transcendental unity of apperception 
that accompanies all appearances leads us to falsely infer that: the soul is a substance; 
its quality is simple; it maintains a unity over time; and it relates to outer objects in 
space. The first paralogism makes the mistake of attributing real existence to a 
substance when in fact this substance is not inferred from experience, but rather derived 
from the concept of substance: “we have not grounded the present proposition on any 
experience, but have merely inferred [it] from the concept of the relation that all 
thought has to the I as the common subject in which it inheres.”191 The other 
paralogisms proceed in the same way. The idea of the unity of thought accompanying 
appearances does not derive from an intuition, but from the concept of unity. The 
numerical identity of consciousness as persisting in time is invalid because this is not 
given in intuition as it is for external objects derived from experience. Finally, we 
cannot take appearances for things-in-themselves outside the subject, since any 
thinking about them derives from a priori concepts of the understanding.  
Kant then considers cosmology’s “four antinomies” that are generated by applying 
reason to nature as the sum total of appearances, which is not itself given in 
appearances. What Kant shows is that cosmology’s four standard theses can be 
contradicted by four antitheses, so that we cannot definitively affirm any by pure reason 
alone. The first thesis is that “the world has a beginning in time, and in space it is also 
enclosed in boundaries.”192 The proof is that, if there is no beginning in time or 
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boundary to space, each successive series of states and space would be an elapsed 
infinity. Since it is impossible for infinity to elapse, however, there must be a beginning 
and a boundary. The antithesis states that “the world has no beginning and no bounds 
in space, but is infinite with regard to both time and space.”193 The proof is that, if there 
is a beginning and a boundary, the beginning is preceded by time and the boundary 
delimited by space such that there is always already time and space. The thesis of the 
second antinomy states that “every composite substance in the world consists of simple 
parts.”194 The proof is that we cannot imagine composites without simple parts, but we 
can imagine simple things without composites. The antithesis states that “no composite 
thing in the world consists of simple parts.”195 The proof is that, since every simple 
thing must occupy a space, it forms a composite of space. The thesis of the third 
antinomy states that “causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only one 
from which all the appearances of the world can be derived. It is also necessary to 
assume another causality through freedom.”196 The proof is that, since every happening 
requires a cause, the series of all causes requires an initial spontaneity to bring it about 
if we are to avoid an infinite regress. The antithesis states that “there is no freedom, but 
everything in the world happens solely in accordance with laws of nature.”197 The proof 
is that every beginning of action including a spontaneous beginning presupposes a state 
of the not-yet-acting cause such that even the free, spontaneous act is determined. The 
thesis of the fourth antinomy states that “to the world there belongs something that, 
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either as a part of it or as its cause, is an absolutely necessary being.”198 The proof is 
that the world of sense changes, and every change requires an ultimate preceding 
condition including an unconditioned to avoid an infinite regress. The antithesis states 
that “there is no absolutely necessary being existing anywhere, either in the world or 
outside the world as its cause.”199 The proof is that, since all things are in time and 
hence subject to change, an unconditioned would contradict our experience. Even if 
the necessary cause were outside the world and hence not subject to time, it would have 
to begin to enact the series of causes and would thus still belong in time.  
While Kant might seem to be critiquing some fundamental Augustinian theses, such as 
that of a necessary being, it is crucial to grasp that he is arguing that we can neither 
prove nor disprove them by appeal to pure reason. In the next section, we shall see how 
he believes that we can even re-establish the dogmatic theses through practical reason. 
4.1.6. Kant’s critique of the proofs of God’s existence 
Finally, Kant addresses the ideas of pure reason. The central idea of reason is that there 
is a maximum reality of all possible predicates and cognition, which is to be identified 
with being qua being: “the object of reason’s ideal [...] is also called the original being; 
because it has nothing above itself it is called the highest being, and because everything 
else, as conditioned, stands under it, it is called the being of all beings.”200 As the 
original being encompassing all, it is simple, self-sufficient, eternal, and hence one and 
the same with the concept of a perfect God: “we will be able to determine the original 
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being through the mere concept of the highest reality as a being that is singular, simple, 
all-sufficient, eternal, etc. […] The concept of such a being is that of God.”201  
Kant identifies three inadequate proofs for the existence of God by means of 
speculative reason. The “cosmological argument” argues that, if something finite 
exists, then a necessary being must exist to guarantee the series of finite existences. 
Given that we ourselves exist as a finite being, then that necessary being must indeed 
exist. Kant dismisses this argument because it relies on causality to move from the 
world of sense to the suprasensible, when causality is only a category that relates to 
empirical appearances: “the principle of causality has no significance at all and no mark 
of its use except in the world of sense; here, however, it is supposed to serve precisely 
to get beyond the world of sense.”202 The “physico-theological proof” reasons from a 
determinate, conditioned existent in the world to a necessary, unconditioned being to 
guarantee it. It thus makes the same mistake as the cosmological argument except in 
reference to an external thing rather than the I. 
Finally, the “ontological proof” argues that the idea of a necessarily existing God is 
enough to prove his actual existence. For Kant, the ontological proof is invalid since 
existence is not a predicate but a logical determination of predicates: “being is 
obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that could add to the concept 
of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing or of certain determinations in 
themselves.”203 Like so many, Kant identifies Anselm as the originator of the 
ontological argument, at which he takes aim here for supposing that we can deduce 
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from our mind’s ideas the existence of things independent of any relation to us.204 As 
we saw in the previous chapter, however, Anselm acknowledged that he derived his 
argument from Augustine.205 So, even though Kant never mentions Augustine by 
name, the fact that he often envisions his transcendental philosophy as a critique of the 
ontological argument means that he is also critiquing Augustine. It is therefore Kant’s 
critique of the ontological argument that marks his greatest distinction from Augustine. 
4.1.7. Making room for faith 
Kant concludes the first Kritik by advising that we must have the “discipline” to restrain 
our knowledge within the proper limits of possible experience.206 At the same time, 
Kant anticipates the second Kritik by qualifying that, while the Ideas of reason so 
crucial to Augustine and Descartes cannot be validly established by pure reason, they 
are the necessary conditions for the possibility of our practical or moral reason:  
Since there are practical laws that are absolutely necessary then if these necessarily 
presuppose any existence as the condition for the possibility of their binding force, this 
existence has to be postulated. […] In the future we will show about the moral laws 
that they […] presuppose the existence of a highest being.207 
Thus, Kant argues, the first Kritik was not intended to rid metaphysics of religious 
theses, but merely to show they cannot be proven by means of pure reason: “I therefore 
presuppose readers who would not want a just cause to be defended with injustice.”208 
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While the first Kritik can be viewed in isolation as a negative project of exposing 
Augustinian theses to be illusions of pure reason, it also sets the stage for the second 
Kritik’s positive project of restoring theses on the surer grounds of practical reason.  
4.2. KRITIK DER PRAKTISCHEN VERNUNFT 
4.2.1. Against the Neo-Kantians’ understanding of Kant’s critical project 
It is crucial to qualify that the sceptical prohibition on rationally thinking the thing-in-
itself perturbs Kant, because he not only wants to determine our knowledge’s true 
limits and conditions, but also sustain the metaphysics of the Good. It is well 
acknowledged, after all, that Kant was pursuing a synthesis of modern science and 
traditional morality. Kant himself rejects the view that he has “misused” his philosophy 
“to depreciate Christianity”: “my conscience is clear: I have never let the Divine Judge 
out of my sight.”209  
Although Kant’s moral commitments are well known, it is still worth insisting on this 
point insofar as there are philosophers such as certain Neo-Kantians who argue that 
Kant prohibits any and all access to objective reality.210 While most of the Neo-
Kantians do admit from time to time that Kant has another, religious side, they 
nonetheless emphasize that both for Kant’s purposes and their own Kant was always 
more committed to a critique of theology rather than its restoration. To give just one 
example, Ernst Cassirer’s biography best exemplifies this partial reading by 
                                                     
209 Immanuel Kant, “To Friedrich Wilhelm II, After October 12, 1794,” in Correspondence, 217, 219. 
210 For an excellent compilation of Neo-Kantian readings of Kant, see Sebastian Luft (ed.), The Neo-Kantian Reader, 
trans. Brian A. Chance (London: Routledge, 2015).  
 
 
93 
emphasizing Kant’s initial critique of dogmatic metaphysics.211 Cassirer’s chapter on 
Kant’s youth and upbringing thus portrays him as turning away from religious dogma, 
despite the fact that Kant would continue to write much which was conducive to 
theology.212 To get around this fact, Cassirer argues that the first Critique is a complete 
whole without any need for the second Critique’s restoration of freedom as a thing-in-
itself:    
We do not need here, however, to make the effort to foresee the new form and the 
solution to the problem of the thing in itself, which is achieved in Kant’s doctrine of 
freedom, for it does not affect the theory of appearance as such, the systematic analysis 
of pure experiential knowledge. It composes a self-contained whole.213 
Elsewhere, Cassirer does admit that practical concerns were already present in the first 
Kritik: “he had conceived his philosophy from the very first as a self-contained whole, 
and ethical problems formed an essential, integrating constituent of it.”214 For Cassirer, 
however, Kant’s musings on moral reason are a secondary task in light of his initial 
critical project. On the contrary, I shall presently argue that the practical proof of 
being’s goodness becomes one of Kant’s main concerns, what he himself calls “the 
most important views involved in the reconstruction of metaphysics.”215 
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4.2.2. Kant’s ontologization of the Good by other means 
In his earlier, pre-critical “The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration 
of the Existence of God” (1763), Kant already attested to his theological commitments 
when he attempted to verify God’s existence from both the a posteriori inductive 
argument from design, and an a priori modified ontological argument that God is the 
cause of what is potential but not actual. Having eliminated proofs with recourse to 
understanding or sensibility in the first Kritik, Kant was obliged to find another 
demonstration. Kant himself admits the need to find a new method for demonstrating 
anew the Christian faith’s absolutely benevolent God when confronted by his own 
critique of dogmatic metaphysics:  
We should, then, think for ourselves an immaterial being, an intelligible world, and a 
highest of all beings (all noumena), because only in these things, as things in 
themselves, does reason find completion and satisfaction, which it can never hope to 
find in the derivation of the appearances.216  
It is this need to ontologize the Good upon a surer footing than Augustine and 
Descartes’ ontological argument that accounts for why Kant devotes so many of his 
later works to religion, morality and theology’s essential binary between good and evil.  
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4.2.3. Kant’s third way of reviving Augustinianism on practico-transcendental 
grounds 
In his critical period proper, Kant finds a “third way out” through his practico-
transcendental method of thinking the metaphysical conditions for the possibility of 
our moral practice.217 What Kant terms “practical” or “moral reason” shows us what 
being must be like in itself, if our moral behaviour is to have any validity. As Kant 
explains, the Augustinian postulates are not dogmas, but rather rational, inasmuch as 
they are the necessary presuppositions for the possibility of our moral practice’s 
validity: “these postulates are not theoretical dogmas but presuppositions from a 
necessarily practical point of view; hence, although they do not expand theoretical 
cognition, they do give objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason.”218 It is 
crucial to see that, for Kant, the idea of the Good is no mere phantom, but ontologically 
real insofar as it is necessary for moral thought. He describes his new method, what he 
calls “moral theism,” as being as certain and rigorous as a mathematical proof: 
The moral theist asserts without qualification that it is impossible for speculative 
reason to demonstrate the existence of such a being with apodictic certainty. But he is 
nevertheless firmly convinced of the existence of this being, and he has a faith beyond 
all doubt from practical grounds. […] Hence a faith in God built on this foundation is 
as certain as a mathematical demonstration.219 
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Kant even goes so far as to say that the testament of practical proof far outweighs any 
doubt that pure reason might stir in us (even as he notes that pure reason cannot 
disprove the practical proof anyway, such that the two form one consistent system): 
The conviction I have regarding the infallibility of divine truths is so powerful in me 
that I would consider everything that contradicts them to be sufficiently disproved and 
would reject it. It is, however, precisely the agreement between my system and religion 
that raises my confidence to a fearless serenity in the face of all difficulties.220 
It is not that practical reason establishes for Kant that God is a necessary postulate 
derived from reason; on the contrary, practical reason tells us that God is the creator of 
reason: “God is the supreme cause of the entirety of reason and nature.”221  
What Kant therefore proposes to do is develop a critical theodicy that defends God’s 
benevolence better than Augustine and Descartes’ ontological arguments could by 
thinking the purity of his being as the necessary condition for the possibility of our 
moral reason. Seen in this light, Kant’s goal with the first Kritik is to clear the way of 
pure reason’s illusory ontological argument so as to re-establish the same content that 
proof establishes by surer, critical means in the second Kritik. As he himself insists, “if 
in what follows we raise doubts about these speculative proofs and take issue with the 
supposed demonstrations of God’s existence, we will not thereby undermine faith in 
God. Rather, we will clear the road for practical proofs.”222 Such will be Kant’s aim 
after the first Kritik: construct a critique of practical reason that restores the 
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metaphysics of the Good by transcendental means in light of the critical philosophy’s 
destitution of the classical proofs of the benevolent God’s existence. 
As late as his often overlooked essay, “On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials 
in Theodicy,” written in 1791 after the third Kritik, Kant explains how his ulterior 
motive for the critique of pure reason was to ontologize the Good upon the firmer soil 
of our practical affirmation of the very same theodicy. Certainly, Kant holds that all 
hitherto existing theodicies have failed to redeem the Redeemer inasmuch as they rest 
on essentially ontological arguments, which fallaciously apply categories of the mind 
to noumena: “every previous theodicy has not performed what it promised, namely the 
vindication of the moral wisdom of the world-government against the doubts raised 
against it.”223 Nonetheless, Kant goes on, if we continue to synthesize beyond the thing-
for-us to formulate theological ideas, it is precisely because they mark the conditions 
for our practical reason: 
We also have in the moral idea of our own practical reason a concept of a moral wisdom 
which could have been implanted in a world in general by a most perfect creator. […] 
The proof of the world-author’s moral wisdom in the sensible world can be founded 
only on this insight.224 
From before his critical turn to his very late writings, Kant is consistently concerned 
with re-establishing the Christian onto-theology of the Good on solider foundations 
than Augustine, Descartes and the other dogmatic metaphysicians could. 
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As heterodoxic as my reading of Kant might at first seem despite Kant’s above claims 
to be pursuing precisely the kind of critical theodicy I have outlined, I am not alone in 
my line of reasoning. Already in Kant’s own day, Karl Reinhold’s Letters on the 
Kantian Philosophy argued that Kant only critiques both blind faith and dogmatic 
metaphysics to show how we can have properly rational grounds for our faith, albeit 
through practical rather than pure reason: 
One would very much misunderstand the Critique of Reason if one were earnestly to 
believe that it […] declares without reservation that our previous metaphysics is 
useless. It does just the opposite. While it denies this science the capacity to 
demonstrate God’s existence, it assigns to this same science the noble vocation of 
purifying moral faith of the crude and subtle errors that have clouded it until now and 
of protecting it forever from degenerating into superstition or nonbelief.225  
As Manfred Kuehn later puts it in his authoritative biography, Kant only critiques pure 
reason’s pretences to think God, or what Kuehn calls “belief,” so as to reconstruct the 
same doctrines upon practical reason, or what Kuehn distinguishes as “rational belief”: 
“Kant then went on to point out that this need of reason does not enable us to know that 
God exists. It only justifies a belief. Still—and this seems to be Kant‘s most important 
concern in the essay—this is a rational belief.”226 Seen in this new light, the second 
Kritik, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten and Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen 
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der bloßen Vernunft, as well as Kant’s lectures and essays on theology, must be 
reconceived as a critique of all hitherto existing theodicies grounded upon pure reason, 
in an effort to find a surer footing for theodicy in practical reason.  
More recently, T.K. Seung has made a similar argument that Kant is actually a Platonist 
insofar as he only critiques Plato’s rationalist demonstration of the Idea of the Good so 
as to re-establish it upon the grounds of practical reason: “Kant renamed the Platonic 
Forms the Ideas of pure reason. Although the Ideas of pure reason inevitably leads to 
metaphysical illusions in theoretical philosophy, he says, they are absolutely essential 
for practical philosophy.”227 My only criticism of Seung is that he would have fared 
better if he had characterized Kant as a crypto-Augustinian rather than a Platonist, since 
Kant not only restores the Idea of the Good, but also Augustine’s theodicean account 
of freedom as the cause of evil, which is underdeveloped in Plato. Similarly, in Kant’s 
Critical Religion, Stephen Palmquist provides a detailed account of how Kant only 
abolishes pre-critical theology so as to uphold its key principles through a fortified 
critico-practical theology:  
Anyone who wishes to regard moral action as irrational is constrained to postulate 
something that would make it possible to understand how the highest good could 
become a reality. [...] Kant argues that the immortality of the soul and the existence of 
God are the two postulates that can save morality.228  
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Here as with Seung, however, what Palmquist’s admirable study downplays is that the 
religious doctrines Kant reintroduces can be best described as Augustine’s notions of 
the being of the Good and the privation of evil rooted in the will. As Kant himself 
succinctly puts it: “the sole objects of a practical reason are, therefore, those of good 
and evil.”229  
The rest of this chapter will thus recapitulate Kant’s four key writings on religion to 
see Kant’s affinity not only with Augustine’s summum bonum and privatio boni, but 
also with the late Augustine’s inadvertent re-ontologization of evil. I begin as Kant 
does in his preliminary Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten with his description of 
what we naturally determine to be good according to our moral practice. I then turn to 
Kant’s transcendental deduction in the second Kritik of the objective conditions for the 
possibility of our moral practice, so as to show how he practically restores the 
essentially Augustinian tenet of being’s absolute perfection. I conclude with an 
exegesis of Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, where Kant not 
only deduces what is essentially Augustine’s own theodicy and ethics, but also 
Augustine’s problematic admission of a radical, primal evil. Throughout my exegesis, 
I also refer to Kant’s Lectures on Philosophical Theology where he summarizes these 
other works in a way which often best brings out their affinity with Augustine.230 
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4.2.4. The good will and the categorical imperative  
Before re-establishing Augustine’s being of the Good as the formal conditions for the 
possibility of our practical reason, in the Grundlegung, Kant begins by asking what it 
means for us to be good in the first place. Putting it negatively, Kant reasons that to be 
good cannot simply mean that we conform to what is good by chance, self-interest, 
natural inclination, unconscious spontaneity, or any other extraneous reason. 
Formulating it positively, to be good means to have a “good will,” which both intends 
to act, and really does act for the sake of the Good as an end in itself. In Kant’s terms: 
“as to what it is to be morally good, it is not enough that it conform to the moral law, 
but it must also happen for the sake of this law; otherwise, that conformity is only 
contingent.”231 Much as Augustine concludes that the Christian ethic necessitates both 
practical, charitable action and faithful, contemplative intention, so does Kant assert 
that the will must act to produce the Good for its own end rather than as a means to 
some objective consequence, as well as consciously do so rather than out of a natural, 
spontaneous inclination.  
Now, Kant continues, if the good will cannot act out of a spontaneous instinct or from 
our self-interest, it can only act out of a “duty” to a “law” of a higher Good beyond 
it.232 Given that the good will acts for the Good as an end unto itself, the law to which 
it obeys cannot direct it to act out of its own self-interest, but only out of a duty to the 
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highest Good of all. Such is Kant’s definition of what it means for us to be good: have 
a good will directed towards fulfilling our duty to the law.  
Thus far, Kant has only defined what it is for us to be good by nature of our willing to 
obey the duty to the Good; he has not, however, defined what the Good is as such. To 
this end, Kant argues that, for the good to be beyond any particular self-interest, it must 
be a highest, universal Good of all. Moreover, this highest Good cannot be 
“hypothetical” or “assertoric,” which is to say, as a means in pursuit of another, higher 
end, since the highest Good is the ultimate end of all moral practice.233 Rather, Kant 
identifies the highest moral law with what he terms “the categorical imperative.”234 
According to the categorical imperative, we ought to act not only in certain 
“hypothetical” situations as a means to another end, but categorically; viz., such that 
we could will our action to be universally applied to everyone, including ourselves: 
“act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will 
that it become a universal law.”235 The good will affirming the categorical imperative 
achieves the universal Good of all insofar it cannot harm another as a means to its own 
self-interest, since it would be willing that it could itself be (ab)used by others in the 
same way as a means to their own ends. Kant provides a helpful example of how the 
categorical imperative functions in concrete moral reasoning: we should not refrain 
from putting our talents to good use even if we are in a privileged and comfortable 
position, since we would actually be willing the loss of our safe position in a world 
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where no one bears the fruit of their respective talents.236 In this way, the categorical 
imperative incites us to treat everyone not as a means to our own happiness, but as an 
end or good in themselves, what Kant characterizes as a heavenly “kingdom of ends” 
modelled on the biblical kingdom of God. 
Despite the logical terms in which Kant describes the highest Good as the categorical 
imperative, we can see that he still attributes it the key quality of Augustine’s own 
summum bonum: it is universal in that it encompasses the good of everyone’s particular 
goods into one absolutely, all-unifying Good of all. It is no wonder that Kant claims 
that the Bible best expresses precisely the categorical imperative through Christ’s 
message that we ought to love our neighbours and enemies as ourselves, inasmuch as 
the categorical imperative requires that whatever we will as a good for us can be 
universally willed for all.237  
4.2.5. The conditions of freedom and the benevolent God for practical reason  
Having defined just what the Good is, in the second Kritik, Kant turns to deducing the 
metaphysical conditions for the possibility of our developing good wills in conformity 
with the categorical imperative. Kant concludes that those metaphysical conditions for 
our moral reason are nothing other than Augustine’s concepts of the benevolent God, 
and our immortal soul’s libero arbitrio as the cause of evil. For Kant as for Augustine, 
the three key postulates of ontology are: the existence of the benevolent God; the 
immortality of the soul; and that soul’s freedom.  
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Kant first follows Augustine in arguing that the good will requires that we are free to 
be able to be consciously responsible for affirming the categorical imperative, rather 
than doing so from a spontaneous inclination: “the concept of freedom, insofar as its 
reality is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason, forms the keystone of the 
whole edifice of a system of pure reason.”238 I shall return to why Kant needs freedom 
as a postulate not only to establish the good will as freely good, but also to account for 
evil without indicting God in the process. 
Moreover, Kant qualifies, if we are free to choose the good, and hence do not yet 
embody it, there must be an ontologically objective good, which the Christian God 
incarnates. Much as Augustine proves God’s existence and benevolence as the highest 
Good after which we strive—and therefore could not have ourselves generated in being 
inferior to it—so does Kant practically reason that the moral law that the good will 
strives to obey must already be actual, and hence embodied by an absolutely benevolent 
being. As Kant explains: 
Because the human being cannot himself realize the idea, inseparably linked with the 
pure moral attitude, of the highest good, yet encounters in himself a duty to work 
toward this, he finds himself drawn toward the faith in the cooperation or arrangement, 
by a moral ruler of the world, through which alone this purpose is possible.239  
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Kant attributes God the three key characteristics that Augustine, too, identifies. 
Namely, he must be an omnipotent, benevolent and just creator by permitting us to 
participate in his divine essence, inasmuch as our will spontaneously strives after him: 
In accordance with this need of practical reason, the universal true religious faith is 
faith (1) in God as the omnipotent creator of heaven and earth, i.e., morally as holy 
legislator; (2) in him, the preserver of humankind, as benign governor and moral 
provider thereof; (3) in him, the steward of his own holy laws, i.e., as just judge.240 
In this way, our moral reason is not only enforced by the belief in the ontological fact 
that we are free, and hence morally responsible for our actions, but also that there is an 
omniscient Supreme Being to whom we are indebted as the actual embodiment of the 
highest Good. In his Lectures, Kant even more directly raises the ontological stakes of 
his concept of the Good when he argues that being is nothing other than the highest 
Good insofar as it exhausts all reality without remainder or “deficiency”: “we come to 
the idea of a highest being. Let us represent to ourselves: (1) a being which excludes 
every deficiency. […] (2) A being which contains all realities in itself.”241 Here as in 
Augustine and Descartes, being as the absolute totalization of reality is conflated with 
the Good as the highest perfection.  
Finally, Kant reasons that our free soul must be immortal. This is because, although no 
will can attain perfection of the moral law, the ideal is the necessary condition after 
which our practical action strives. We must thus assume that our progress towards the 
ideal is infinite, which requires assuming in turn that we are immortal: “the highest 
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good is practically possible only on the presupposition of the immortality of the 
soul.”242 Kant’s own vision for what being must be like for our moral practice to be 
valid bears a striking, if unwitting resemblance to that of Augustine. 
Based upon these formal, Augustinian conditions for our moral reason of the 
benevolent God and the soul’s freedom and immortality, Kant continues to restore 
other classical, Christian doctrines on new, transcendental grounds. For instance, Kant 
argues that the idea of Christ, a human being who is able to instantiate the highest 
Good, provides a necessary example by which our moral practice can be fortified in 
the belief that it, too, can attain the ideal of a wholly good will: “there had […] come 
down from heaven to earth such a truly divine minded human being, who through his 
teaching, way of life, and suffering, had provided in himself the example of a human 
being pleasing to God.”243 Further, Kant reaffirms the ideas of the resurrection of the 
dead and the final judgment as the necessary ideals of a kingdom of ends to come, after 
which our practical reason can strive: “[as for] this presentation of a historical narrative 
of the future world, […] we can—in continual advance and approach to the highest 
good possible on earth—only look ahead, and make provision for it.”244 As Gottfried 
Höffe explains, all of the tenets that Kant restores by practical reason are those 
Christian doctrines he had earlier eliminated by the critique of pure reason: “the essence 
of Christianity lies, for Kant, in a religion of pure practical reason, whereby […] the 
opposition between good and evil […] can be described independently of any historical 
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form as the expression of the moral self-understanding of autonomous reason.”245 It is 
little wonder that Kant observes that the articles of faith are the best historical 
expressions of our practical reason’s metaphysical conditions.246 
It is crucial to see here that Kant is not saying any and all historical religions empirically 
instantiate practical reason’s postulates. Indeed, Kant even goes further than Augustine 
in denying that Judaism is anything but a series of historically contingent political 
statutes. On the contrary, for Kant, Christianity is “the only true religion for man’s 
salvation” inasmuch as it alone fully grasps the essentials of the moral postulates of the 
summum bonum and human freedom: “we therefore cannot begin the universal history 
of the church […] except at the origin of Christianity.”247 For Kant as for Augustine, 
there is no contradiction between reason and faith in (Christian) dogmas: “between 
reason and Scripture there is to be found not merely compatibility but also unity, so 
that whoever follows the one will not fail to concur with the other.”248 Kant’s 
Augustinian conception of the amicable rapport between reason and faith is particularly 
evident in the preface of Der Streit der Fakultäten and its first essay “The Conflict of 
the Philosophy Faculty with the Theology Faculty.” Written in the context of the 
censorship of his Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, Kant 
defends himself against the charge that he misuses his philosophy “to distort and 
disparage many of the cardinal and basic teaching of the Holy Scriptures and of 
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Christianity.”249 Contrary to the common (mis)reading of the essay that Kant is 
advocating that reason should be “free to evaluate everything,” including matters of 
faith, Kant repeatedly qualifies that this is so because reason not only furnishes nothing 
to contradict faith, but because it even finds ways to fortify it anew.250 Much as 
Augustine argues that reason fully endorses the scriptures, so does Kant argue that 
“Christianity must as such be based on reason,” and yet the Bible “contains a means 
for introducing this religion” to those lacking the time to devote themselves to such 
rational endeavours.251 Certainly, Kant at times holds that any religious tenets other 
than these general principles are invalid before reason, if not before faith. Fortunately 
for Augustine, however, we need no others to re-establish his metaphysics’ central 
tenets.  
4.2.6. Kant’s transcendental theodicy of the will’s privation 
After having ontologized the Good as the necessary condition for our practical reason, 
in Religion, what he also calls a “union of Christianity and the purest practical reason,” 
Kant addresses the “antinomy” of evil: “that the world lies in baseness is a lament as 
ancient as history.”252 Given Kant’s Augustinian onto-theology, it shall come as no 
surprise that his theodicy describes evil as a privation or “deviation” from the moral 
law. That is to say, since being is the highest Good, evil can only be the deviation from 
being into nothingness. In Kant’s own words, “the proposition, the human being is evil, 
can signify nothing other than this: he is conscious of the moral law and yet has 
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admitted the deviation from it into his maxim.”253 To give a concrete example, if we 
were to put our own good alone before the good of all others, we would be deviating 
from the moral law which seeks the universal Good of all. Even though our own good 
is certainly a part of the universal Good, to pursue the former alone would be to deprive 
the Good of its greater totality. While Kant tends to describe evil as the moral law’s 
deviation, he elsewhere describes it in identical terms to those of Augustine as a 
“negation” or “limitation,” without any reality apart from the being of the Good from 
whence it derives: “evil […] is only a negation, and consists only in a limitation of 
what is good”; and: “negations […] are nothing but limitations of the highest 
reality.”254 Like Augustine, Kant even takes aim at the old Manichean heretics for 
ontologizing evil contra practical reason’s postulate that being is absolutely good: 
“Manichaeism conflicts with human reason, since reason leads us to one single being 
of all beings, and it can only think of this being as supremely holy.”255 Here as 
elsewhere, Kant is simply redressing Augustine’s claim that evil is the diabolical pride 
of putting our own self-interest before others, and thereby depriving us of a higher 
Good still.  
Kant does not stop there in his transcendental deduction of the Augustinian theodicy; 
he even identifies precisely our free will as the source of this deviation. Here as with 
Augustine, Kant certainly admits that our capacity to deviate from the categorical 
imperative as the Good of all is a necessary possibility, which stems from God’s 
conferral of freedom to us. At the same time, if evil is co-eternally potential from the 
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moment God confers us a free will to affirm or renounce him, it is not actual until we 
ourselves choose to negate the primordial Good from whence we arose. As Kant 
elucidates: 
If man is to be a free creature, […] it must also be within his power to follow or to 
shun the laws of morality. Man’s use of his freedom has to depend on him, even if it 
should wholly conflict with the plan God designed for the moral world. […] Hence if 
God does not prevent evil in the world, this never sanctions evil; it only permits it.256  
Although evil’s deviation from the Good is a necessary condition for the possibility of 
our moral practice of freely affirming or renouncing the divine Law, it is only 
actualized by free subjects like us. Consequently, the blame can only then be laid at 
our doors rather than at the gates of heaven. For Kant as for Augustine, evil only 
transpires when we freely misrecognize our particular self-interest for the highest 
Good, thereby depriving being of its totality, such as it is only to be found in the love 
of God’s benevolent essence.  
More precisely, Kant specifies three kinds of deviations from the divine Law. Firstly, 
Kant calls “frail evil” the impotency to live up to what we consciously know to be the 
higher Good, upon being confronted with the possibility of satisfying our own 
particular, more immediate self-interest: “it [evil] is, first, human heart’s weakness as 
such in complying with adopted maxims, or the frailty of human nature.”257 Imagine, 
for instance, that a passer-by drops their wallet, and we decide to pick it up and keep it 
rather than alert them of their loss. At this point, we might commit an act of frail evil 
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inasmuch as, even though we know that keeping the wallet for ourselves is wrong, we 
deviate from the moral law anyway so as to derive the benefit of accruing the stranger’s 
money.  
Moreover, Kant names “impure evil” the unintentional enactment of a moral good for 
immoral ends of our own self-interest: “second, the propensity to mix immoral 
incentives with the moral ones (even if this were done with good intention and under 
maxims of the good), i.e. impurity.”258 To return to the above example, we would be 
committing an act of impure evil if we gave the stranger’s wallet back, albeit only 
because we expected praise or reward for doing so. While we would be technically 
abiding by the moral law, we would only be doing so in order to benefit ourselves, 
thereby actually putting our own self-interest before that of the highest Good. 
Finally, Kant calls “wickedness” the conscious commitment to the privation of being’s 
absolute goodness: “third, the propensity to adopt evil maxims, i.e. the wickedness of 
human nature, or of the human heart.”259 Although this last evil is theoretically 
conceivable, Kant dismisses the possibility that anyone would actually be committed 
to such wickedness.  
Clearly, Kant’s transcendental theodicy restores the essentials of Augustine’s dogmatic 
theodicy upon practical rather than rationalist grounds, in an effort to achieve the same 
end of banishing evil from the kingdom of being. Kant himself concludes as much, 
even if he attributes his moral tenets to Christianity tout court rather than to Augustine: 
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“the doctrine of Christianity […] provides a concept of the highest good (the kingdom 
of God) which alone is adequate to the strictest demand of practical reason.”260 By 
retracing Augustine’s theodicy upon practico-transcendental grounds, Kant imagines 
that he has rationally secured the Good in-itself once and for all.  
4.2.7. Kant’s Augustinian ethics 
After deducing the Augustinian theodicy anew, in the second half of Religion, Kant 
turns to the task of restoring the essentially Augustinian ethics of how we can return 
from our collective fallenness to a kingdom of ends in the city of God. In short, since 
we are often corrupted by putting our own good before the Good of all in the social 
world, Kant’s ethics prescribes that we organize the entire human race around the 
universal law of the categorical imperative: “this, then, is the work of the good 
principle, of establishing for itself, in humankind as a community, a power and a 
kingdom according to laws of virtue, a kingdom that maintains the victory over evil.”261 
For Kant, this society cannot be organized around any nation-state, which would leave 
out the peoples of other states, and hence not be truly universal. Rather, it can only be 
organized around the Church, insofar as the Church treats all Christians equally, be 
they gentiles or Jews, men or women, and masters or slaves. Surprisingly for an 
Enlightenment figure, Kant grants just as much authority to the Church as the arbiter 
of the universal law of all as Augustine does: “such a community, as a kingdom of God, 
can be undertaken by human beings only through religion, and […] in order for this 
religion to be public, this kingdom can be presented in the sensible form of a 
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church.”262 Kant is adamant that it is only the Church that has ever historically sought 
to constellate the peoples of the earth around the rational postulate of the highest Good. 
More precisely, Kant qualifies that the Church institutes the categorical imperative by 
way of its scriptural scholars. It is left to the theologians like Augustine to interpret the 
scriptures and extract from it the postulates of practical reason: “rational religion and 
scriptural scholarship are, therefore, the proper appointed interpreters and trustees of a 
holy document.”263 Kant’s ultimate ethical arbiter of the scriptural scholar turns out to 
be none other than Augustine himself as the greatest example of a theologian who 
sought to rationally demonstrate the articles of faith. Even though Kant does not 
mention Augustine by name, he very likely had him in mind when he gives as an 
example of such ethical figures the scriptural scholars in Augustine’s ancient Rome, 
since Augustine was indeed the most rational among the Church fathers: “well-
meaning public teachers have kept on interpreting them [holy books] until they pretty 
much brought them, in terms of their essential content, into agreement with the 
universal moral dogmas.”264 Simply put, Kant’s ethics ultimately prescribes that we be 
good Augustinians by grounding our religion in rational thought, even if for him this 
means practical rather than pure reason as it did for Augustine.  
4.2.8. Radical evil in Eden 
Despite Kant’s best efforts to ontologize the Good, Kant’s critique of practical reason 
ultimately harbours its own unwitting ontologization of evil. For Kant, the condition 
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for the possibility of the Good is that we have the freedom to rationally choose it contra 
evil. That is to say, any concept of morality necessarily presupposes its opposite of the 
evil that we resist in order to be good. The antinomy thus arises in that Kant can only 
ontologize the Good by also ontologizing evil. Therein lies Kant’s concept of human 
nature’s “propensity” for “radical evil”: radical evil is the name for the metaphysical 
evil that our practical reason must paradoxically presuppose as the a priori condition 
for the possibility of our freedom, and hence our good will. In Kant’s own words: 
There is in the human being a natural propensity to evil; and this propensity itself, 
because it must in the end indeed be sought in a free power of choice and hence must 
be capable of being imputed, is morally evil. This evil is radical, because it corrupts 
the basis of all maxims.265 
This is precisely Kant’s problem with the Genesis narrative: it tries to separate evil as 
historically arising later in time than the Good with the Fall, even though it is actually 
a necessary precondition for Adam and Eve to be good in the first place by freely 
affirming God’s law.266 As Allen Wood observes, Kant’s notion of freedom naturalizes 
evil as an equal “propensity” along with the categorical imperative: “Kant holds that, 
although human nature contains predispositions to good, the human power of choice is 
by nature evil.”267 Gordon Michaelson, too, explains that Kant’s concept of freedom 
subverts his own attempt to render being wholly good inasmuch as the formal 
conditions for its possibility are not only the existence of the Good, but also of evil: 
“within the Kantian framework this amounts to reason virtually turning against its own 
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best interests, and freedom freely producing its own most severe debility.”268 Or, as 
Slavoj Žižek explains, a “crack” in Kant’s account of the Good is opened up insofar as 
he must posit radical evil as a condition for the moral law: “in ‘practical reason,’ the 
‘crack’ is introduced by the possibility of ‘radical Evil,’ of an Evil which, as to its form, 
coincides with the Good.”269 Even though the whole point of Kant’s religious writings 
are to practically restore the essentially Augustinian doctrines of the being of the Good 
and the will’s erring as the formal conditions for our moral practice, he soon discovers 
that the good will has its own formal condition of our natural propensity for evil.  
4.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the first Kritik, Kant certainly critiques Augustine and Descartes’ ontological 
argument as a transcendental illusion. In the second Kritik, however, Kant devises a 
practico-transcendental method to re-ontologize the Good. Only this too proved 
insufficient insofar as Kant could only ontologize our free choice of the Good by 
paradoxically ontologizing evil. While Kant himself articulates radical evil as a 
necessary logical consequence of his own moral system, Žižek rightly argues that he 
tends to shy away from its implications: “whenever Kant approaches this possibility, 
he quickly dismisses it as unthinkable, as an object of ultimate abhorrence.”270 
Ultimately, Kant suffers from Augustine’s same pitfall of refusing to think the reality 
                                                     
268 Gordon E. Michaelson, Fallen Freedom: Kant on Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 7-8. 
269 Slavoj Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel and the Critique of Ideology (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1993), 45.  
270 Žižek, The Negative, 101. 
 
 
116 
of evil, except as a mere, secondary negation without any ontological positivity of its 
own apart from the one, true being of the Good. 
What the last two chapters have shown is not only that much of modern philosophy 
aims to ontologize the Good, but that it also ultimately fails to effectively do so. In the 
next chapter, we shall thus see why Schelling submits philosophy’s Augustinian 
lineage to a negative reassessment by daring to think the beingness of evil that the 
Augustinians could not. 
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CHAPTER 5. SCHELLING’S FOOTNOTES TO AUGUSTINE 
In this final chapter, I will show how Schelling inaugurates a great paradigm shift to 
the extent that he attempts to resolve the shortcomings of Augustine’s explanation of 
evil by ontologizing it. Although there is relatively little scholarly interest in Schelling 
compared to Kant, Descartes or Augustine, over the last two decades,  anthologies like 
The New Schelling and Schelling Now have launched a veritable “Schelling 
renaissance.”271 Prominent thinkers like Slavoj Žižek, Iain Hamilton Grant and Markus 
Gabriel have argued for the enduring relevance of Schelling’s thought to contemporary 
metaphysical debates in continental philosophy.272 Each year since the turn of the 
century has seen an increasing number of publications on Schelling introducing him to 
a new generation of scholars by making the case for his contemporary relevance. This 
chapter aims to contribute to the Schelling renaissance by situating him as a paradigm-
shifting figure in the history of philosophy to the extent that he breaks with the 
Augustinian conceptualizations of good and evil. 
In the first section, I will show how Schelling’s early philosophy can be characterized 
as an overcoming of Augustine’s ontologization of the Good by drawing out the way 
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Schelling links his project of unifying Fichte’s notion of human freedom with 
Spinoza’s philosophy of nature to a naturalization of evil, so as to elucidate how being 
can negate itself through the emergence of the free human subject. As we shall see, 
Schelling ultimately affirms that God is also free, and hence morally evil, to account 
for why he negates himself by creating privative creatures like ourselves, who are 
capable of renouncing him in a way which paradoxically reaffirms his own privative 
essence.  
By elevating evil to the status of being, however, Schelling then faces the inverse 
problem to Augustine: if evil is all that there is, how can we elucidate the brute fact of 
the Good? Even if the Good is nothing more than a mere error or fantasy of human 
thought, it would still be necessary to explain the beingness of the error which is 
capable of dissimulating reality’s dark ground. In the second section, we shall thus see 
how Schelling’s turning of Augustine on his head eventually corners him into positing 
a second, co-eternal, and yet ontologically distinct principle of the Good alongside the 
principle of Evil, in a brief transitional phase. Given that Schelling’s initial driving 
motive is to unify good and evil in a singular concept of being, Schelling’s late 
philosophy makes an even more severe about-face by affirming, through sheer mystical 
faith alone, the truth of Augustine’s notion of being as a pure Positivity beyond the 
present world’s negative dialectic. So, even though Schelling attempts to break with 
the Augustinian tradition by ontologizing evil, he ultimately falls short in his account 
of the Good, which takes him back full circle to that starting place from whence he 
sought to escape. 
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Schelling’s tendency to conduct his education in public by publishing his work almost 
as soon as he wrote it, to continuously change his ideas and positions often seemingly 
in a single work, and to write in a vague compositional style means that it is possible 
to interpret him in a number of different ways. In tracing Schelling’s rethinking of evil 
not only as subject but as substance, I primarily draw on Schelling’s four 1794-96 
essays where he first distances himself from Fichte and gravitates around Spinoza, 
before developing his own constructive Naturphilosophie in the 1799 text of the same 
name. I also draw on Schelling’s more mature, and hence often clearer and more 
refined, presentations of his fusion of Fichte and Spinoza in the 1809 Freiheitsschrift, 
and the 1811 Clara. My discussion of Schelling’s stages of natural history is primarily 
drawn from the 1799 Naturphilosophie, but also the 1811-15 Weltalter drafts, 
particularly the third version. Finally, my analysis of his late philosophy is primarily 
based on his 1842-43 Berlin lectures, as well as the 1810 Stuttgart Seminars and the 
1833-34 Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. In short, I base my analysis of 
Schelling’s critiques of Fichte and Spinoza on the 1794-96 period, of his 
Naturphilosophie on the 1799-1800 and 1809-15 texts, and of his late philosophy on 
the 1810, 1833-34 and particularly 1842-43 works. While there are certainly 
differences over these periods, Schelling often repeats the same critiques of Fichte and 
Spinoza, as well as his ontologization of freedom and evil. So, it is ultimately this 
particular thread in Schelling’s thought that I will trace with an eye to seeing how he 
tries to resolve the Augustinian theodicy’s shortcomings. 
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5.1. SCHELLING’S OVERCOMING OF AUGUSTINE 
5.1.1. Schelling’s critique of Spinoza as a crypto-Augustinian 
At first glance, it might seem odd to claim that Schelling grounds his first negative 
philosophy upon a critique of Augustine. It is well known, after all, that Schelling was 
largely a Fichtean idealist during the early to mid-1790s, from whence his first writings 
date. This objection is soon mitigated, however, to the extent that Schelling himself 
characterizes Spinoza’s mechanical view of nature that he opposes as a crypto-
Augustinianism. Conversely, Schelling is attracted to Fichte’s philosophy inasmuch as 
it amounts to an ontologization of freedom, or what he also calls at times (along with 
Augustine) “moral evil.” Although Schelling almost always develops his early 
philosophy by first presenting the same opposition between Fichte and Spinoza, I will 
focus upon its presentation in the Freiheitsschrift, since this text best brings out the 
heretical consequences of Schelling’s overcoming of Augustine.273  
Apropos Spinoza, Schelling wants to follow his realism insofar as it is able to speak of 
nature independently of its relation to us, as any metaphysical concept of being qua 
being necessarily must. According to Spinoza, we can explain effects with reference to 
their causes, because the causes must contain at least as much reality as their effects if 
they are able to produce them: “the knowledge of an effect opens on, and involves, the 
knowledge of the cause.”274 Now, since all effects are reducible to their causes 
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inasmuch as they have identical properties, effects are really one and the same thing as 
their causes. Further, since each finite cause must be reducible to a more primordial 
cause from whence it gains its existence, all cause-effects are ultimately reducible to 
one ultimate self-caused substance. In Spinoza’s own words, “it follows quite clearly 
that God is one: that is, in the universe there is only one substance, and this is absolutely 
infinite”; and: “all that He produces is within Himself, and not outside Him, because 
there is nothing outside Him.”275 By tracing all effects back to an all-encompassing 
uncaused cause, substance, or necessary being, Spinoza reduces all particular things to 
what he calls modifications or “modes” of the general “attributes” of substance’s 
essence.276 While Spinoza refers to this monist substance as God in the above 
quotations, he elsewhere calls it “nature” in the sense of extension. After all, if all things 
are reducible to one monist substance’s modes, corporeal bodies can be no exception. 
As Spinoza succinctly puts it, “the order and connection of ideas is the same as the 
order and connection of things.”277 This is why Schelling characterizes Spinoza’s 
philosophy as a “realism” inasmuch as it posits extended nature as the one monist 
substance from whence everything else immanently derives as its modes. 
For Schelling, however, the trouble with Spinoza’s realism is that its reduction of all 
things to a blind, mechanical nature fails to account for our human capacity to freely 
turn against this one, necessary substance. According to Spinoza, since everything is 
determined by the laws of nature, error consists in overlooking the real material causes 
of things in favour of attributing the effects to subjective phenomena.278 As an example, 
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Spinoza argues that our belief that we have free will marks the false attribution of our 
actions to our subjective intent rather than to nature’s laws of motion and rest, which 
are wholly outside our control. For Spinoza, then, human autonomy is the 
misrecognition of the real, natural causes of our actions by attributing them to the 
illusory cause of our own will. As White puts it, “in Schelling’s view, Spinoza is right 
to begin with the absolute. […] Spinoza’s crucial error thus cannot be found in his 
doctrine of the absolute as such; it is found rather in his assumption that the absolute 
must be completely different from and beyond the human subject.”279 Put otherwise, 
Spinoza’s monist system cannot explain how the morally evil human subject can 
emerge out of nature as its own privation, if nature is not in some sense always already 
“free” or “evil.” In Schelling’s own words: 
If […] the concept of system opposes the concept to freedom generally and in itself, 
then it is curious that, since individual freedom is surely connected in some way with 
the world as a whole, some kind of system must be present, at least in the divine 
understanding, with which freedom coexists.280  
Although Spinoza had the right ambition to develop a system of nature, he ultimately 
failed to follow through by denying the brute fact of our moral evil. Consequently, 
Schelling will follow Spinoza in attempting to construct an ontology of nature in-itself, 
all the while redefining nature to elucidate how it can negate itself through the subject’s 
freedom.  
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While Schelling upholds Spinoza’s disavowal of freedom as his chief target, it is often 
overlooked that Schelling sees this as the most popular expression of Augustine’s 
theodicy in late eighteenth century Germany. In a crucial footnote at the Essay’s 
margins, Schelling identifies Augustine as the founder of the privation theory of evil, 
which he sees Spinoza as popularizing in a naturalist guise by denying the reality of 
free will: “it was […] already several among the earlier fathers of the church, most 
notably St. Augustine, who posited evil as mere privation.”281 Certainly, Spinoza was 
often treated as an anti-Christian pantheist; nonetheless, Schelling is able to discern 
that Spinoza and Augustine share the same, striking reduction of our will to a mere 
privation. So, although Schelling situates his philosophy against the critical backdrop 
of Spinoza, the Dutch philosopher is but the most popular variant during the late 
eighteenth century German Enlightenment on the essentially Augustinian privation 
theory of evil. If Augustine is the true father of the tradition to which Spinoza belongs 
when it comes to conceptualizing the will, it is clear that, when Schelling criticizes 
Spinoza’s disavowal of human freedom, he is also criticizing the Augustinian notion 
of privative evil. Seen in this light, Schelling’s goal to construct a system capable of 
explaining everything that there is as an ostensible critique of Spinoza’s mechanical 
aspects, is but one and the same with the injection of evil into the heart of being itself. 
As Schelling himself argues, the price to pay for properly elucidating the being of 
everything, including our freedom, is the elevation of evil to the apotheosis of that 
which is:  
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Either real evil is admitted and, hence, it is inevitable that evil be posited within infinite 
substance or the primal will itself, whereby the concept of a most perfect being is 
utterly destroyed, or the reality of evil must in some way be denied, whereby, however, 
at the same time the real concept of freedom vanishes.282 
For Schelling, any properly all-encompassing concept of being will have to account for 
the Good’s own negation of itself through the human subject’s freedom to commit 
moral evil.  
5.1.2. Schelling’s rupture with Fichte by naturalizing evil 
Having diagnosed Spinoza and Augustine’s mutual reduction of human freedom to a 
mere privation, Schelling turns to Fichte’s idealism for the best account of freedom in 
his day: “until the discovery of idealism, a genuine concept of freedom was lacking in 
all the more recent systems.”283 According to Fichte, human freedom denotes our 
capacity to decide and re-decide our own nature or essence forever anew: “the object 
of the activity of the Ego is posited as product of freedom, that is, as accidental, as a 
thus which could be otherwise.”284 It is crucial to note here the resemblance between 
Fichte’s notion of human freedom and Augustine’s concept of the moral evil as the 
affirmation our own particular will against the general and immutable Good. Only, 
whereas Augustine sees moral evil as a mere privation, Fichte’s idealist take affirms 
the reality of free human activity as a “positive,” ontological activity. For Fichte as for 
Schelling, freedom is not simply the capacity to choose between good or evil; it is 
specifically the positive capacity to choose evil by renouncing the ground from whence 
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we came. If Schelling is attracted to Fichte’s notion of freedom, it is because it grants 
a positive, ontological status to the very account of evil which Spinoza and Augustine 
strip of any reality. 
Already by the late-1790s, however, Schelling becomes critical of Fichte to the extent 
that he only articulates our capacity for moral evil as a phenomenon for us apart from 
nature in-itself. That is to say, Fichte is only concerned for how phenomena such as 
human freedom appear to us moral beings, rather than the ontological status of freedom 
as such. What is missing from Fichte’s idealist account of the primacy of human 
autonomy is any role for a nature that is external and distinct from spirit as the backdrop 
against which spirit emerges. On Fichte’s account, nature, the “object” or the “non-I” 
is not an anterior or even external substance separate from the subject. Instead, it is 
posited by the subject as the means by which the subject can think itself as an object or 
other of its own thought. Simply put, Fichte’s view of nature is that it is merely a 
subjectively posited tool for the I’s self-assertion. So, while Fichte describes the subject 
as free in a way that Schelling admires, he does so in such a way as if it alone exists, 
as if external nature is nothing but the subject’s own positing of an object, which the 
subject can then reshape or “negate” to assert its freedom. Fichte himself states their 
difference in a letter to Schelling, insofar as Schelling divides being between spirit and 
nature where Fichte only sees spirit: “I still do not agree with your opposition between 
transcendental philosophy and philosophy of nature. […] The thing is not added to 
consciousness, nor consciousness to the thing, but both are immediately united in the 
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I.”285 For Schelling, however, Fichtean idealism cannot refute Spinozism, since it does 
not contest its ground in the real world of things-in-themselves: “the fight against 
dogmatism is waged with weak weapons if criticism rests its whole system merely upon 
the state of our cognitive faculty, and not upon our genuine essence.”286 Instead, we 
ought to maintain Fichte’s notion of freedom as a privative potency, but also reconcile 
it with a concept of nature in-itself. Such is why Schelling will ultimately seek to 
transpose Fichte’s idealist concept of human freedom onto noumenal nature to develop 
a system which would be capable of incorporating the brute fact of our moral evil into 
its notion of being. 
Therein lies the realist signification behind Schelling’s ostensibly idealist contention 
that nature is always already spirit. To cut off this classical objection at its head, 
Schelling is not advocating an idealist reduction of nature to the human subject’s 
objects of intuition. After all, such a dependence of the object on the subject would 
simply recapitulate Fichte’s idealism, which is only one of the two philosophies that 
Schelling seeks to synthesize along with Spinoza’s realism. What Schelling denotes by 
labelling his philosophy an “absolute idealism” is certainly a realism, but one which 
holds that nature is distinct and anterior, yet structured in the same way as the free, 
morally evil spirit. Far from affirming a traditional idealism, Schelling shows that we 
can only have knowledge of nature in-itself if it is always already structured as per our 
own subjectivity. For Schelling, it is not that nature is reducible to the subject’s ideas, 
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but rather that nature must always already be privative if such a free, morally evil 
subject can arise from it only to negate it: 
It is by no means adequate to claim that “activity, life and freedom only are the truly 
real” with which Fichte’s subjective idealism can coexist; rather, it is required that the 
reverse also be shown, that everything real (nature, the world of things) has activity, 
life and freedom as its ground.287 
What is merely a subjective “reality” for Fichte or a privation for Spinoza and 
Augustine becomes the objective reality of things-in-themselves for Schelling. Only 
such a malefic concept of being as evil can account for the emergence of a subject, 
which is capable of negating being without dogmatically disavowing the free subject’s 
existence. 
5.1.3. Thinking evil not only as subject but as substance 
We are now in a position to better articulate the radically anti-Augustinian kernel of 
Schelling’s project. On the one hand, Schelling wants to speak of being qua being—
but in a way which can account for being’s own negation with the emergence of the 
free, morally evil subject, rather than reduce the latter to the former as per Spinoza’s 
mechanical view of nature and Augustine’s privation theory. On the other hand, 
Schelling wants to transpose our freedom beyond the things-for-us onto nature in-itself 
rather than reduce the latter to the former as per Fichte’s idealism. As Bowie explains, 
Schelling wants to have Spinoza’s realism without his mechanical elements, and 
Fichte’s dynamism without his idealism: 
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The danger is that one will either fall into the materialist trap of thinking that by 
explaining the mechanical functioning of nature we will finally explain ourselves, thus 
making self-consciousness and freedom epiphenomenal, or into the Idealist trap of 
thinking that self-consciousness is wholly self-grounding, thus making its relationship 
to nature one of simple domination.288 
Termed differently, Schelling seeks to transpose Fichte’s account of human freedom 
onto Spinoza’s account of nature in-itself to develop an enlarged concept of being, 
which is able to honour privative evil with an ontological standing by explaining why 
being’s essence requires that it negate itself as per the subject’s moral evil. In 
Schelling’s own words: 
The task that I had first set myself was, then: to explain the idea of an objective world 
which was absolutely independent of our freedom, and indeed which limited this 
freedom, by a process in which the I sees itself as unintentionally but necessarily 
engaged, precisely through the act of self-positing.289 
Such is the driving motive of Schelling’s early account of evil: transpose human evil 
onto nature to resolve Spinoza and Augustine’s inadequate account of moral evil 
through an enlarged concept of being.  
5.1.4. Ontologizing the privatio boni 
If Schelling were to merely say that nature is reducible to the human being’s specific 
form of moral freedom, he really would be the idealist for whom he is so often 
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mistaken. If he is to affirm that nature an sich is grounded upon the privative being of 
evil, he will instead require a concept of free, moral evil which is irreducible and 
anterior to privative nature’s particular acceptation in the form of our human will.  
The irony is that Schelling finds such a model for a trans-human being structured as 
per human spirit in the works of Augustine himself. In another telling footnote, 
Schelling argues that Augustine inadvertently gave him this insight that God’s act of 
creation is nothing but an act of privation through the Christian doctrine that God 
creates us not by emanating from him, but rather ex nihilo: “Augustine says against 
emanation: nothing other than God can come from God’s substance; hence, creatures 
are created from nothingness, from whence comes their corruptibility and inadequacy. 
This nothingness […] might receive for the first time a positive meaning.”290 For 
Augustine, creation ex nihilo denotes the way that God freely creates us rather than out 
of any preconceived model or essence. After all, does not Augustine say that we are 
made in the image of God? In particular, is not our libero arbitrio made precisely in 
the image of his divine liberty, infinity and omnipotence? Turning Augustine’s own 
insight against him, Schelling argues that being is always already subjective in the 
sense that it is nothing other than the absolutely free God: “God is, according to general 
consensus, the most voluntaristic being.”291  
Of course, what Schelling realizes that Augustine does not is that, if God freely creates 
us out of nothing, it is because God’s free act of creation is exactly a privation. For 
freedom, such as Schelling follows Fichte in defining it, is nothing but the negation of 
                                                     
290 Schelling, Freedom, 40. 
291 F.W.J. Schelling, The Ages of the World, trans. Jason M. Wirth (Albany: Suny Press, 2000), 5. 
 
 
130 
our own essence so as to decide it for ourselves. As Schelling would have it, the essence 
of our freedom consists in turning the world and even itself into an object or other of 
itself; viz., in negating the nature from whence we emerged: “the thought generated is 
an independent power, continuing to act on its own, indeed, growing within the human 
soul in such a way that it restrains and subjugates its own mother.”292 Seen from this 
perspective, what Augustine fails to grasp is that affirming that God is free means that 
he has to be capable of committing the moral evil of negating himself. Here, Schelling 
is essentially proffering another, more heretical resolution to the problem of evil by 
downplaying God’s benevolence so as to emphasize his omnipotence to do anything, 
including even commit the ultimate evil of self-renunciation. That is to say, if freedom 
is defined as the capacity to renounce the being from whence we came, the divine being 
that conferred us this power in his image must also have the capacity to commit moral 
evil: “He is at the same time that which can negate his own being which is dependent 
upon Him, can transform his necessary being into contingent being, namely into a being 
posited by itself.”293 Schelling’s point is that, if God loves and wishes to reveal himself 
as an absolutely free being, he would naturally have to do so in the form of “revealing” 
his freedom by negating whatever backdrop there was from whence he emerged. Only, 
since God is that primal ground of being, there is nothing for God to affirm his freedom 
by opposing—nothing, that is, except God himself. It follows from this that the way in 
which God first “loves” himself by revealing his divine libero arbitrio is by negating 
himself. Therefore, when Schelling says that Augustine’s doctrine of the creation ex 
nihilo must receive a positive sense for the first time, he is saying that God did not 
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create us out of a nothingness that does not denote any actual referent. Instead, 
Schelling interprets the doctrine as saying that God creates us out of the nothingness of 
his own privative essence by negating himself. The paradox for Schelling is that it is 
really Augustine who is the true heretic when he goes on to limit God’s freedom by 
disavowing that he has the power to corrupt himself. 
We have come to the crux of Schelling’s solution to the problem of evil: it is only if 
God is always already privative that we can explain why he creates precisely privative, 
free human beings, who can renounce him in a way that simultaneously affirms him 
qua absolutely free being. As Snow explains, “the orthodox Christian asks how evil is 
possible, given God’s goodness, thus taking the divine reality as primary. Schelling 
takes the human experience of the reality of evil as primary, and asks what sort of God 
could possibly coexist with our knowledge of evil.”294 For Schelling, the way in which 
God would negate himself (and hence reveal himself qua pure free force of negation) 
would be through his act of creating individuated things, who are made in his image, 
not in spite of, but because they deprive him of his plenitude. Consequently, the 
creation of fallible, inferior entities like us is the act by which God mutilates himself 
to paradoxically “reveal” himself qua free being. Put otherwise, Schelling’s concept of 
the free God means that the very rupture from the divine being with the emergence of 
humans paradoxically affirms its being qua privative, free act. As Bernstein 
perspicuously observes, Schelling’s God needs us lowly beings to affirm his free 
essence: “Schelling departs from the philosophical and theological tradition whereby 
God is thought to be completely self-sufficient. On the contrary, God needs his 
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creatures in order to reveal himself. […] This is the evil spirit that can act only in and 
through human beings.”295 This is what Schelling is getting at when he repeatedly states 
that “the first existence is the contradiction itself”; viz., God reveals or loves himself 
by contradicting, negating, or depriving himself through his act of creating inferior, 
lowly worms capable of wriggling out of his way, and thereby affirming his free, 
privative Essence.296  
At first, Schelling describes being in terms of Augustine’s free God. Later, however, 
Schelling makes it abundantly clear that affirming God’s absolute freedom is one and 
the same thing as positivizing the evil of privation. If freedom is precisely a turning 
away from the divine ground, God’s own freedom can only be expressed through his 
very own act of immanent self-negation. As Schelling explains, God’s freedom rests 
on an even more fundamental ground of “positive disharmony” or primal “finitude”: 
“evil is not merely a privation of the good, not a mere negation of an inner harmony 
but rather a positive disharmony”; and: “evil does not come from finitude in itself but 
from finitude raised up to Being as a self.”297 Far from being a privation of being’s full 
positivity, evil must be the dark ground of being itself to account for the moral evil to 
which we bear witness all the time in the temporal world of becoming: “all other 
explanations of evil leave the understanding and moral consciousness equally 
unsatisfied. They all rest fundamentally on the annihilation of evil as a positive 
opposite.”298 It is only if the divine being is always already evil that we are able to 
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explain why he negates himself by creating privative, imperfect beings to paradoxically 
affirm himself qua absolute freedom or moral evil, before those beings commit the 
further sin of renouncing him, and hence returning to his dark ground anew through the 
assertion of their own freedom. Such is the way that Schelling resolves the 
shortcomings of Augustine’s theodicy through an admittedly heretical transvaluation: 
ontologize evil such that we sinful spirits attest to rather than refute being’s negative 
essence(lessness).  
5.1.5. The (dark) ages of the world 
We can better detail Schelling’s overcoming of Augustine by looking at the threefold 
history of being’s self-revelations or negations, which he traces over many of his 
works, and particularly the four drafts of the Weltalter.299 In the beginning, Schelling 
recapitulates his basic insight that the ground of being is always already a pure 
negativity or privative force, which can only reveal itself by paradoxically negating 
itself: “the beginning really only lies in the negation.”300 Schelling then describes how 
privative being first negates, externalizes, or alienates itself by creating the objective, 
physical world of nature. Schelling thus sees nature or “matter” as God’s dark ground 
manifesting itself: “this subordinate, dark, and unconscious dimension that God, as 
essence, continually seeks to expel and exclude from his proper self is matter.”301 Pace 
Augustine, extended nature is not so much the contingent Fall and subsequent 
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punishment for our morally evil act of renouncing God, as it is the necessary means by 
which God reveals his privative freedom.  
At the same time, Schelling emphasizes that, if being is nothing but self-negation, it 
will have to continue to fall from itself even after it has initially done so through the 
first negation of nature. After nature has negated pure non-being in order to affirm it, 
nature must in turn generate its own immanent contradiction, which reaffirms nature’s 
true ground of pure negativity. It is at this stage that Schelling develops his notorious 
Naturphilosophie to show how nature is not some consistent, monist whole as it is for 
Spinoza; rather, nature is always already generating its own immanent contradictions. 
The fact that Schelling’s model for the evil of privation is always the free human 
being’s particular acceptation of moral evil closest to us elucidates why he makes the 
point of nature’s heretical ground by stating that nature is always already spiritual: 
“nature is already, within and in itself, not a corporeal, but a spiritual-corporeal 
being.”302 Schelling thus describes nature as a “pure,” non-sapient subject that 
nonetheless performs the essential act of subjectivity by rendering its own being 
contingent in negating itself: “the subject which is at first a subject which is pure and 
not present to itself—in wishing to have itself, in becoming object to itself—is tainted 
with contingency.”303 Elsewhere, Schelling still regularly refers to spiritual nature as 
“demonic” insofar as spirit is one and the same with moral evil: “that essence which 
[…] is neither merely corporeal nor merely spiritual but the corporeal aspect of the 
spirit and the spiritual aspect of the body, we shall refer to as the demonic.”304 
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More concretely, Schelling appropriates the physics of his time to argue that the 
movement of inert extended bodies is guided by dual, conflicting forces of attractive 
and repulsive gravity, as well as electromagnetic and chemical reactions. It is dead 
matter’s gravitational, chemical and electromagnetic collisions and reconfigurations of 
itself which eventually negates itself as it gives rise to living organisms: “one and the 
same universal dualism diffuses itself from magnetic polarity on through the electrical 
phenomena, finally even into chemical heterogeneities, and ultimately crops up again 
in organic nature.”305 It is at this point that Schelling most clearly affirms nature’s 
privative potency by modelling seemingly invariant inorganic laws and processes on 
finite, organic life. The living organisms that Schelling depicts are radically finite in 
that they do not contain their existence in their essence. Rather, they feel hunger, thirst, 
cold and pain. They are thus forced to adapt by changing or “negating” themselves and 
their environment if they are to satisfy their needs in a hostile external world. As 
Schelling puts it, “life consists precisely in the freedom to negate its own being as 
immediate, posited independently of itself, and to be able to transform it into a being 
posited by itself.”306 Here, Schelling intends this definition of life to not only hold for 
sentient creatures, but also for inorganic objects and processes. As far as Schelling is 
concerned, there is little difference between organic life’s struggle for survival by 
negating and being negated by its environs, and gravitational, chemical and 
electromagnetic collisions and compositions of inorganic bodies. For instance, the 
collision of matter’s basic building blocks betrays a negation as they lose their old form 
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when combined with each other to assume new large-scale structure formations, such 
as planets and stars, as well as mountains, rivers and forests. So, it is not that inorganic 
processes generate a living organism that expresses being’s negative process only 
insofar as it can starve, age and ultimately die; rather, the inorganic processes that give 
rise to the living are always already negative in the sense in which they form a history 
of new and forever emerging corporeal bodies, forms, and interactions. Far from 
developing a mystical or religious conception of the natural world as is all too often 
alleged, Schelling’s Naturphilosophie simply states that nature is grounded upon the 
conflicting, antagonistic interaction of living things and their environmental milieus in 
a singular network of being’s privative becoming. In other words, Schelling’s is a view 
of nature close to what Augustine called natural evil, albeit with an added ontological 
weight. 
In the third age of the world, Schelling describes how organic nature’s constellations 
and re-constellations of sensible shapes, forms and forces of negation ultimately result 
in the emergence of the rational human being. We have no need to re-tread how humans 
mark an acceptation of negation, since it was precisely Schelling’s initial model for the 
being of privation that he sought to absolutize, such as it alienates or externalizes itself 
and nature in becoming an other or object of its own thought against which it can then 
freely choose to act.  
As with his initial model of the “voluntaristic” Christian God, Schelling’s talk of 
teleology here largely adheres to an Augustinian vocabulary which speaks of being as 
the free God’s self-revelation: “to look at the entire history of the world as a progressive 
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revelation of God is now a customary thought.”307 We can see, however, that he is 
really appropriating the same signifier as a Trojan horse to smuggle in a malefic non-
being, of which the ages of the natural and spiritual worlds are but so many self-
hereticizations—or is he? 
5.2. SCHELLING’S LATER PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT  
5.2.1. Schelling’s middle “Manichaeism” 
In the final analysis, Schelling’s seemingly only terminological likeness to Augustine 
ultimately betrays a far graver conceptual complicity. Schelling’s about-face first arises 
when he is confronted with the opposite problem to Augustine: whereas Augustine fails 
to account for the brute fact of evil, Schelling’s inverse hereticization of being must 
now illuminate the brute fact of the Good. Snow periodizes Schelling in terms of how 
to mitigate the threat which evil opposes to a systematic conception of all reality: “the 
acknowledgement of the reality of evil presents the most radical challenge conceivable 
to systematic philosophy. […] It is what forces him ultimately to produce a devastating 
critique of what he later calls negative philosophy.”308 After all, Schelling himself 
admits that nature does not only have a repulsive force of negative gravity, but also a 
unifying force of attractive gravity. Similarly, the evolutionary cycle of living 
organisms is not only propelled by the eventual demise of all things, but also their 
struggle to survive and conserve themselves. As Schelling’s own critique of the history 
of philosophy attests to, the hitherto last age of the world of human reason has also 
been predominantly marked by a desire for the Good, until the advent of Schelling’s 
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still only recent overcoming of Augustine. Even if the Good were a mere illusion or 
error of human thought without any objective reality, Schelling would still have to 
determine how a repulsive being of allegedly pure negativity can distort itself through 
the Augustinian thought of it as the privation of the “true” being of pure positivity.   
The following figure 2 formalizes what Schelling’s initial account of evil can and 
cannot explain. Given that Schelling’s basic gesture was to transvaluate Augustine’s 
concepts of good and evil, figure 2 is a direct inversion of my earlier formalization of 
Augustine’s hierarchy of being in figure 1. The large circle at the centre represents 
Schelling’s concept of being, which is akin to Augustine’s concept of the evil of 
privation. The smaller circles that partially overlap and partially fall outside the central 
circle represent the production of individuated things by virtue of their participation to 
varying degrees of intensity in the being of evil. Finally, the figure permits us to see 
that Schelling is unable to account for the beingness of that part of things that falls 
outside the circle of sinister being, and yet structures much of the history of the world. 
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Figure 2. Schelling’s inverted hierarchy of being  
 
 
 
Unable to properly conceive of the brute fact of the Good in a world of pure evil, 
Schelling initially resorts to re-introducing a second, unifying force of the Good, along 
with the dissipating force of a not-so-pure Impurity in what is often referred to as his 
“theory of potencies.” Already at the end of the Essay and increasingly throughout the 
Weltalter, Schelling ultimately acknowledges that it is only this ontology of the dual-
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being of good and evil that can account for both inert nature’s attractive and repulsive 
forces, life’s cycle of life and death, and human reason’s desire for redemption and 
capacity for moral evil: “both of the opposed potencies, the eternally negating potency 
and the eternally affirming potency, and the unity of both make up the one, inseparable, 
primordial being.”309 Although Schelling is never entirely satisfied with this theory of 
potencies or his earlier philosophy, his later works do tend to favour the former. Thus, 
Schelling now tells us, the transcendental condition for the possibility of human 
freedom is not only the moral evil that renounces the nature from whence we emerge, 
but also the unifying desire to attain beatitude with the Good. Struggling to elucidate 
how the Good could emerge out of a primal Schism, Schelling has no choice but to 
return half of being back to its rightful proprietor—Augustine’s benevolent divinity. In 
this way, Schelling retraces Augustine’s own transitional, Manichean philosophy 
between his youthful, sinful hedonism and his mature Christian rationalism. 
5.2.2. Schelling’s return to Augustine 
At first, Schelling thinks that the solution to elucidating both good and evil consists in 
rationing out a segment of being to each of them. It is not long, however, before 
Schelling realizes like the young Augustine that this Manichean solution only 
reproduces the problem of furnishing a system, which would be capable of seizing the 
essence of all things in a singular concept of being. That is to say, Schelling’s solution 
here is but the problem disguised as its opposite, insofar as the conferral of being to 
two incompossible principles cannot satisfy the ontological criterion of being as that 
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which totalizes all of reality in one concept. As he puts at in the Freiheitsschrift’s final 
pages, “there is either no common point of contact for both, in which case we must 
declare ourselves in favour of absolute dualism, or there is such a point; thus, both 
coincide once again in the final analysis.”310 Given that Schelling’s initial 
absolutization of humanity’s moral evil was motivated precisely by the attempt to unify 
the counterpoised human evil and divine benevolence in one system of immanent, 
monist being, Schelling cannot rest content with a dualist ontology to the extent that it 
tautologically comes full circle with the original problem.  
In chasing after the true system that still eludes him, Schelling ultimately makes an 
even more fatal about-face: he totally re-ontologizes the Good by asserting the 
existence of an even higher unity in a Neo-Platonic realm beyond the privative play of 
the forces of a partial good and a privative evil: “if evil exists in the discord of the two 
principles, then good can exist only in the complete accord of the two, and the bond 
that unifies both must be divine since they are one, not in a conditional, but in a 
complete and unconditional manner.”311 In place of evil, or even of two dualist forces 
of good and evil, Schelling now affirms that there is an even higher, purely self-
identical being, which rests completely “indifferent” to the dualist forces: “if Nature is 
to be thought as absolute totality, then nothing can be opposed to it, for everything falls 
within its sphere and nothing outside of it. […] Antithesis must be assumed to have 
sprung from a universal identity.”312 Here, Schelling essentially reintroduces the 
Augustinian idea of a completely unified being that dwarfs all dualisms, so as to 
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maintain the system when confronted with the temporal world’s irreconcilably 
antagonistic forces.  
Although Schelling holds that this resolves the problem of systematicity, he now 
encounters another problem: he himself admits that there is no evidence of a 
transcendent realm of pure becoming in the temporal, privative world in which we 
reside. Nor does the human subject provide such evidence insofar as Schelling himself 
has demonstrated that spirit’s essence is its free, morally evil negation of any such final 
unity. Without either the empirical Naturphilosophie or rational thought to back up his 
re-ontologization of the Good, Schelling makes one final resort of appealing to pure 
mystical faith alone. Here, it is crucial to see why Schelling calls his epistemic method 
a “metaphysical empiricism,” in order to avoid confusion on whether Schelling is using 
an empirical rather than a mystical approach. In his Berlin lecture series, Schelling 
distinguishes between three empiricisms. “Base empiricism” only affirms that we can 
know pure sensations without any knowledge of the suprasensible. The second 
empiricism affirms that we only know things through sense data, and yet we do have 
knowledge of the suprasensible by having faith in the divine revelation. Schelling’s 
own third way states that we can “empirically” know the suprasensible through our 
own inner sentiment, which is directed towards a Good beyond all empirical goods in 
the here and now. In his own words, “a higher level of philosophical empiricism, 
however, is one that […] goes beyond all external facts but nevertheless relies on the 
inner fact of an irresistible feeling to convince us of the existence of God.”313  
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Although Schelling terms his approach an empiricism, it is actually more akin to the 
negative theologians’ mystical approach.314 This elucidates why Schelling now 
opposes the truth of his mystical epistemology’s “divine magic” to his own previously 
twofold methods of empirical Naturphilosophie and dialectical rationalism: 
Through false imagining and cognition that orients itself according to what does not 
have Being, the human spirit opens itself to the spirit of lies and falsehood. […] By 
contrast, the true good could be effectuated only through a divine magic, namely 
through the immediate presence of what has Being in consciousness and cognition.315 
For the late Schelling, only “mystical empiricism” can guarantee the uniformity of his 
system through the assertion of a transcendent realm of pure Positivity or “potency” 
beyond the sensible and rational “actuality” of all things in the this-life. Tillich 
describes Schelling’s mystical subsuming of all things under God’s becoming self-
identical as aimed at repressing sin, or what Tillich calls “guilt-consciousness”: “the 
eternal meaning of the world process is that indifference becomes love. But love is the 
bond of the principles, that is, it is identity. Identity is the absolute divine goal. Thus, 
in eternity, mysticism triumphs over guilt.”316 By appealing to the mystical approach 
of feeling our way to a higher Good than all external goods, Schelling backtracks from 
his earlier, heretical philosophy to Augustine’s ontology of the Good as the sole source 
of all things.  
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It is Schelling’s re-ontologization of the Good here by mere assertion alone for the sake 
of the system, which has given the grounds for the critique of his thought first initiated 
by Hegel’s disciples. According to them, Hegel rightly develops the properly rationalist 
concept of being’s pure dialectical negativity that we actually encounter. Conversely, 
Schelling retreats in the face of the terrifying, yet all too real negativity behind a 
“philosophy of faith” in a possible final day of judgment, where we will once more be 
united with the plenitude of God. As a young Friedrich Engels puts it, “Hegel maintains 
that anything which is reasonable is also real; Schelling says, however, that what is 
reasonable is possible, and thus safeguards himself, for in view of the known extensive 
range of possibility, this proposition is irrefutable.”317 Or, as Frederick Beiser more 
recently observes of the late Schelling’s undemonstrated reconversion to the idea of an 
absolute, self-identical spirit at the hidden ground of the world, despite all the empirico-
rational evidence before him in the world itself: “he stresses that we cannot prove the 
existence of the absolute, since all demonstration is valid only in the sphere of the 
conditioned.”318 By identifying a higher being of pure Indifference beyond the dualist 
shadow play during the ages of the world, Schelling thinks that he finally furnishes the 
true metaphysical system which seizes the beingness of everything in what turns out to 
be nothing other than Augustine’s own ontology of the Good.  
Here, it must be objected that, if Schelling’s solution to guaranteeing the systematicity 
of the concept is none other than Augustine’s absolutely self-sufficient and indifferent 
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Good without any absence or deficiency, does he not then run up against Augustine’s 
same problem of explaining the brute fact of evil, which motivated his own critique of 
the Augustinian theodicy in the first place? It would seem, however, that Schelling is 
perfectly aware his system risks regurgitating the very philosophy of the Good that he 
earlier critiqued. Consequently, Schelling qualifies that there is a minimal, yet crucial 
difference between his own ontologization of the Good and that of Augustine: whereas 
Augustine dogmatically repudiates tout court the existence of evil, Schelling opts to 
account for evil as the necessary means of the Good’s becoming. At this point, 
Schelling once more returns to modelling the benevolent Supreme Being on the human 
spirit, albeit now not so much on our moral freedom as on our self-consciousness. That 
is to say, for self-consciousness to be as the thinking of oneself, it has need of 
externalizing or alienating itself as an other or object of its own thought through which 
consciousness then returns to itself: “the self cannot intuit the real activity as identical 
with itself, without at once finding the negative element therein, which makes it 
nonideal, as something alien to itself”; and: “it is with it in order to have an Other 
through which it would be able to contemplate itself, present itself, and be intelligible 
to itself.”319 The paradox of self-consciousness is that it has to negate itself by 
becoming an other of itself to paradoxically affirm itself as the thinking of itself.  
Therein lies the key to accounting for the brute fact of evil given that being is an 
absolutely benevolent God, or what Schelling terms “absolute spirit”: he is not so much 
a benevolent state as he is a benevolent process, which unifies all things around himself 
as their purposive totality. God is not so much a noun as he is a verb, not a fixed state 
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or stasis, but a doing or activity. The insight that God’s unifying process must be like 
our own self-consciousness’ return to itself enables Schelling to argue that God can 
only think or “love” himself as the highest Good by externalizing or alienating his 
absolute benevolence through his act of creating inferior, privative beings, which 
harbour the desire to be reunified with him: “the beginning of consciousness in Him 
involves his separating Himself from Himself, His opposing Himself to Himself.”320 
Termed differently, evil is the becoming of the Good’s self-revelation by alienating 
itself from itself, to paradoxically express itself through those alienated creatures’ 
constant aspirations and strivings to re-actualize the Good in its all-encompassing 
wholeness. While Schelling had earlier argued that the act of creating privative beings 
capable of moral evil was the direct expression of being qua evil, he now transvaluates 
that creation as the synthetic movement of being in all its unifying benevolence.  
In this way, Schelling retroactively re-evaluates his earlier philosophy’s ontologization 
of evil as the preliminary stage on the way to his late philosophy, which restores the 
Good as the former’s reconciliatory quilting point all along.321 By acknowledging the 
ontological reality of the temporal world that Augustine simply denies—while still 
subordinating it as the privative, albeit necessary unificatory becoming of the Good, a 
Good which is nothing other than this unificatory process as such—Schelling 
concludes that he has at last uncovered the system of being.  
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5.2.3. Schelling’s Augustinian circle 
In the wake of this final defence or theodicy, Schelling claims that he is able to explain 
evil as the acceptation of the Good’s unificatory process, rather than just a pure 
privation: “the positive is always the whole or unity; that which opposes unity is 
severing of the whole, disharmony, ataxia of forces. The same elements are in the 
severed whole that were in the cohesive whole.”322 It is therefore unsurprising that 
more theologically orthodox thinkers, like Adam Karl August von Eschenmayer and 
Martin Deutinger, received Schelling’s later philosophy with open arms, even if they 
were still dissatisfied about him granting the negative a role as the necessary process 
of the positive’s development. As Thomas O’Meara summarizes their views in 
Schelling and the Theologians, “Schelling had improved upon his earlier metaphysics 
and had laboured over a positive, Christian philosophy, but […] the consciousness of 
time is at fault; the tension in the relationship of God to the world is imperfectly 
resolved.”323 No wonder Schelling himself claims that his later philosophy is the 
rational crystallization of its historical expression throughout the ages in the guise of 
Christianity, if not Augustine’s Christianity specifically: “he must grasp Christianity 
as that which is truly universal, that which, therefore, even serves as the very 
foundation of the world.”324  
It is nonetheless difficult to see how this is in line with Schelling’s earlier view that a 
self-identical being would be unable to account for the multiplicity of particular, 
                                                     
322 Schelling, Freedom, 38. 
323 Thomas Franklin O’Meara, Romantic Idealism and Romantic Catholicism: Schelling and the Theologians 
(London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 168. 
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individuated things in nature such as we ourselves embody: “I hate nothing more than 
the mindless striving to eliminate the multiplicity of natural causes through fictitious 
identities. I observe that nature is satisfied only by the greatest dominion of forms, and 
that it delights in arbitrariness in the deathly management of decomposition.”325 
Despite Schelling’s insistence that his concept of being captures both the Good and 
evil as the former’s necessary becoming, I want to insist that Schelling’s late 
philosophy still remains subject to my (and his) critique of the Augustinian lineage. To 
claim that evil is the becoming of the Good’s unificatory process does not explain the 
beingness of the precise point in time, however brief, when evil first negates the Good 
to only thereafter enable the Good to attract the privative beings back towards it. 
Further, how does evil’s transvaluation as the Good’s method of self-revelation explain 
the fact that many things in nature, and especially we humans, can go against any desire 
others and ourselves might have to re-join the Good? Indeed, does not Schelling’s own 
initial negative philosophy exhibit precisely this (anti-)ethic of attempting to affirm the 
Good’s negation? Even if this were his theoretical error or illusion, rather than the true 
nature of sensible reality, any concept of being would still have to account for why the 
privation, which is supposed to create the conditions for the Good’s self-revelation, 
more often than not seems to inhibit it.  
In the final analysis, Schelling’s failure to capture the evil of privation qua privation, 
rather than reducing it to the preliminary stage in the Good’s self-revelation, remains 
caught in the horizon of my (and indeed his own) critique of Augustinianism. It is little 
                                                     
325 F.W.J. Schelling, “On the World Soul,” in Collapse VI, ed. Robin Mackay, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant (Falmouth: 
Urbanomic, 2012), 68. 
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wonder that Schelling’s final take on evil is an almost word-for-word reformulation of 
Augustine’s doctrine of the privatio boni, which he earlier audaciously chastised for its 
failure to adequately grapple with the brute reality of evil: “evil is, however, not a 
being, but rather a non-being that has reality only in opposition and not in itself. 
Precisely for that reason absolute identity is prior to evil as well, because the latter can 
appear only in opposition to it.”326 Whether Schelling postulates a co-eternal, unifying 
force alongside the equally ontological force of evil, or simply sublates both by an even 
higher Idea of pure indifference to all dualisms, he cannot escape the charge that he 
never really thinks evil qua privation, negation and repulsion, but instead as the merely 
secondary becoming of plenitude, affirmation and synthesis.  
5.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter started out by showing how Schelling seeks to account for Fichte’s idealist 
notion of our free, moral evil by situating it at the tell-tale heart of nature an sich. That 
is to say, Schelling accounts for the brute fact of evil that Spinoza and Augustine 
disavow by conceiving of the being that human sin is supposed to negate as always 
already evil. As heretical as all this may sound, we ultimately saw how Schelling’s 
turning of Spinoza and Augustine on its head confronted him with the inverse problem 
to that of Augustine of being unable to account for the beingness of the Good, except 
by conferring half of being back to the Good in what amounts to a rather heterogeneous 
philosophy of two incompossible potencies. As discussed, however, Schelling’s initial 
driving motive was to furnish a system capable of explaining moral evil in a single 
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concept of nature. Consequently, Schelling was ultimately led to reinstate, by mystical 
faith alone, an even higher being akin to Augustine’s Good without lack, in a kind of 
transcendent Neo-Platonic realm of pure ideality beyond the interplay of light and 
shadow, which constitutes our own world.  
Although Schelling was among the first to try to break from the Augustinians’ grip, his 
solution ultimately proved unsuccessful. Whether other philosophers in his wake could 
better heed his call for a concept of being, which can account for both good and evil 
through a single principle, is another story for another dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
I began by examining Augustine’s attempt to rationally demonstrate that reality is 
absolutely Good, such that evil is only a privation resulting from the misuse of our will. 
What my exegesis showed, however, was that Augustine’s doctrine of predestination 
ultimately contradicted his conflation of being and the Good by holding that God 
condemns some to eternal damnation no matter what good use of their will they make, 
in what amounts to a coming into being of an eternal realm of pure privation alongside 
that of the Good.  
The third chapter then considered how, like Augustine, Descartes’ goal was to make us 
certain of God’s absolute goodness in a world in which an evil demon could be 
deceiving us as to the truth of our own existence. Like Augustine, Descartes 
demonstrated that we, thinking substances, judge ourselves according to an Idea of 
perfection, which cannot come from ourselves or anything other than the divine, perfect 
being itself. Like Augustine, Descartes’ ontological argument enabled him to conclude 
that evil is but the error of mistaking a part of reality for its totality when we freely 
choose to think beyond the limits of our finite understanding. The trouble for Descartes, 
however, was that he followed Augustine’s predestinarian doctrine in the guise of his 
late occasionalism (according to which God is the cause of all our actions, including 
even the misuse of our “free” will) in a way that re-ontologized evil.  
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In the fourth chapter, we saw how Kant repudiated dogmatic metaphysics on the 
grounds that its concept of being was a transcendental illusion generated by pure 
reason. At the same time, Kant proceeded to substitute our pure reason for practical 
reason, so as to once more demonstrate that dogmatic philosophers and theologians’ 
concept of the benevolent God is the condition for the possibility of our moral 
practice’s validity. Having practically restored the benevolent God, Kant then 
denigrated evil as a mere privation of the being of the Good derived from our free will’s 
denial of his perfection. Despite Kant’s novel defence of the essentially Augustinian 
theodicy, Kant not only conferred a certain beingness to our choices of the Good but 
also to radical evil when he ultimately ontologized human freedom.  
In the fifth chapter, I examined how Schelling forced philosophy to come to terms with 
how the human being capable of evil can emerge out of a ground, which it can negate. 
To this end, Schelling inferred that the ground must always already be capable of such 
evil. Here, Schelling’s model was Augustine’s own God insofar as he is absolutely free, 
and hence capable of negating even himself. For Schelling, then, it was the supremely 
privative Being that creates morally evil human beings, not so as to negate its essence, 
but to affirm it paradoxically by negating it. At this juncture, however, Schelling shied 
away from his own heretical insight when he ran into the inverse problem of Augustine: 
how are we to account for the brute fact of certain unifying forces if the ground of being 
is absolutely evil? Ultimately, Schelling backtracked by dogmatically affirming that 
being is absolutely good, such that the evil of privation is but the secondary, albeit 
necessary, becoming of the Good to be itself by communing with itself as an object of 
its own divine thought. 
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6.1. TOWARDS A HERETICAL HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY  
This analysis of Augustine’s influence, be it direct or formal, on Descartes, Kant and 
Schelling has afforded us sufficient evidence to establish the hypothesis that 
Augustine’s influence on a certain thread of modern and post-Kantian philosophy may 
be deeply underestimated. The goal for future research is thus to see to what extent 
other philosophers recapitulate Augustine’s template for philosophy, be it explicitly or 
inadvertently. As with Descartes, Kant and a certain Schelling, my suspicion is that 
even some of the most ostensibly secular or heretical philosophers might turn out to be 
the most paradoxically faithful. 
Of course, this is not the time or place to go into details. I can only offer several possible 
lines of interrogation. It could be argued, for instance, that Leibniz appropriates 
Augustine’s own rationalist method to demonstrate that the physical evil of extended 
bodies ultimately finds their entelechy or sufficient reason in spiritual, indivisible 
monads, which are in turn grounded in God’s pre-established harmony of all things 
around the choice of the best.327 As per Augustine, Leibniz’s doctrine of pre-
established harmony ultimately permits him to furnish a theodicy which accounts for 
evil as so many physical and moral falls from God’s grace.328  
Similarly, although Rousseau chastises blind obedience to Church dogma, he also 
follows Augustine by rationally deducing the highest ideal of a secular Good in the 
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guise of the State of Nature.329 He then develops a “social constructivist” theodicy, 
whereby humankind’s fall from Nature stems from our “perfectibility” or free will to 
come together in societies and develop new kinds of alienating desires, which are 
dependent upon others outside our own immediate and self-identical being. Despite the 
naturalistic tone, then, Rousseau maintains that evil is nothing other than a construction 
without any reality of its own apart from the State of Nature that it corrupts.330  
We can also find certain Augustinian residuals when Berkeley appropriates Locke’s 
empirical method to argue that all our sensations are ideas, before arguing further that 
our passive ideas organized around the law of pleasure can only be occasioned by the 
benevolent, Christian divinity.331 Whether inadvertently or intentionally, Berkeley 
would thus be a “crypto-Thomist” who appropriates the modern age’s empirico-
scientific method as a Trojan horse, so as to smuggle back in the medieval theology of 
the omnibenevolent God. From this of course all-too-brief survey, we can nonetheless 
glimpse that there is much fruit to bear from putting Augustine in dialogue with other 
modern thinkers beyond this thesis’ scope.  
As my reading of another, anti-Augustinian Schelling has already suggested, it would 
also be worthwhile to see to what extent still other philosophers submit Augustine to a 
negative reassessment by ontologizing the evils of privation, matter and human 
freedom. Like this other Schelling, Hegel also seeks to tarry with the negative by 
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thinking the morally evil, free subject not only as a privation but also as the ontological 
substance par excellence.332 Even more explicitly still, Nietzsche attempts nothing less 
than the transvaluation of the Christian categories of physical and moral evils as the 
true, sensible being, which the fairy-tale of a benevolent God only distorts.333 In a 
similar vein, Heidegger also contends that being is nothing but its own withdrawal, 
refusal or “privation” from its presence-at-hand for us. It is not mere chance that 
Heidegger develops such ideas in his early 1920-1921 lecture series on Augustine, 
Neo-Platonism and Saint Paul.334  
To recapitulate these omens: a future research project arising out of this study would 
be twofold. In a first movement, it would continue to examine to what extent modern 
philosophers like Leibniz, Rousseau and Berkeley follow Descartes and Kant by 
adhering to Augustine’s metaphysics of the Good and the privatio boni. In a second 
movement, it would then see to what extent post-Kantian philosophers like Hegel, 
Nietzsche and Heidegger take up Schelling’s attempt to submit Augustine to a negative 
reassessment, even if many of them may, like Schelling, wind up buckling under the 
weight of the Church father’s tradition. By expanding the inquiry into the legacy of the 
thought-structure that Augustine inaugurated in this way, we could further see how it 
is fruitful to put him in dialogue with other philosophers, as this thesis has already gone 
some way towards doing through the examples of Descartes, Kant and Schelling. 
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